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Due to certain fundamental flaws, orthodox linguistics has not succeeded in producing a 
coherent account of 'schizophrenic language' - the host of symptoms that are alternatively 
characterised as evidence of formal thought disorder or labelled as disorganised speech, a 
disorder in itself. The most important of these flaws are its treatment of languages as fixed 
codes, which doubles as an explanation of how linguistic communication works, and its 
postulation of the mental structures that would be necessary if languages were indeed fixed 
codes, and communication a matter of encoding and decoding messages. In particular, 
orthodox linguistics has bolstered the now-dominant neo-Kraepelinian, biomedical account 
of schizophrenia, which treats utterances as symptoms that give clues to brain 
(dis)organisation and (dys) function. Integrational linguistics, which criticises the culturally 
based assumptions - collectively referred to as 'the language myth' - that are at the heart of 
the orthodox account of languages and language, provides an alternative. It sympathises with 
the growing trend in cognitive science and philosophy towards 'embodiment' and 
'distributed cognition', which recognises that encultured entities like languages, minds, brains, 
bodies, and world are intrinsically defined by their co-evolution in the species, and co-
emergence during an individual's development. Integrationists argue that by focusing in the 
first instance on second-order cultural constructs called 'languages', orthodox linguistics fails 
to give an account of the first-order experience of language users. 
This thesis approaches the topic of 'schizophrenic language' from a broadly integrationist 
perspective in order to demonstrate that because orthodox linguistics is so widely taken for 
granted in psychiatry, its biases inform current mainstream accounts of schizophrenic 
language, motivate the outright dismissal of interpersonal accounts, past and present, and 
provide a skewed picture of the phenomenon it purports to be describing, by ultimately 
constructing an individual-focused, deficit-based account of what is not, as opposed to what 
is. That is, by holding up orthodox linguistics' idealised version of communication and 
speakers (which has little applicability even to 'normal' language users), it uses deviation 
from the ideal as description and explanation, rather than recognising the strategies actually' 











The alternative argued for here is to apply the tenets of integrationist linguistics to 
schizophrenic language behaviour, to give a fuller account of communication situations 
involving schizophrenics and normal interlocutors. As a result, this thesis calls for a 
reformulation of the idea that incomprehensibility stems from deviant speech, itself the 
product of an irrational brain. 'Sense', 'deviance' and 'irrationality' are a moment-to-moment 
metalinguistic appraisals made by language users, second-order cultural constructions that 
shape the speech community's response to certain individuals. Describing the speech of 
schizophrenics as 'deviant', 'irrational', or 'nonsensical' constrains their joindy-constructed 
capability of making sense using the resources (which may include other individual's minds) 
at their disposal. Integratio~ linguistics thus brings into focus a moral and political 
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''I'm not trying to make noise. I'm trying to make sense. If you can make sense out of nonsense, wen. 
have fun. I'm trying to make sense out of sense. I'm not making sense (cents) anymore. I have to 
make dollars." (Schizophrenic patient in Andreason, 1979:1320) 
i. Making sense of 'nonsense' 
Linguistics, usually glossed as the 'science of language' (pateman, 1987:1), aims to make 
sense of how we make sense of, and with, language, by accurately describing the nature and 
characteristics of language. In particular, it has concerned itself with the structure of 
languages (and by extension, language) and the rules that appear to govern its use. By and 
large, languages are regarded as a type of code through which humans convey meaning, in a 
process called communication. By virtue of this shared standardised code, humans speaking 
the same language understand each other's encoded meanings. 
Misunderstandings do occur; from time to time there appears to be a code failure. Of course, 
a code cannot really fail - people can only fail in their knowledge or appropriate use of 
thereof. Slips of the tongue, mishearing, sec nd-language speakers, children learning their 
first language, jargon, ambiguity all represent everyday opportunities for miscommunication. 
In recent decades, linguistics has extended its focus to cases of a sustained and pathological 
breakdown in communication; for certain individuals, the effordess conveyance of meaning 
we have come to expect from language ,no longer occurs. In some, the broader cause is fairly 
obvious; lesions caused by trauma or disease mean the destruction of brain tissue formerly 
dedicated in some way to language. For others, the disturbance seems to be linked to the 
mental illness it accompanies, the cause for both as yet unknown~ but widely regarded as 
having their mutual origins in abnormal brain structure or function. It is this latter group 
with which this thesis is concerned; and those diagnosed with schizophrenia in particular. 
Schizophrenia, as a mental illness, is located' finnly in the proVlOce of psychiatry, the 
'medicine of the mind'. The approach towards linguistic behaviour adopted in medical 
models of schizophrenia is fairly consistent: language is an autonomous faculty/ability, 












faulty brain, although unlike in aphasia, there is no obvious brain trauma.1 The psychological 
bent of the discipline points to the likelihood that schizophrenic language impainnent is 
indicative of faulty thinking. All behaviour can thus be taken as direcdy symptomatic of this 
broken mind/brain. Dissent (generally) comes from outside the medical realm. Both 
psychiatry and psychology seem, either implicidy or explicidy, to employ an understanding of 
language that is closely aligned with mainstream, traditional linguistics. 
Etiology is however of lillie concern to linguists, and for the most part left to psychiatrists 
and neurologists. In an attempt to make sense of the nature of this sudden failure or absence 
of meaning, this 'non-sense', linguistics attempts to look for systematic deviations from the 
standard code and rules used by normals. The implication then is that these deviations are 
responsible for the misunderstanding, either perceived, on the part of the patient, or received, 
on the part of their healthy interlocutor, and even could potentially help refine descriptions 
of the essential nature of the linguistic code and its rules. 
Linguistics as a discipline has undergone a series of internal revolutions within a relatively 
short space of time,2 each of them centring around just what exacdy it is the business of 
linguists to be studying, or put differendy, defining language. Despite its many revisions, it is 
sti.11 subject to criticism, and it is one recent line of attack, from within, that will be applied to 
linguistics' involvement with pathological language. Integrational linguistics poses a radical 
challenge to orthodox linguistics, by calling into question the very foundations on which the 
discipline is based. By implication, therefore, it also stands opposed to orthodox linguistic 
explanations of linguistic behaviour in those labeled 'schizophrenic'. However, a 
comprehensive integrationallinguistic account of psychotic language behaviour has yet to be 
published. 
t There is a long tradition of comparing schizophrenic speech with that of aphasics, perhaps because it is the 
only disorder that bears any resemblance to the breakdown u;. communication experienced by those in 
conversation with schizophrenics. It has become apparent that there are definite distinctions between the 
disorders, as shall be discussed in Chapter 4. 













My argument is threefold: firsdy, certain assumptions about language, collectively referred to 
as 'the language myth' by integrational linguists, have significandy shaped the course of 
research into schizophrenic language, and even, to a degree, of schizophrenia in generaV 
particularly due to the centrality 'language' has been afforded in recent conceptions of the 
disease. The 'languages as codes' idea, and that this provides the explanation for how 
communication takes place, referred to above, form the two central fallacies that make up 
the language myth. This reification of languages as fixed and bounded entities, which 
individuals somehow house in their brain, has resulted in all manner of flawed accounts of 
what a breakdown in communication entails, based on an assumption of how successful 
communication takes place. While evidence of the language myth can be found even in the 
very earliest works on schizophrenia (written a litde over a century ago), the direct 
involvement of linguists has deepened its influence in shaping research questions about 
schizophrenic language behaviour. The fact that there is even a sub field of research into 
psychotic language could be interpreted as a product of the language myth. 
Secondly, the language myth has enabled the cementing of, and continues to reinforce, the 
stark dichotomy between 'normals' and those with 'deficits': The concept of positive and 
negative symptoms aside, the linguistic behaviour of schizophrenics is largely described in 
terms of deficit. Negative symptoms are clearly the absence of normal behaviour, positive 
symptoms are the result of a lack of the' control that ensures only normal behaviour 'gets out'. 
Schizophrenics' minds, or their language (depending on the theory), are defined by the 
abnormality of their various attributes or characteristics.4 The discourse of traditional or 
orthodox language theory does not allow for actual descriptions of what is there, only what is 
not. 
Thirdly, both schizophrenia studies and integrational linguistics stand to benefit from an 
integrational account of schizophrenic language behaviour. It offers a more nuanced 
understanding of observed/recorded behaviour than the usual 'deviant output from a 
3 That this is the case is hardly surprising: it has already been demonstrated that "the language myth plays a 
considerable role in [other] contemporary social institutions" (Harris,2006:716). 













broken brain' scenario, and may provide a way out of the stalemate that some debates on 
how best to characterise the phenomenon (of schizophrenic language) have reached It 
challenges integrationallinguistics to broaden its scope, and to question the normal/deviant 
dichotomy that has dominated traditional orthodox linguistics. If it is to re1nain true to its 
founding principles, integrationallinguistics has to be able to give an account of all language 
behaviour, not merely that which is considered 'normal'. If it does not, it runs the risk of 
merely replacing the much reviled 'ideal-speaker-hearer' with another idealised account of 
language behaviour that is as unrealistic; shifting but not eradicating the boundaries of what 
counts as relevant, and who counts as a member of the speech community. 
iii. Structure 
Despite its lifetime prevalence rate of 1 in every 100 people (Frith & Johnstone, 2003), 
schizophrenia is a disease that remains hidden from the public eye, and is largely 
misunderstood by the general population. Chapter 1 provides a brief overview of its history, 
symptoms, diagnosis, possible causes, and treatment, as background 
As Chapter 2's title indicates, integrationallinguistics takes a critical stance against traditional 
('segregationist') studies of language, founded upon what they regard as an unquestioned 
'myth' about the nature of language itself. The chapter provides an overview ofintegrational 
linguistics, by focusing on the work of three theorists in the field, Roy Harris, Michael 
Toolan, and Talbot Taylor. It also introduces Per Linell's notion of 'dialogism', which, like 
integrationism, mounts a critique against the founding assumptions of orthodox linguistics. 
In Chapter 3, I attempt to provide a clearer picture of the 'official' or dominant position on 
schizophrenic language behaviour and, armed with a newfound ability to recognise the 
hallmarks of traditional 'segregationist' linguistics (gleaned from Chapter 1), I assess this 
position for evidence of the influence of the 'language myth'. Chapter 4 takes a more 
historical perspective, tracing the changing concept of 'language' within the first century of 
research on schizophrenia, highlighting the distinct shift that occurred with the overt 












And finally, although the main aim of this thesis is to argue that a critical, integrational 
linguistic accoWlt of schizophrenic language behaviour is necessary, it does take a few 
tentative steps towards outlining what such an accoWlt might look like: by demonstrating the 
flaws in the dominant approach, and enlisting the help of work that has largely been 
overlooked by the orthodox position on schizophrenic language behaviour, Chapter 5 
sketches the integrational response. 
iv. A note on terms 
As shall be discussed in the first chapter, 'schizophrenia' is by no means an Wlcontested term. 
While the official psychiatric diagnostic materials acknowledge a single disease with subtypes, 
it has long been argued that perhaps what has been lumped together Wlder one name is 
really a family of diseases with distinct etiology. Still others have argued for the term to be 
discarded altogether, seeing it as an imprecise diagnosis, a misleading label, and some even 
claiming that as a disease, schizophrenia does not exist. 
I do not wish my use of the term 'schizophrenia' to be regarded as dismissive of these 
debates; on the contrary, that they exist is testament to some of the concerns that drive this 
thesis. However, despite its unresolved ontological status, 'schizophrenia' is a label for a 
concept (albeit fuzzy) that has a very real significance for the lives of people to whom it is 
applied. My concern is with the Wlderlying beliefs of those who wield the construct, in 
theory and in practice, based on their assumption that it holds some degree of validity. 
The specific 'symptom' on which this thesis focuses is also problematic to name. I have 
settled on the somewhat awkward 'schizophrenic language behaviour'S (to be abbreviated 
henceforth as SLB) with a view to allowing for distinctions between speech and writing, and 
to incorporate phenomena which are often excluded from stricdy orthodox linguistic 
accoWlts. The word 'behaviour' attempts to draw attention to the fact that much of what has 
been included in descriptions of the phenomenon are really inferences based on observation 
(and this 'observation' may include self-report). While I do not deny that there is 
thinking/ cognition going on, we do not have direct access to this activity/these thoughts, 
and a clearer distinction should be made between the oft-conflated observed/experienced 












and the inferred. That said, there is a sense in which there is no way of neutrally describing 
'observable behaviour'; it is always already infused with interpretation. 
v. In closing 
I do not pretend to offer a new theory of schizophrenia or SLB. Such an endeavour is well 
beyond the scope of the thesis, and the knowledge and abilities of its writer. Furthermore, by 
focusing on the social/interactional realm of SLB, I do not mean to imply that there is no 
biological basis to the phenomenon. However, neurolinguistic accounts will fail to give a full 
account if they ignore the context of language (body and world) and the use to which it is 
put, and rely on the orthodox linguistic tendency to treat it as an independent/autonomous 
system. Integrational linguistics may help to account for some of the discrepancies and 
contradictions with which current research continues to grapple. 
A theory of abnormal or deviant language is also simultaneously and implicidy a theory of 
'normal' response to this language. Most accounts of SLB based on an orthodox linguistics 
succeed in erasing, obscuring or downplaying the metalinguistic activity of both the 
hearer/receiver/assessor/theorist of schizophrenic utterances, and that of the schizophrenic 
producer. We are presented only with 'product', apparendy free of the traces of the work of 
production (or rather, the only 'work' that is acknowledged is the deficient mental activity 
located in the brain of the schizophrenic). A fuller picture is required. To be sure, no 
account or theory can hope to include everything in its explanation; to identify patterns and 
similarities across different contexts, by definition requires that certain aspects of individual 
events be disregarded as irrelevant (or less relevant) variables. Integrationallinguistics calls 
for a greater awareness of the metalinguistic work (particularly that engaged in by theorists 
and clinicians) that is involved in separating out the constants from the variables, and a 
recognition that these are a product of our (Inclusive of all who use language) activity, not 












1. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF SCHIZOPHRENIA 
1.1 Introduction 
Roughly one per cent of the population will be affected by the disease during their lifetime, 
with the onset for most occurring in early adulthood. It appears in all cultures, all countries 
at a relatively similar incidence rate. It places a heavy burden on governments economically, 
and on friends and family members of the patient both economically and emotionally. 
Despite its relatively common occurrence, schizophrenia is a disease about which the general 
public are largely uneducated and, as has been observed countless times, ignorance breeds 
fear (Frith & Johnstone, 2003). 
Even though in recent years films such as A Beautiful Mind (2001) have perhaps helped to 
dispel the myth that schizophrenia is synonymous with multiple personality disorder, 
common associations with the term, such as 'hearing voices', only scratch the surface of 
what the disease is about. Another misconception in the mind of the public arises from the 
confucion of 'psychotic' with 'psychopathic' - indeed the word 'psycho' has entered 
common use to indicate a violent, crazed individual. The picture that emerges after a bit of 
reading on the subject is very different from the one portrayed by popular media. 
1.2 History 
Reports of madness date back to the beginnings of recorded history. That said, the concept 
of madness has altered over time. While some scholars claim they can pinpoint examples of 
modem mental illness in ancient texts, this retrospective diagnosis is frowned upon by most 
(Frith & Johnstone, 2003; Neale & Oltmanns, 1980). One can say with some confidence that, 
although there is evidence that people even in ancient times displayed some of the 
symptoms that those diagnosed as schizophrenic do, this is not sufficient to declare that 
schizophrenia - the disease we know today - has always been around (Frith & Johnstone, 
2003). Based on the accumulated evidence, Shorter (1997) considers it most plausible that it 
is a modem condition (the recency hypothesis), as opposed to a disease that went 












and the hannful effects oflong-tenn institutionalisation.6 Some even go so far as to label it a 
condition of modernity (Sass, 1992). 
Where, then, does one begin? The word 'schizophrenia' has barely enjoyed its centenary. But 
as common sense dictates, one does not coin a tenn and then look around for a meaning - a 
new concept usually precedes a new word, generated out of necessity. Neale & Oltmanns 
(1980) locate the origins of the idea in the early 1800s. "At that time, spurred by advances in 
medicine that had resulted from a more accurate classification of diseases, the foundation for 
modern conceptions of schizophrenia was laid" (p.2). This was the era when psychiatry came 
into its own as a reputable discipline - and it was in Germany that it was first introduced as a 
subject at universities (Frith & Johnstone, 2003). 
Throughout the 1800s, vanous physicians described and classified groups of patients 
according to similar emotional and mental symptoms and outcomes. But it was the 
organisation imposed by Emil Kraepelin upon these discrete notions that brought about the 
concept that broadly matches the modern definition of schizophrenia. His systematic 
classification of psychiatric disorders, published in a textbook that was revised many times 
during his lifetime, is the reason he has come to be regarded by most as the "father of 
modern psychiatry" (Neale & Oltmanns, 1980:2). 
1.2.1 Kraepelin 
Kraepelin grouped conditions that had been described in the 19th century, such as dementia 
paranoides, catatonia and hebephrenia, under the existing tenn 'dementia praecox'. Although 
he was never completely satisfied with the name,' it captured the "progressive intellectual 
deterioration" (dementia) and the "early onset" (praecox) of the disorder (ibid., p.3). He also 
recognised that although there were enough similarities to group these patients under one 
6 This debate is by no means insignificant. As Shorter (1997:63) notes: '''!be stakes are high because the debate 
is really asking, do the origins of psychiatry lie in the manufacture of illness for reasons of professional gain, or 
do they lie in caring for a flood of patients afflicted with historically new diseases?" 
7 This is apparent in the very first chapter of D,,,,,,,1ia PrrJlCOX (1919), the English translation of the section on 
Dementia Praecox in Kraepelin's PJ,Ychiatry, where he muses ''If therefore the name which is in dispute, even 
though it has been already fairly generally adopted, is to be replaced by another, it is to be hoped that it will not 
too soon share the fate of so many names of the kind, and of dementia praecox itself in giving a view of the 
nature of the disease which will tum out to be doubtful or wrong" (p.4). He goes on to list all the names 
proposed at the time - curiously Bleuler's 'schizophrenia' is last - followed by the concluding sentence, "It 












label, it was necessary to distinguish subtypes: paranoid (marked by delusions), catatonic 
(marked by motor dysfunction) and hebephrenic (marked by emotional incongruity). At 
Bleuler's (to whom we shall come in a moment) suggestion, Kraepelin later added the simple 
subtype, where no symptom dominates (ibid.). 
Kraeplin's contribution to our knowledge of the disease was largely descriptive; although he 
believed the cause to be physiological, and his focus was brain pathology, he was aware that 
he lacked the empirical evidence to speculate about etiology (Neale & Oltmanns, 1980; Frith 
& Johnstone, 2003). He identified the cardinal symptoms as: "auditory and tactile 
hallucinations, delusions, incoherent speech, blunted emotions, negativism (resisting 
suggestions and doing the opposite), stereotyped behaviour, and lack of insight" (Frith & 
Johnstone, 2003:28, 30). Although a significant number of his own patients recovered (13%), 
he was fairly convinced of the inevitable decline of functioning in the person diagnosed with 
dementia praecox (ibid., p.38). 
1.2.2 Bleuler 
It was Kraepelin's contemporary, Eugen Bleuler, who actually coined the term 
'schizophrenia'. He derived it from what he saw as the quintessential feature of the disease-
translated as a ''loosening of associations" (Frith & Johnstone, 2003:30) or "breaking of 
associative threads" (Neale & Oltmanns, 1980:4) - from the Greek meaning 'split mind,.8 
Bleuler envisioned a mind that was coming apart at the seams - not too different from 
Kraepelin's idea of "a peculiar destruction of the internal connections of the psychic 
personality" (McKenna, 2007:32). 
Although Bleuler considered himself to be following in Kraepelin's footsteps, his ideas 
ultimately diverged quite markedly (Frith & Johnstone, 2003). They were shaped by the 
psychoanalytic concepts being developed by Sigmund Freud at the same time (Neale & 
Oltmanns, 1980). To Bleuler, the disease was not necessarily only based in neuropathology; 
he believed there was a strong case for exploring its psychological dimension. Indeed, as the 
8 This also unfortunately the likely root of the misconception conflating schizophrenia with 'split personality' 
(the layman's term for multiple personality disorder, or what is also now known as dissociative identity 












title of his major work indicated - Dementia Praecox, Or the Group of the Schizophrenias (English 
translation, 1911[1950]) - he understood it not as a single disease, but rather a group or 
family of diseases with different causes and outcomes. Importantly, he was not convinced of 
the patient's inevitable deterioration - an idea on which Kraepelin was more or less sold 
(Robbins, 1993). In this way, Bleuler's 'schizophrenia' resembles the modern-day conception 
of a "schizophrenic syndrome ... [that] is an end point for disease processes whose etiology 
runs the gamut from organic, to psychological, with multiple permutations and combinations 
of the two" (fbid., p.ll). 
Based on this approach was another of Bleuler's significant contributions: his distinction 
between fundamental and accessory symptoms. Hallucinations, delusions and catatonic 
posturing were relegated to the background, while associative disturbances, abnormal 
affectivity, ambivalence (conflicting emotions and desires), autism, and avolition (loss of will) 
took centre stage (Neale & Oltmanns, 1980; Robbins, 1993; Frith & Johnstone, 2003). In 
fact, he did not consider hallucinations or delusions at all necessary for a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia - this is the basis for his addition of 'latent' and 'simple' subtypes (Frith & 
Johnstone, 2003). 
1.2.3 Their legaq 
In the United States, Bleuler's broader notion of schizophrenia took hold, not surprising 
considering the popularity the psychoanalytic tradition enjoyed there until the 1970s (Frith & 
Johnstone, 2003). Meanwhile in Europe, the Kraepelinian view of schizophrenia dominated, 
with its narrow definition of the disease and focus on brain pathology. Along with these 
ideas came their corresponding approaches; Americans adopted a theoretical approach, while 
Europeans were more concerned with description. Thus American psychiatrist Adolf Meyer 
pushed for a focus on the "individual characteristics of each patient" (Neale & Oltmanns, 
1980:7; original emphasis) rather than applying an existing classificatory system wholesale, in 
an attempt to "treat the person as well as the disease" (Meyer, 1926/1951, Vol. 3:62 in ibid.). 
His contemporary, Harry Stack Sullivan, placed emphasis on treatment, based on the belief 












A few decades later, on the other side of the Atlantic, Gennan psychiatrist Kurt Schneider 
developed a list of symptoms that he considered central characteristics of the disease - these 
are his 'first-rank' symptoms. Neale & Oltmanns (1980:12) explain: "Rather than rely on the 
highly inferential judgements made by the reviewer, Schneider emphasized the need for a 
careful exploration of the specific features of the patient's phenomenological experience." 
His list of symptoms, although following the descriptive tradition, are different in that they 
are from the patient's perspective, their self-reported experience. 
These symptoms include: auditory hallucinations (audible thoughts, hearing voices conversing 
about the patient, or commenting on the patient's behaviour), somatic passivity (a hallucination 
of an external force interfering with the patient's functions), disturbed thinking (thought 
withdrawal - external entity 'sucks out' thoughts; thought insertion - external entity inserts 
thoughts, or patient's thoughts belong to external entity; thought diffusion - others have 
access to the patient's thoughts, i.e. can read his/her mind), delusional perception (a normal 
"innocuous" perception is considered to have speci l significance); and "made" feelings, 
impulses and volitional acts (an external agent is imposing these on the patient) (Neale & 
Oltmanns 1980:12-15). 
Unsurprisingly, America's focus on the individual's symptoms lead to the creation of more 
subtypes, and ultimately schizoph enia became a more inclusive diagnosis. Patients, who in 
Europe would have been considered borderline, or diagnosed with affective psychoses or a 
personality disorder, were often labelled schizophrenic in the US. These differences were 
highlighted by the US/UK Cross National Project, a study conducted in 1972 that compared 
the incidences of diagnosis in London and New York (Neale & Oltmanns, 1980; Frith & 
Johnstone, 2003). 
1.2.4 Schizophrenia: the concept 
Although the concept has remained virtually unchanged over more than a century (Robbins, 
1993), it has not gone unchallenged. Differences in opinion about what schizophrenia is, and 
what does and doesn't count as schizophrenia,9 point to a much more concerning and 
9 For example, a modern debate only resolved in the last decade has been the existence of childhood 












fundamental debate that has raged over the decades about the validity of the construct itself. 
The anti-psychiatry movement (and Thomas Szasz and RD Laing in particular) was perhaps 
most vocal in ques~oning the existence of schizophrenia. 
We do not accept 'schizophrenia' as .being a biochemical, neurophysiological, 
psychological fact, and we regard it as a palpable error, in the present state of 
the evidence, to take it to be a fact. Nor do we assume its existence. Nor do 
we adopt it as a hypothesis. We propose no model of it. 
[Laing & Esterson, 1970:12] 
Even if one accepts its existence, as Neale and Oltmanns (1980) point out, thinking of it as a 
disease, or even a syndrome, is not a very useful approach. Instead, they find it most useful 
to identify schizophrenia as an open scientific construct: "an abstract, explanatory device or 
concept ... which cannot be direcdy observed" (p.19), "an internal event or state that is 
inferred on the basis of symptoms and observable signs" (p.20). This is not quite the same as 
saying that it does not exist. For the purposes of this paper, the notion that there is 
something that roughly corresponds to what is called 'schizophrenia' will be accepted. 
1.3 Symptoms and diagnosis 
1.3.1 Symptoms 
McKenna's Schizophrenia and Related Syndromes (2007) introduces his subject with a fairly 
exhaustive list of symptoms (pp.2-27) that have each, over the last century or so, been 
observed in studies of schizophrenics (thus they include, but also exceed, Schneider's first-
rank symptoms). Admittedly, not all of these are exclusive to the disease, but all have been 
documented frequendy enough to be considered characteristic. These include: 
Abnormal ideas 
These are primarily delusions, whose differing content determines a number of 
subcategories: delusional mood; delusions of reference, misinterpretation, 
misidentification; delusions of persecution; grandiose delusions (ability, identity, 












memory, delusional confabulation. Miscellaneous abnormal ideas include partial 
delusions; obsessions; and overvalued ideas. 
~bnonnalp~tions 
Auditory hallucinations: elementary/non-verbal; third person and commenting; 
imperative; functional; 10 extracampine.ll 
Hallucinations including the visual, somatic, olfactory and gustatory senses are also 
reported. 
Miscellaneous others abnormal perceptions include perceptual distortions; 
pseudohallucinations; depersonalisation and derealisation. 
Fonnal thought disorder 
Cardinal elements: Derailment; loss of goal; incoherence; neologisms and related 
abnormalities; and poverty of content of speech. 
Miscellaneous aspects: circumstantiality; vorbeireden (approximate answers); stilted 
speech; concrete thinking; and perseveration 
Motor, volitional and behavioural disorders 
Catatonic phenomena: simple, complex, very complex; and catatonic speech 
disorders 
Miscellaneous: involuntary movement; lack of volition; non-specific abnormal 
behaviours 
Emotional disorders 
Affective flattening and inappropriateness: affective unresponsiveness; emotional 
withdrawal; inappropriate affect; shallowness, coarsening, blunting of affect; and 
retardation of affect 
Miscellaneous: mood colourings; perplexity 
10 Voices that are superimposed on or develop out of real/existing environmental noises (McKenna, 2007:10). 
II Defined by McKenna (2007:10) as ''hallucinations ... identified by the patient as occurring outside the realm 












The most obviously 'linguistic' symptoms, and which have received most attention from 
linguists, are those listed under 'thought disorder' - this classification should already give the 
reader a hint of the complexity and confusion we'll encounter in Chapter 3 surrounding 
research on SLB. However, speech disorder is also listed as a behavioural disorder, verbal 
hallucinations ('hearing voices') are by definition linguistic, and the discussion of 'abnormal 
ideas' can hardly be divorced from the fact that these will likely be made known through 
either speech or writing. 
1.3.2 Grouping of ~mptoms 
Schizophrenic symptoms, whether considered central or peripheral, primary or secondary, 
have come to be grouped according to a positive/negative dichotomy. This is not to be 
misconstrued as a value label; rather it is best understood in arithmetic ferms, plus and minus. 
Positive symptoms are perceptions, thoughts, feelings that normal people do not experience. 
Negative symptoms are the absence of the perceptions, thoughts, feelings that most people 
experience. Thus, hallucinations and delusions are positive symptoms, while flat affect or . 
poverty of speech would fall into the negative category (McKenna, 2007). 
Although it is true that patients can exhibit any combination of symptoms, a clustering of 
symptoms has been documented. This is a grouping based on symptoms that often co-occur 
in a single patient; the presence of one predicts the likelihood of the presence of those others 
in the group. The groups are not, however, mutually exclusive (Frith & Johnstone, 2003). 
David Liddle determined three symptom clusters, which he labelled as psychomotor poverty 
syndrome (mostly negative symptoms like poverty of speech, affective non-responsivity, 
reduced spontaneous movement); dis organisational syndrome (for example, derailment in 
speech); and reality distortion syndrome (mostly positive symptoms like hallucinations and 
delusions) (McKenna, 2007:51-53). 
1.3.3 Diagnosis 
As the debate on whether schizophrenia should be considered single or plural would suggest, 
the symptoms (and outcome) of the disease are many and varied. An individual diagnosed 
with schizophrenia may exhibit only some of the symptoms, some of the time. There is no 













it diagnosed? Currendy, the four most common systems used are the St Louis Criteria, the 
Research Diagnostic Criteria, the World Health Organization's International Classification of 
Diseases, tenth revision (lCD-tO), and the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual (DSM), now in its fourth revision (DSM-IV) (Frith & Johnstone, 
2003:33). 
What these have in common is their insistence on "clear evidence of psychosis 
(hallucinations, delusions, thought disorder), occurring currendy or in the past" (ibid., p.35). 
As an example of such a diagnostic system, a summary of the DSM-lV's five criteria that 
have to be met in order to warrant a diagnosis of schizophrenia, are listed: 
A. Characteristic symptoms: At least two have to be present (for a significant 
period of time each) for at. least a month: delusions, hallucinations, 
disorganized speech, grossly disorganized or catatonic behaviour, negative 
symptoms. 
Note: One .rymptom is sufficient if delusions are bizam, or hallucinations are of a voice 
keeping running commentary, or voices conversing. 
B. Social/occupational dysfunction: For a significant portion of time since 
the onset of the disturbance, one or more major areas of functioning such as 
work, interpersonal relationships, or self-care are markedly below the level 
achieved prior to onset. 
C. Duration: Continuous signs of disturbance persist for at least six months, 
including one month of Criterion A symptoms. 
D. Exclusion of mood disorders: No major episodes of depression or elation 
have occurred concurrendy with the psychotic symptoms. 
E. Exclusion of known organic causes: The disturbance is not due to the 
effect of drugs or a known brain disorder. 












As one can see from the list of characteristic symptoms, Schneider's first-rank symptoms are 
quite prominent. However, this is not his most visible influence on diagnosis today. The 
Present State Examination, as the name suggests, only takes into account current symptoms, 
with no reference to duration, history or social functioning. A diagnosis of schizophrenia is 
based on the presence of what are essentially Schneider's nuclear symptoms, those 
symptoms that he believed would accurately confinn schizophrenia, once organic brain 
disease had been ruled out (Frith & Johnstone, 2003). Thus this diagnostic system excludes 
disorganised speech, and most negative symptoms - these are the secondary symptoms to be 
relied upon only when primary symptoms are not present. 
1.4 Causes 
Theories of causation have come and gone, but no single hypothesis has managed to gather 
enough evidence to definitively lay the issue to rest. Apart from brain pathology, first put 
forward by Kraepelin, numerous possible environmental sources have been proposed and 
investigated. 
1.4.1 Genetics 
One of the enduring puzzles of schizophrenia is why, evolutionarily speaking, it persists in 
the population at a relatively consistent incidence. Sufferers of the disease are more likely to 
die young, and less likely to produce offspring - so why hasn't this rooted the disease out·of 
the human gene pool? This paradox has prompted some researchers to postulate its genetic 
link to an adaptive trait that all humans share, one that is considered by many to be distincdy 
human - the capacity for language. Crow (1997) maintains that schizophrenia is 'the price we 
pay for language'; that which enables our linguistic ability has a component that can (m a 
small percentage of the population) go horribly wrong. Interestingly, this theory is not 
primarily motivated by the phenomenon of disorganised speech, but does use the symptom 
to bolster its position, as shall be discussed in Chapter 3. Twin and adoption studies have 
demonstrated a clear genetic component to schizophrenia. However, genetics only indicate a 












1.4.2 The knocks of life 
Although stress has been researched quite thoroughly in connection with the onset of acute 
episode of schizophrenia, "the findings are suggestive rather than conclusive" (Frith & 
Johnstone, 2003: 110). The findings for the effects of some recreational drugs are more solid 
- cannabis use is now thought to increase the risk for those already genetically predisposed 
to schizophrenia (Frith & Johnstone, 2003). 
Probably one of the most curious, yet finnly established, facts concerning schizophrenia is 
that significantly more people diagnosed with schizophrenia were bom during winter. This 
suggests a seasonal, potentially disease-causing agent that may damage the foetus in some 
way. Maternal exposure to influenza during pregnancy also seems to be linked to a higher 
incidence of schizophrenia of their babies on reaching adulthood (Frith & Johnstone, 2003). 
1.4.3 Society and the familY 
In a radical departure from the etiology proposed so f r, the anti-psychiatry movement,12 
located the cause solely in the interpersonal, or social realm. In fact, Laing went so far as to 
say that schizophrenia is a sane response to an insane society - there is nothing medically 
wrong with schizophrenics. However, his theories, as well as earlier theories such as 
Bateson's double-bind hypothesis (111 which a child is reared in a family environment where 
they constantly receive mixed messages oflove and hate), and the schizophrenogenic mother, 
proposed by Fromm-Reichmann, have not stood up to scientific testing (Frith & Johnstone, 
2003). 
A related claim is that the impoverished environment, and even prison-like practices, of 
asylums were to blame for most of the symptoms prevalent among so-called schizophrenics. 
In other words, institutionalisation made patients worse, not better (Shorter, 1997). Research 
suggests that institutionalisation may impair cognitive functioning, in schizophrenics and 
other patients with mental illness. However, the classic positive and negative symptoms of 
12 This is a somewhat problematic tenn, in that history has lumped together a number of theorists under one 
label- theorists who even at the time resisted the association, and disagreed with each other. Laing in particular 












schizophrenia are equally prevalent among schizophrenics who have received long-tenn in-
patient care, and those who have not (Frith & Johnstone, 2(03). 
Such determinedly non-biological claims were perhaps easier to believe before techniques 
such as brain imaging enabled the observation of brain structure and functioning in the live 
patient, rather than waiting till autopsy. Modern technology has provided sufficient evidence 
that there is something different in the brains of schizophrenics. 
1.4.4 Brain 
The overwhelming success of neuroleptics (medication that acts on a neurochemical level) 
suggest that the neurotransmitter dopamine is involved This 'dopamine hypothesis' surfaced 
in the 1960s, and states, briefly, that an excess of dopamine in the brain is responsible for 
schizophrenic symptoms. However, the evidence, although strong, is circumstantial. No one 
knows for sure how or why an excess of dopamine would cause these symptoms (Frith & 
Johnstone, 2003; McKenna, 2007). 
Another observation that has been repeated often enough is that the brains of 
schizophrenics generally have larger ventricles (the fluid-filled 'spaces' in the brain). There is 
an overall reduction in brain size, with the regions most affected being the temporal lobes, 
the amygdala (concerned with emotion) and the hippocampus (concerned with long-tenn 
memory). Functional imaging suggests reduced activity in the frontal lobes of schizophrenics. 
These differences, although well-documented, are descriptive - not explanatory (Frith & 
Johnstone, 2003). Are these causal, or symptomatic of some other process of the disease? 
Even though mainstream thinking on the disease agrees that it is biologically based, located 
in the brain, the burden of proof rests on these researchers to demonstrate the link between 
the symptoms observed and any brain activity or structure that can be measured by modem 
technology. As McKenna (2007:136) puts it 
Accepting a biological basis for schizophrenia still leaves an explanatory gap; 
it is not readily apparent how an abnormality in brain structure or function 












most if not all of which are quite different from the usual. signs of brain 
disease, not to mention being prone to erratic fluctuations in a way not at all 
reminiscent of neurological disorders. 
And while progress is being made, the research is still in its infancy. 
1.5 Treatment 
Schizophrenia, to date, has no cure. What treatment exists, focuses on reducing the 
symptoms. For some people with schizophrenia, this is sufficient to live a near-to-nonnal 
life; for others, it improves functioning, but they never return to their pre-onset quality of 
life. And finally, some chronic sufferers are resistant to treatment and require lifelong 
institutionalisation. 
1.5.1 The earlY years 
Despite gloomy prospects predicted for all patients receiving the diagnosis of schizophrenia, 
especially by those in the Kraepelinian school of thought, there were still early attempts at 
treatment or cures. Until the introduction of antipsychotic medication in the early 1950s, 
barbiturate-induced sleep therapy, insulin coma therapy, prefrontal lobotomies, and 
electroconvulsive therapy (Eel) were the usual approaches (Robbins, 1986). That is not to 
say that the arrival of antipsychotics banished these methods; however, attempts to prove to 
the sceptics the efficacy of these neuroleptic drugs, over and above existing treatments, 
encouraged controlled studies - which soon revealed the latter's inefficacy. 
1.5.2 Drugs 
Neuroleptics, the first one of note being chlorpromazine, produced amazing results. 
Unfortunately, like other pre-drugs treatments, the early antipsychotic medications had 
negative side-effects, often causing lasting damage. Particularly common were the 
Parkinson's disease-like motor disturbances that developed, which came to be known as 
tardive dyskinesia 13 (Shorter, 1997). In the 1980s, a new group of antipsychotics was 
\3 The reason for this is that these drugs work by blocking dopamine receptors (more specifically, the D2 
receptors) in the brain. Parkinson's disease, characterised by motor problems, is caused by a dopamine 
deficiency - thus the treatment induced similar symptoms in the schizophrenic patients treated with this 












introduced, offering real hope to sufferers. Known as atypicals, these appear to have all of 
the benefits of earlier drugs, with none of the motor side-effects (Frith & Johnstone, 2003). 
1.5.3 PrJchotherapy 
Apart from these somatic approaches, treatment attempts have included forms of 
psychotherapy, such as psychoanalysis and more recently cognitive behavioural therapy. 
There is very little evidence for the efficacy of psychoanalysis (Robbins, 1993), although 
there are individual schizophrenics, like Elyn Saks (2007) who attribute their ability to cope 
in no small way to this form of treatment. The official position14 seems to be that it is almost 
certain that psychotherapy on its own will not be effective, but m: conjunction with 
neuroleptic medication, may play a supportive role in rehabilitation (Shorter, 1997). 
Cognitive behavioural therapy has enjoyed some success. Essentially, it forces the patient to 
focus on their thoughts, rather than their feelings, and to use logic to deal with their 
delusional perceptions, for example. When successful, patients can recognise these unusual 
thoughts as unreasonable, and stop them from developing into full-blown psychosis 
(.McKenna, 2007). 
1.5.4 De-institutionalisation 
It was the early foans of treatment, such as ECT and lobotomies, and the poor condition of 
asylums which anti-psychiatrists like Laing so opposed - he experienced them as barbaric 
and inhumane.1S It was these that inspired his mission to reform psychiatry and prompted 
his alternative approaches, such as psychotherapy and a move away from asylum-type 
institutionalisation, towards a community-living arrangement. Since he made no attempt to 
validate his claims and methods scientifically, it is very difficult to assess the efficacy of what 
he proposed. 
Ironically, it was the introduction of antipsychotic medication that really kick-started the 
release of patients from institutions. Community-based living was not the brainchild of the 
anti-psychiatry movement. However, one gets the sense that its popularity was motivated by 
economic reasons rather than humanitarian aims. Without adequate support systems in place, 
14 There are those that disagree - see Bentall (2003). 












many psychiatric patients ended up on the streets - 'managed care' can hardly be called an 
unqualified success (Shorter, 1997). 
1.6 Conclusion 
This brief overview of schizophrenia leaves one with mixed impressions. While treatment 
has clearly improved since the first descriptions of the disease, there still seem to be so many 
areas of uncertainty, that it is hard not to entertain some doubts about the concept's validity. 
It is also difficult to ignore the political nature of trends in psychiatry. As Shorter (1997) 
notes, psychiatry has a vested interest in schizophrenia - it is the mainstay of the discipline. 
As such, the history of schizophrenia is also a history bf modem psychiatry. A disease of the 
soul or mind became concretised as a disease of the brain, allowing the discipline to establish 
itself as a respected science. Ironically, as psychiatry found the exact biological causes of 
mental illness, they would 'lose' those diseases to the relevant medical field, such as 
neurology. Schizophrenia has to a degree resisted this transfer. Instead it is shared by an 
ever-increasing number of fields - the likes of neurology, biochemistry, psychology, speech 
and language pathology, linguistics. 
Integrational linguistics' interest in schizophrenia goes beyond the obviously linguistic 
symptoms. For the history of psychiatry enjoys parallels with the history of linguistics: the 
almost symbiotic relationship between psychiatry and schizophrenia is not too dissimilar 
from the relationship between linguistics and language. The drive for scientific status and 
autonomy have shaped the course of both, and determined how they have constituted, even 
'created' their subject. As Joseph, Love & Taylor (2001a:viii) note, citing Foucault, "in all 
fields of intellectual inquiry - although perhaps in language inquiry more than most - issues 
of disciplinary territoriality have often been regarded as inseparable from the inquiry itself'. 












2. CRITICAL LINGUISTICS 
2.1 Introduction 
Newmeyer (1987) locates the beginnings of modem linguistics in the late 1700s, when the 
discovery of ancient texts and exotic foreign languages (due to colonial expansion) ultimately 
gave birth to comparative linguistics. Others consider Ferdinand de Saussure - who "free[d] 
language studies from the tyranny of the historian" (Harris, 1981 :46) to establish linguistics 
as a science in its own right - to be the 'father of modem linguistics', which would push the 
inception of the discipline to a century later. However, it was only in the mid-twentieth 
century that linguistics was afforded autonomy within academic institutions, separate from 
literature departments (Newmeyer, 1987). Nevertheless, linguistics is a discipline whose 
relatively rapid transformation from a side-show to historical studies, to an established field 
spawning a legion of sub-disciplines and having wide-ranging influence beyond its 
(contested) scope, particularly in the flourishing cognitive sciences, is enough to leave one 
breathless. 
There is no doubt that Noam Chomsky helped put linguistics on the map in the 1960s.16 But 
it was a very particular linguistics; like Saussure before him, he aimed not only to contribute 
to the discipline, but to (re)define it, by determining what is, and what is not, the business of 
linguists. As Love (2009:31, citing Harpham, 2006) comments, this - what amounts to 
successive redefinitions of 'language' - is a common thread running through the history of 
linguistic thought. Prompted in part by the shortfalls of Chomskyan generativism that soon 
became apparent, a recent criticism of the state of the discipline emerged in the early 1980s. 
But it was not merely a reaction against the trend of the day; it had in its crosshairs the much 
more deep seated origins of the discipline. Leading the charge was Roy Harris, then the 
Chair of General Linguistics at Oxford (Taylor, 1997). Harris (1981) had the audacity to call 
into question the very assumptions on which linguistics is based - and by implication, the 
aims, scope and methods of the discipline. These assumptions he collectively labelled 'the 
language myth', claiming that the entity we have come to characterise as 'a language' is more 
fallacy than fact. Effectively what he was calling for was (and still is) a "linguistics without 












languages" (Joseph, Love & Taylor, 2001b:203). While this may seem like the academic 
equivalent of going out on a limb, and then proceeding to saw it off, his revolutionary 
project was, if flawed, not as self-contradictory as it sounds. It is not to say that English or 
Polish or Afrikaans don't exist at all, but rather that they don't exist in the form of the 
'''determinate or determinable' objects that 'orthodox modem linguistics' calls languages and 
takes itself to be describing" (p.204). These are second-order abstractions from the reality of 
expenence. 
Ultimately, what he is criticising is the artificial segregation and privileging of certain aspects 
of human communicational activity over others. Harris' proposed alternative to orthodox 
'segregationist' linguistics is 'integrational linguistics', a lay-oriented approach focused on 
actual linguistic experience, rather than idealised abstractions, with the implication that, by 
definition, these idealised abstractions have litde validity. While in thirty years, he may not 
have eradicated orthodox linguistics (and indeed the question as to why such a damning 
critique can be happily ignored by mainstream linguistics is not without significance!7), he 
has certainly succeeded in winning followers; his students have expanded upon his ideas 
(although as a prolific writer, Harris has certainly expanded upon them himselfl). The work 
of two such theorists, Michael Toolan and Talbot Taylor, will be used here to supplement 
the Harrisian overview of integrational linguistics, due to their focus on characteristics of 
language that have particular relevance to research into SLB. 
While Harris calls for a wholesale overhaul of orthodox linguistics, other integrationists are a 
litde more circumspect in their aims. Toolan in Total Speech: An Integrational Approach to 
Language (1996), like Harris, defines his task against the backdrop of segregationist linguistic 
analysis and fixed-code theories: "to show the inadequacies of any thoroughgoing adoption 
and application of those principles" (pp.2-3). He feels it is important to understand that 
these principles are derived from "certain ideas that are useful as simplifying aids to such 
pragmatic tasks as translation and language teaching" (thus recognizing a litde more overtly 
the important ways these second-order constructions are woven into our first-order 
17 Taylor (1997 - see below) at least is of the opinion that the flaw against which integrationists do battle is too 












experience), but that when they "are recast as unquestionable foundational axioms" (ibid.) a 
warped notion of language begins to take shape. 
Taylor (1997), too, both extends and critiques his mentor's work. He identifies the core error 
in thinking about language as being encapsulated by the principle of intersuijectivi!J, so called 
because it represents language as a resource that allows speakers to share something which is 
essentially subjective. His investigations into language are driven by questioning the 
recurrent nature of topics and problems within Western linguistic thought. Instead of real 
progress, he identifies similar arguments, with similar solutions, based on similar taken-for-
granted assumptions, leaving him to question whether the pet problems that have been 
pored over for centuries by their very nature prevent solution. 
While Taylor acknowledges the credibility of Harris' suggestion that the irresistible force 
shaping the lines of thinking about language are to be found in "the literate and intellectual 
practices which characterize the development of Western culture" (1997:7-8), he senses that 
this alone is not sufficient to explain the phenomenon. As far as Taylor is concerned, no 
amount of evidence pointing out the flaws in the 'language myth' will be effective; rational 
argument will not win in a battle against what is essentially a deeply held belief.1s 
Naturally, Harris' critique is culturally and philosophically situated in a particular history of 
ideas; while his work is original, he certainly didn't snatch it out of the ether (one criticism 
of his work is that he presents it as such - see Joseph, 2003:25). Post-structuralist theories 
surely help prepare the way for such radical criticism, that turns in upon and deconstructs its 
own discipline's foundations, andJoseph (2003) notes clear connections between Harris and 
Derrida on the topic of writing. Influences may be found even further back, if we consider 
Per Linell's (2005) assertion that all thinking about language is either essentially Cartesian 
(monological) or Hegelian (dialogical); Harris would be associated with the latter. Linell 
explains these two approaches, respectively, as 
18 In fact, in MlIl1Ial Mim1llkrstanding (1992), Taylor effectivdy argues that the communicational sceptic's 
rhetorical manoeuvres mirror those of whom he is criticising - for Joseph (2003), 'the sceptic' is "at times a 












a) languages as structured sets of fonns, used to represent things in the 
world 
b) language as meaningful actions and cultural practices, interventions in the 
world [Linell, 2005:4] 
Linell (2005) also situates himself within the dialogical tradition - quite explicidy: he calls his 
approach 'dialogism'. His theories are included in this overview because they also, to a 
degree, mount a critique of the discipline as a whole, in claiming that a pervasive bias 
towards written language underlies much of what it claims about language in general. He 
notes that a written language bias is not only to be found in linguistics, but in other fields of 
study as well. The shared perspective can pardy be explained by shared background; he 
locates the foundation underlying much of the written language bias in Cartesian dualism, 
the source of many of the dichotomies that Western thinkers have been grappling with for 
centuries: individual vs. society; structure vs. actor; language vs. speaker. Various theories 
have assigned primacy to one half of each of the pairs; all of these theories are monologistic. 
Relevant to our purposes here, he earmarks psychology as one such monologism-dominated 
field (Linell, 2007). Dialogism - to which Linell subscribes - acknowledges the analytical 
utility of these distinctions, but cautions that they should not be treated as autonomous 
entities. Rather, their interdependency and intersubjectivity should also be recognised. What 
it amounts to is a "reverse [ofJ the focus-background relationships fr~m the structure-in-
focus view to a dynamics-in-focus view" (2005:223, emphasis omitted). Thus, for Linell, 
'applied sociolinguistics' is more foundational than the abstract, 'pure' linguistics on which it 
is supposedly based. 
Linell acknowledges a number of theories and approaches that share features with dialogism, 
and which in some way or other oppose the monological stance embodied by Chomskyan 
generativists, such as radical constructionism, ethnomethodology, conversation analysis, and 
even integrational linguistics. Dialogism attempts to address what Linell sees as these 
theories' flawed approach in focusing too much on either situated interactions or the 
situation-transcending structured knowledge, and disregarding the influence of the theorist. 
Rejecting both 'abstract objectivism' and pure subjectivism, "it stresses the embeddedness 












"intersubjectivism" (p.215): it is always located 'between', rather than 'out there' or 'in here'. 
Dialogism invokes a '''double dialogicality' (Linell, 1998a: 54 [cited]) of discourse, action and 
cognition ... [m which] utterances are creatively and dialogically accomplished" (p.216) in both 
a situational and a sociocultural context. 
Although Linell clearly distances himself from integrationallinguistics (or rather, Roy Harris' 
version of itt~ it is my opinion that the two approaches' conclusions have more in common 
than either of their founders would like to a<:ln)it. I imply no plagiarism here; merely that new 
approaches tend to justify their existence by emphasising their unique contribution to a field 
or discipline, and playing down their similarities with other approaches. Ultimately, dialogism 
is not that different from Taylor and Toolan's version of integrational linguistics, but by 
explicidy invoking 'dialogue' as metaphor for broader linguistic processes, it underscores 
face-to-face speech as the prototypical meaning-making (unavoidably shared) activity.zt1 Both 
integrational and dialogical critiques of linguistics argue that language is always situated, not 
abstract, and yet simultaneously recognise the origins, influence and gjgnificance of a 
situation-transcendent notion of language in literate culture. Thus Linell's dialogicism 
expands upon one facet of integrationallinguistics and simultaneously is a critique of it. 
Both integrationism and dialogism can be seen in the light of a movement in the (social) 
sciences towards 'embodiment'; the realisation that the entities such as mind, thought, 
language and so on, only have existence in actual bodies with actual brains in actual 
environments (it is the context in which these entities or faculties have evolved) - a defining 
rather than peripheral property. Thus to study them in an abstract way makes no sense at all, 
19 He finds the concept of 'language myth' -language as a linguist's construction - while applicable to 'national 
languages', problematic when taken to its logical conclusion (the concept of language itself is a construction, 
and not 'real'). And Harris, he feels, does not make it clear how far he is willing to go. Thus, although 
illwninating, integrationism "runs the risk of throwing out the baby with the bathwatcr" (p.202) by focusing on 
situated interactions, and labelling anything that transcends these as mythical Here Linell verges on throwing 
the baby out with the bathwater himself, in dismissing integrationism purely on the basis of Harris' earlier 
theories, while largely ignoring his later refinements (for example, Harris [1998:29] explicitly acknowledges 
language's macrosocial dimension, "practices IStablished in the community" [emphasis added], which by 
definition implies it has a 'situation-transcendent' aspect), and those, such as Toolan, who perhaps take a less 
radical approach, or Taylor, who views language's "situation-transcendent [metalinguistic] practices" (Linell, 
2005:213) as a structuring exoskeleton. The publication of La1llll"# and History: I1If#grationirt Pn'Sj>ImtllS (Love, 
2006a) surely puts this point to rest. 
20 Linell (1998:13, n.14) points out in a footnote that the "Greek dia means 'through, between, across', not 
'two''', although there are grounds to argue for a relationship with dyo-, di-; others relish the (erroneous) 












for the very starting point of such a venture denies one crucial aspect of what we know to be 
true about the very basic nature of what is being studied. Such a venture can only fail. The 
tentative work seeking correspondence between distributed cognition (which falls 
within/ overlaps with the project of embodied cognition) and integrationism will also be 
addressed briefly (10 Section 2.12 below). 
Since the ultimate aim of this overview is the application of these theories in the chapters 
that follow, those features of language with particular relevance (historically) to the study of 
SLB will enjoy greater attention. That is to say, that while this overview is detailed, it is by no 
means exhaustive. Nevertheless, it provides a fairly good picture of the foundations on 
which integrational approaches to numerous aspects of language are based. 
2.2 The problem 
An analysis of the 'speech circuit' formulated by Ferdinand de Saussure reveals the key 
characteristics of what Harris (1981) terms 'the language myth'. As we shall see, it is this 
belief about how a language operates that informs the belief about what a language is. The 
classic speech circuit runs as follows: A has a thought. A encodes thought by expressing it in 
words. B hears the words. B decodes the words into their corresponding thoughts. Due to 
the code shared by both, B's decoded thought corresponds exactly to A's original thought. 
For conversation to continue the process will be repeated in the inverse, i.e. B will transmit 
their thoughts to A, in reply. 
For the sake of convenience, the speech circuit is depicted as having a beginning and an end, 
starting in the mind of the speaker, and ending in the mind of the hearer.21 Thus 
communication is conceived of as a transfer or exchange of thoughts. For communication to 
be successful, speaker and hearer must share a code, and this code must be fixed and 
bounded. This code consists of word-meaning pairs, or more technically, form-concept pairs. 
The processes of coding and decoding entail matching up meanings with words, and words 
21 However, the heuristic value of having such limits soon gives way to factual status. The ideal utterance event 
does not allow for interruption, simultaneous speaking, feedback. It must start with a fully formed thought, and 
its end is signalled by a fully formed thought (that matches the original thought). In other words, "Saussure's 
identification of the initial and tenninal points in the chain" effectivdy "begs questions the integrationist would 












with meanings, respectively. This code, then, is what we call a language, and speech is an 
expression of it. Speech is the transfer of ideas between people of a shared speech 
community, by means of the vehicle of words (Harris, 1981; 1995; 1998). 
So far so good; the description above ties in with the average person's commonsense 
understanding about how a language works (and thus what a language is). What exactly is 
mythical about it? The answer, according to Harris (1981), is, well, everything. The classic 
speech circuit encapsulates the "two interconnected fallacies" (p.9) that constitute the 
language myth: "The telementational fallacy is a thesis about the function of language, while 
the determinacy fallacy is a thesis about the mechanism of language" (ibid.). The idea that 
knowing a language is a case of "knowing which words stand for which ideas" (ibid.) - i.e. 
having a sort of mental dictionary - is the telementational fallacy. The idea that 
communication is a result of all people (who speak the same language) sharing this mental 
dictionary - i.e. a language is a fixed code which speakers know and share - is the 
determinacy fallacy. 
Harris continues: 
Stated in a slightly more abstract way, the language myth assumes that a 
language is a finite set of rules generating an infinite set of pairs, of which one 
member is a sound-sequence or a sequence of written characters, and the other 
is its meaning; and that it is knowledge of such rules which unites individuals 
into linguistic communities able to exchange thoughts with one another in 
accordance with a prearranged plan determined by those rules. [p.ll] 
Thus a belief about what languages are is superimposed upon the experience of the 
individual communicator (Love, 2009). Not only does this fit quite nicely with the 
commonsenSe notion of what a language is and how it works - it is reflected in our ways of 
talking about language - but that this is the commonsense view is testament to the all-
pervasive influence of the language myth. For in spite of our ubiquitous experiences of 












grammar books seems to prove the validity of this version of the nature of this entity we call 
a language. 
Furthermore, our everyday interactions bear this out. We treat questions such as 'What did 
you say?', 'How many words are there in the following sentence?' and 'What does .filigree 
mean?' as valid and meaningful utterances, to which we can provide answers. These reflexive 
practices regarding our own language use seem to confirm that language is a concrete, 
established entity, consisting of words and their meanings, and that there is a clear 
distinction between what is (or counts as) language and what is (or does) not. 
The mythical nature of the language beast starts to emerge here, in our metalinguistic 
practices: that some of our metalinguistic experiences are ignored as irrelevant, ascribed to 
extralinguistic factors (misunderstanding, ambiguity), while others are privileged and used as 
the model of 'normal' experience by mainstream linguistics, should raise a few questions 
among the critically minded. Metalinguistic practices play no small part in upholding our 
erroneous assumptions about languages, and Taylor in particular elaborates on the 
relationship between the two (see Section 2.5). But first let us qualify the various assertions 
that have been made thus far about orthodox linguistics' position on the matter. 
In this traditional view, "the entire situational and interpersonal context of language is 
omitted from consideration" (p.34). As a fixed, systematic code, any variance between two 
instances of the conveyance of the 'same~message must be excluded from the definition of a 
language. Harris calls this the "invariance condition"· (p.88). Traditional·linguistics doesn't 
deny that context affects interpretation, rather it denies that dealing with these extraneous 
features is the proper job of linguists. "A language in their view is to be treated as a system 
of decontextualised verbal signs, organized into complexes called 'sentences', and mastery of 
a language is interpreted as mastery of the decontextualised system" (p.32). This idealisation 
is considered necessary for a scientific study of language. 
Like Harris, Linell criticises the way linguistics, in an attempt to be scientific, has ended up 
creating its object of study rather than describing or investigating something that exists. He 












"splitting and inversion" (2005:9), in which dialogical practices are transfonned into cases of 
'language use'. First, the activity of language is split into structure and process; the structure 
is then separated out as an autonomous object, which takes priority (the inversion); in this 
new hierarchy, communication activities are described in terms of the invariable structure 
applied in various contexts. 
2.3 The solution 
To counteract the language myth, Harris (1981) proposes an approach called 'integrational 
linguistics', which seeks to make sense of linguistic experience from the point of view of 
people using language, and provide an "inward" account (foolan, 1996:22). In other words, 
it proposes to be a 'lay linguistics'; one that "derive[s] its basic concepts from the first-order 
communicational experience of lay members of the community" (Harris, 2006:714). For 
Taylor, in particular, this includes the ordinary everyday ways of how we speak about and 
make sense oflanguage and communication (see Joseph, 2003). 
Here, language is understood as "a process of making communicational sense of verbal 
behaviour" (Harris, 1981:165). It cannot be divorced from an understanding of what is 
considered 'rational' - the layperson's "everyday assumptions concerning the total behaviour 
of a reasonable person" (ibid.). It is driven by the 'non-compartmentalisation principle': the 
communicational space is not divided up into language and non-language. Nor do language 
users possess or employ two sets of knowledge -language and how it is to be used - but this 
is one and the same: knowing language is knowing how to integrate it. 
It is this insight that motivates Toolan's challenge to the distinction between 'text' and 
'context', arguing that this is never given in advance of a particular situation, and therefore 
not fixed. "Context is both indispensable to our making sense of language and shockingly, 
liberatingly variable; it is only locally determinate, as occasions of communication arise" 
(1996:4). Furthennore, to speak of 'context' as an entity is already to reify it; rather, 
integrationists argue that "there is only the activity of contextualizing" (ibid.) - crucial to 












Thus integrational linguistics is concerned with "analys[ing] how questions of semantic 
indetenninacy arise in communicational interaction, and what linguistic techniques are in fact 
employed by participants to resolve the difficulties involved" (Harris, 1981:188). Harris uses 
the metaphor of driving a car in traffic: the repeated adjustments in response to other 
motorists on the road that are required for getting to one's destination. So too, do we as 
communicational participants 'give each other room', both verbally and non-verbally. 
Ultimately what Harris is calling for is a completely new approach, not an addendum to 
traditional lines of argument. For the integrationist, communication is not the transmission 
or reception of messages between speaker and hearer, or the transmission of anything really. 
Communication is the "integration of activities" (Harris, 1998:29). As such, it is the most 
basic of human 'programmes'; one's continued existence depends on integrating one's own 
activities with each other, and with those of others. By foregrounding communication, 
integrationists deny language's privileged position, turning traditional linguistics on its head: 
"~]anguages presuppose communication" (p.5). 
Three factors govern human communication: 
Biomechanical: physical and mental capacities of the human being 
Macrosocial: practices established in the community or some group within the 
community 
Circumstantial: the specifics of particular situations 
[adapted from Harris 1998:29] 
Although listed separately, in any given communication interaction, all three will be 
integrated While the 'biomechanical' realm may seem the most familiar to orthodox 
linguistics, integrationists caution that this does not invoke a faculty dedicated to language - it 
extends far beyond a single mental module. Rather "the foundational requirements and 
characteristics of language us~g are quite general ones and that human language does not 
crucially rest on specific and language-exclusive mental faculties and mechanisms" (roolan, 
1996:10). Fleshing out of Harris' assertion that 'languages presuppose communication', 












attributes of "faith; trust; orientedness to others; faculties of memory and imagination; goal 
orientedness; and the ability to perceive the relatedness and non-relatedness of phenomena 
(understood as the perception of similarity and difference rather than of identity and 
difference)" (pp.11-12). The terms 'other-oriented', 'faith' and 'trust' (which evoke Harris's 
'giving each other room') are perhaps misleading; language interaction is not always the 
philanthropic give-and-take these terms suggest. Toolan is, however, keenly aware of the 
political nature of language and meaning making. In fact, he points out that 
although language is never a code, nevertheless it is quite apparent that 
individuals and groups - especially subordinated and dis empowered ones, 
although here the issue of what constitutes subordination must not be 
prejudged - may be habituated to a code-like. predictability of usage, forms, 
and meanings. [p.18] 
Slighdy less radical, Toolan's challenge to orthodox linguistics calls for "a revised application 
of extant methods" (1996:22). Integrationallinguistics is thus "a principle rather than a 
method" (p.23) that defines rather than obscures its initial assumptions for any investigation 
into language. For Toolan (p.9), this starting point is encapsulated in four central tenets: 
a) the principle of cotemporality 
b) the privileging of local relevance 
c) the sequentiality of linguistic production 
d) the uniqueness of experience 
In other words, language is always situated in the here and now, and is bound up in, and 
makes reference to, what surrounds it in both time and space. The first tenet employs a term 
coined by Harris (1981) to describe the fact that "~]inguistic acts are assumed to be 
immediately relevant to the current situation, unless there is reason to suppose otherwise, 
just as non-linguistic acts are" (p.1S7). Even then, these 'reasons to suppose otherwise', 
whether marked linguistically or extralinguistically, will form part of the immediate temporal 
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According to Harris, it is 
the ultimate basis of the distinctions we feel obliged to draw in order to deal 
metalinguistically with a whole range of so-called 'type-token' ambiguities, and is 
also intrinsic to our understanding of such everyday notions as asking question, 
stating facts, and giving instructions. [1981 :157] 
He emphasises that stressing the importance of cotemporality does not equate to a denial of 
'displacement', language's much-celebrated power to refer to events or objects remote in 
time and place. Rather, "acknowledgement of cotemporality as central to our experience of 
language is what alone makes possible any convincing explanation of how displacement 
works" (p.158). Cotemporality has to be explicidy"suspend[ed] or neutralise[d]" (ibid.) for 
displacement to be allowed. 
Beyond the immediate concerns of linguistics, cotemporality touches the very core of what it 
means to be human: "[t]he principle of chronological integration between linguistic and non-
linguistic events plays an important part in our picture of human rationality" (p.157). (As 
Eugen Bleuler [1950(1911)] remarked of his schizophrenic patients, "[c]ausality frequendy 
does not seem to exist for them" [p.82] - an event could be explained as being caused by 
something that occurs afterwards.) The integrationallinguistic approach to rationality will be 
discussed more extensively below (Section 2.13); we now proceed to a detailed breakdown of 
how integrational linguistic thought challenges what have traditionally been hailed as core 
features or properties of language. 
2.4 Linguistic knowledge 
Modern linguistic theory, in its psychologistic - Saussurean and Chomskyan - versions, is 
focused on describing' ''what [people] are assumed to know", the "mental reality underlying 
actual behavior" (Harris, 1981:35), rather than giving an account of verbal behaviour itself-
this is secondary, a manifestation of the knowledge of the language. This description takes 
the fonn of a decontextualised system of knowledge - the supposedly scientifically necessary 
idealisation extends to the language user, best expressed by Harris' example of the 'ideal 












a member of 'a completely homogenous speech-community, who knows its 
language perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant 
considerations as memory limitation, distractions, shifts of attention and 
interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the 
language in actual performance' [Chomsky, 1965, in Harris, 1981 :32-33]. 
Firstly, Harris (1990, in Joseph, Love & Taylor, 2001) takes issue with the notion that the 
'ideal' has any part to play in explaining communication. For 'idealisation', either in the sense 
in which it is used in science (for the purpose of calculation - i.e. it has a practical 
application), or in the humanities (as "prescriptive stereotypes''), when applied to language, 
speaker/hearers, or speech communities, is "a false comparison"; they "turn out to be 
neither one thing nor the other" but rather are merely "steps in a pr cess of explanation" 
(p.206) - and not very good ones at that 
Human speakers always are affected by "memory limitation, distractions, shifts of attention 
and interest" (the notion of "errors" shall be dealt with below in Section 2.7) - these are 
features of, not obstacles to, human communication. There are no ''homogenous'' speech 
communities - indeed just what this means is open to speculation. And what would the 
criteria be for knowing one's language perfectly? Thus, Harris views this ideal speaker-hearer 
as being, by definition, a "communicational cripple" (1981:33) - for what he/she knows (as 
far as the knowledge can be considered linguistic) is completely divorced from the real ways 
and contexts in which language is used In other words, it is a notion of competence that by 
definition would render the possessor incompetent However, orthodox linguistics accounts 
for "any apparent discrepancy between linguistic behaviour and postulated language rules" 
(p.152) by invoking two doctrines: that of ellipsis (speakers' utterances are an abbreviated 
version of a form that does conform to the rules), and that of distinguishing between 
linguistic and contextual/pragmatic knowledge. 
In combination with the doctrines of ellipsis and distinct linguistic knowledge, the invariance 
condition serves to exclude the creative dimension of language. As Harris cautions, "[a] 
language with job-secure words presupposes omniscience" (p.175). Orthodox linguistics 












language (although an utterance may be an abbreviated form). Thus, it is impossible to say 
anything novel; it is merely contexts that have not previously been encountered. 
However, as Harris proceeds to point out, these two doctrines are simultaneously the 
language myth's downfall which, when taken to their logical conclusion, lead to 'elliptical 
regress'. For if every incomplete sentence is really a shortened version of some complete, 
grammatically correct sentence (<What we really meant to say, if we had bothered,), we 
ultimately "reach a position in which all deictic expression may be treated as elliptical" 
(p.201), i.e. standing for something else more explicit. Using pronouns as his particular 
example, Harris finds that "nowhere, it seems, except in the present particulars of current 
situations can we find an ultimate anchorage for what it is we are talking about" (p.202). 
For Harris, there can be no knowing language without knowing how it is to be used 
appropriately. (And this is not given in advance, although previous experience provides 
compelling suggestions.) Crucial, however, is the point that these are not two separate kinds 
of knowledge - linguistic 'knowledge' (if one can call it such) of linguistic 'facts' is by 
definition practical, not abstract, and ever shifting. 
Harris's position is that the reason for invoking the concept of fixed (shared) knowledge is 
to explain how communication is successful. Integrationists counter the claim - how then 
would one explain or determine that understanding has taken place? Having both parties 
confinn that they have understood is not sufficient (we have surely all had experiences where 
someone has claimed to understand what we have said, and their subsequent behaviour 
suggests otherwise). Is the solution to have a theory of what counts as understanding (specific 
behaviour or verbal response), such that if certain criteria are met, we can declare 
understanding to have taken place? As Taylor (1997) goes through the motions of 
attempting to stipulate such criteria, and as his list of what these criteria depend upon grows 
longer and longer, it soon becomes apparent that "the justification of an understanding-
claim is an organic feature of the context in which it occurs" (p.89). The speaker, in assessing 
whether the hearer has understood them, "does not follow any rule, but acts according to his 












Thus, from the integrational perspective, what the doctrines of ellipsis and fixed knowledge 
really express or capture is a specific language game or practice, in which the hearer tries to 
make sense of what has been said But that line or distinction is blurred, and the 'making 
sense' is cast as an imagined sentence that encapsulates what was actually said (or intended). 
The dialogue between hearer and speaker is compacted into this single sentence, outwardly 
expressed as the original utterance that is forced to carry the burden of both inputs. The 
work the hearer does is erased and simultaneously (super)imposed on the speaker. The 
dialogic nature is denied. 
2.5 Metadiscourse 
While within integrational linguistics language is firmly subordinated to human 
communication in general, and thus governed by the same factors (biomechanical, social, 
and circumstantial), there is a feature that language does not share with all communication 
activities - reflexivity. Reflexive language, metadiscourse, or 'language about language' is a 
feature of our everyday speech. However, as Taylor (1997) points out, theoretical rhetoric 
interprets it as descriptive; as description, metadiscourse is simultaneously taken out context, 
reified, and (dis)regarded as lay theorising of a matter which only professional linguists can 
give proper account. In the reification process, metadiscourse's practical normative function 
in everyday interaction is completely overlooked. 
"Language users ordinarily treat linguistic acts as something they value, as something whose 
characteristics matter to them; and they convey - and enforce - this attitude, in large part, by 
speaking of language and the circumstances of its occurrence in normative and evaluative 
terms" (p.ll). Taylor stresses that this is not to say that metadiscourse is a way of stating or 
referring to language rules that are predetermined by convention. Rather, normative 
metadiscourse has a moral and political dimension to it. It is the law, executed, not a 
description of it 
It is by means of contextually embedded instances of normative metadiscourse 
- rather than by 'unspoken agreements' or 'tacit conventions' - that we 












negotiate and contest the differential values and constraints that 'we' in 'our 
culture' place on linguistic phenomena. [p.13] 
References to normative metadiscourse are not wholly absent from linguistic theory, but 
these usually dismiss it as "prescriptivism" (p.13). Taylor makes reference to Deborah 
Cameron's argument that in contrast to the "unscientific value judgments" (p.14) normative 
metadiscourse is usually said to amount to, it constitutes an important phenomenon for 
linguistic study, due to its social and political significance, and not the least because it is a 
central characteristic of the object linguists purport to be studying. 
In fact, "concepts of correctness, relative value, and propriety are essential to the human 
experience of language, and of the contextual circumstances in which language is integrated" 
(p.16). Making normative discourse the focus of linguistics will allow theorists to get closer 
to the language user's experience of language. But this means theorists will have to abandon 
the notion that they are studying a scientific object, "independent of the voluntary acts of 
individuals" (ibid.), and acknowledge language's inherently political nature. There are some 
non-linguists who have already done this; Taylor lists ethnomethodologists Garfinkel and 
Heritage, and philosopher Wittgenstein. 
But language use does appear to be patterned, ordered, predictable - in other words, 
structured (or "code-likl' [Toolan, 1996:18, emphasis addedJ). Yes, says Taylor, but we need 
to adjust our expectations of what form that structure takes. His approach is to conceive of 
language as having an 'exoskeleton': 
its units and the patterned relationships between them ... are only misleadingly seen 
as properties that are internal to language itself, or to the interactions in which it 
occurs, or to the language that is being spoken, or to the language-user's 
mind/brain [p.18, emphasis added]. 
Using the analogy of measurement, Taylor illustrates his understanding of what language is, 
and what it is to know language. Language is a method for measuring the world, "for 












characterizations of the world" (p.19) However, he cautions that this is not to embrace 
linguistic relativism where language 'constructs' the world The measurement metaphor 
implies a property being measured that is independent of the action of measuring. 
But there is another way in which that being measured is not independent - when the object 
to be measured by language is language itself. For it is through this measuring activity that 
the role of language as accurate measure is reinforced and/or renegotiated Each language 
has its own tenus to achieve this purpose. While there may be different terms and 
techniques in different languages, no language is a language without this metalanguage 'built 
in'. 
Clearly, being a competent speaker of a language involves a lot more than possessing a 
mental dictionary or grammar book, or even a phrase book that tells you which utterances 
are appropriate when. As Taylor puts it: 
knowing language is more than a matter of being able to construct 'well-
formed' and meaningful sentences, and more even than being able to use such 
sentences appropriately in particular discursive routines, or language games. 
For it also involves knowing how to integrate your participation in these 
language games into the cultural practices which we recognize as characteristic 
of 'us' - of what Wittgenstein called our form of life. [p.21] 
Thus linguistic competence is better seen as a skill, an ability, than a static body of 
knowledge. The result of this reformulation is that concepts such as 'grammaticality' get an 
integrational makeover as no longer "a question concerning a property of the sentence itself 
but rather of how we reflexively characterize it" (p.23). 
like grammaticality, other concepts brandished by linguists as analytical tools are derived 
from an already 'enculturated' language: "alff!a4J the product of the language users' own prior, 
and continually refashioned, analyses" (p.24, original emphasis). Thus, Taylor concludes, 
there is no first-order, immediate knowledge; rather, "the theorist's analytical object will be a 












imposition of his own methodological techniques and criteria" (p.25, original emphasis). 
Love (2006b) regards "[o]ne of the projects of integrationallinguistics [to be] to show how 
such second-order processes are founded in and arise out of our first-order linguistic 
experience" (p.17). It would seem then, however, that Taylor believes first-order linguistic 
experience is in principle inaccessible as an object to others, integrationists or no - a not 
illogical conclusion to draw from Harris's theories, but not one Harris chooses to address. 
Although the source of the language myth is linked to our metalinguistic practices, 
metalinguistic activity is clearly not erroneous in and of itself. It is the unquestioned 
application of these practices to a science of language that is the problem. 
What has often happened in the history of linguistic and logical theorizing is 
that some of these derived distinctions and notions have been accorded a 
quasi-axiomatic status which cuts them off from their experiential basis. 
Consequendy, all kinds of academic enigmas have been generated which 
serve to obscure that experiential basis still further, and lead even to refusal 
to recognise it. [Harris, 1981:157] 
Harris locates the origins of the myth n post-Renaissance nonnative accounts of language, 
written by those who were attempting to give some direction to speakers and writers in 
avoiding ambiguity and improving clear communication. These normative accounts -
enshrined in dictionaries and grammar books - have subdy shifted over time to being taken 
as ontological accounts of what language actually is. Thus we are still left, for example, with 
the eighteenth century grammarian's legacy of the "tripartite organisation of language 
descriptionD" (p.57): phonetics, lexicon, grammar. Harris points to the difficulty (despite the 
apparent effordessness) of making these old grammatical categories fit within modem 
linguistics, without a generous allowance for 'fuzziness'. 
That may be the immediate basis for our concept of 'grammaticality', but there is an even 
deeper set of beliefs and practices that underlie this. Harris finds evidence of the 
telementational and detenninacy fallacies at the beginnings of what can be tenned the 












our treatment of language as autonomous, and separable from the non-linguistic world, 
Harris attributes largely to literacy: the advent of writing. 
2.6 Writing 
The ultimate basis for the illusion that languages are codes is (i) our inclination to 
treat unique utterances as things that can be talked about, (ii) the fact that we 
then find there is no way of citing them in order to talk about them except by 
repeating them, (iii) the fact that we then interpret the possibility of repetition as 
conjuring into existence something more abstract than either utterance itself -
namely, the enduring linguistic unit that both utterances are taken to be 
utterances of. [Love, 2004:573] 
While reflexivity is inherendy a feature of language, and thus speech, integrationists argue 
that it is the advent of writing which radically altered our perspective on our metalinguistic 
activities. As Linell (2005) puts it, writing makes the language-as-product view so much more 
possible, and so much easier to accept. With writing, we have something left over, after the 
action has taken place, something tangible. The illusion to which Love (2004) alludes (above) 
is strengthened: writing allows for a different way of identifying an utterance beyond merely 
spoken repetition. It constitutes "a very powerful tool for the decontextualization and 
recontextualization of speech, [by] detach[ing] the spoken word from the speaker and 
mak[ingl it 'representable' in another context" (Harris, 1998:123). 
The relationship between speech and writing in orthodox linguistics exhibits a cunous 
paradox. Harris highlights the irony that the conception of language peddled by orthodox 
linguistics - in which speech has primacy over writing - is one entrenched in, and shaped by, 
practices of a literate culture. In other words, the properties of writing have been generalised 
to hold true of speech as well, despite explicit declarations of writing's Cinderella status. 
Indeed, some linguists have gone so far as to exclude writing from the domain of language 
altogether, demoting it rather to "a way of recording language by means of visible marks" 
(Bloomfield, 1935 in Harris, 1998:109), while "the spoken word alone" (Saussure, 1922 in 












Meanwhile, it is written language that fonns the model for what proper, grammatically well-
fonned speech should 'look' like. That literacy has moulded the way we view speech, and by 
implication, the way we conceptualise language, is a fundamental flaw dogging modem 
orthodox linguistics. This 'scriptism' (Harris' term) fonns the centre point of Linell's (2005) 
critique of the discipline - a discipline he, too, finds wholly tainted by what he calls the 
'written language bias'. 
Like integrationists, Linell regards a written language bias (WLB) responsible for mainstream 
linguistics' conceptions of what language is, what a language is, where language is situated, its 
structure, what language is used for, and what meaning is. He distills the WLB into 101 
points (2005:ch.3); as many of Linell's points overlap with integrationallinguistic conclusions 
already mentioned, only those which represent an extension or development of integrational 
thought will be focused on. 
The written language bias dictates that all utterances are analysable texts; the focus of study 
is on the said rather than the act of st!Jing. The idea of being able to exacdy repeat someone's 
words seems plausible in writing (direct quotation), and thus there is a distinction between 
direct and indirect discourse. However, Linell notes that even in the written mode, direct 
quotations by implication appear in a new context, and thus are not identical to the original 
utterance, while in spoken interaction, there is a blurring between direct and indirect 
discourse. 
Traditionally, the boundaries between text and context are clear, and thus texts are repeatable 
in a new context, unchanged - nowhere is this clearer than in the attitude that transcription 
is a "veridical record of speech" (Linell, 2005:118). However, because text and context are 
difficult to distinguish, and difficult to predict in advance of an interaction, the project of 
extracting 'text' from a situated communication event is inherendy flawed. Likewise, 
dialogism regards transcription as an impoverished textual abstraction from a social, 
interactive activity. Toolan (1996) expresses the integrational linguistic attitude towards 
transcription as "a kind of absconding with that part of an 'interaction most easily reduced to 












(or senes of events) into a textual product (separable from 'the' contextual setting), a 
property" (ibid.). 
Furthermore, the orthodox position holds that "[c]oherence is a primary characteristic of a 
text, a piece of discourse or a conversation, and is defined in terms of intra-textual 
connectedness" (Linell, 2005:103). In contrast, for Linell, coherence is not internal to a text, 
but extends beyond the text as a relationship between 'discourse' and 'context'; nor is it a 
fixed property, but rather emergent from moment to moment 'in' the activity. Dialogism 
focuses on the activity rather than the product. 
Grammatical ambiguity and semantic paradoxes exist chiefly in, and are products of, the 
written mode (a structurally similar utterance in spoken communication would feature 
intonation, pauses or emphasis, for example, that would avoid ambiguity). In situated 
communication, semantic 'problems' or ambiguities stem from sources other than structure, 
such as different perspectives, or vagueness (Linell, 2005). 
In contrast to orthodox linguistics, integrational linguistics, holds that speech and writing 
cannot be separated from each other, by foregrounding one or the other; language cannot be 
equated with speech; and writing is not merely a way of recording the spoken word; and thus 
the study of writing is not dependent on the study of speech (adapted from Harris, 
1998:109). In short, writing is an alternative means of linguistic expression, not a poor 
reproduction of the spoken, and although it shares some characteristics with speech, it has 
enough unique features to be considered an object of study in its own right. 
Harris (1998) highlights some key differences: writing integrates different biomechanical 
activities to speech, for example the fine motor co-ordination of handwriting or typing. 
Writing has an additional spatial dimension, whereas speech has only a temporal dimension. 
It functions not as a representation of different forms of speech, but rather it integrates 
speech with other activities (for example, reading out loud). The distinction Linell (2005) 












Table 2.1: Differences between speech and writing 
Spoken Language/Speaking Written Language/Writing 
• dynamic behaviour distributed in • written text and its components 
realtime characterised as objects, persistent 
in time and static 
• involvement of bodily gestures • disembodied trace of writing 
activity 
• interaction is wholly dependent • relatively autonomous, lacks an 
on the situation and other immediate situational context, thus 
contexts must be more explicit than speaking 
• adapted for monological use 
• communication through talk is • reading and writing requires explicit 
available to all normally equipped instruction 
human beings • more constrained by rules 
• prinruuysoc~ation • secondary s~ation 
SOfIrCI: SlIfIII1larisedjrolll LineD, 2005:19-24. 
However, Line11 qualifies this list with the caveat that the general distinctions drawn are 
based on the spoken prototype of infonnal conversation, whereas the written prototype is 
that of printed, expository prose. On closer inspection the distinctions between 
reading/writing and speaking may not be so clear cut. In certain communication activities 
the two media may have more in common with each other than the same media across 
different communication contexts. For example, some genres of spoken language are 
formalised and restricted in ways very similar to written language. 
Secondly, Linell notes that even though there is prestige attached to literacy in our modern-
day literate Western culture, both this and the belief that written language is the more 
'proper' form of language should not be assumed to be universally held beliefs, even in 
literate cultures. In ancient times, it was a slave's task to read out writing to a master - it was 
speech-in-person that was considered authentic and creative among the free. In medieval 
times, writing was distincdy distrusted - it was believed that the careless or the malicious 












speaking and writing further, and will likely bring about a change in attitude towards the two 
phenomena, in time. 
Paradoxically, a discipline that is shot through with a bias towards written language has no 
systematic, coherent theory of writing itself. ''From an integrational point of view, the 
mistake embodied in the traditional Western view of writing is plain: it confuses the function 
of the written sign with just one of its possible uses" (Harris, 1995:7, my emphasis). That 
one possible use is recording speech: glottic writing, leaving mathematical and musical 
notation, as well as modern typography, and 'pseudo-writing,22 out in the cold in terms of 
their ability to signify anything, i.e. to function semiotically (Harris, 1995). This confusion of 
function is the reason why writing is seen as inferior to speech. 
2.7 Ideal speech and speech errors 
The concept of 'speech error' is deeply ingrained in all manner of linguistic theories, and 
thus Taylor (1997) finds it necessary to devote a large section of his chapter on sc.riptism 
(ch.2) to a discussion of this orthodox illusion. Broadly defined, a speech error is anything 
which "disrupt[s] the ideal fluency of the speaker's utterance" (Taylor, 1997:29); examples 
include silent pauses, filled pauses, repetitions, and false starts. Usually these are 
"represented. .. as the product of non-linguistic faculties at work in the speaker's mental 
processing of 'what he is going to say'" (ibid.). 
'Speech error' is a revealing term; these discontinuities are not typically found in written 
language - they are filtered out. 
In this respect discontinuity is like many of the features of spoken language, 
including intonation, rhythmic grouping, and articulation rate. And yet all of 
these, along with discontinuity, are commonly occurring features of the speech 
acts we regularly perform in communicational interaction. [p.30] 
22 The term, as Harris explains (pp.85-87), incorporates two distinct but related phenomena, both equally 
fascinating. Anthropologists label shamanic writing which is intelligible only to the shaman, and only while he 
or she is in the trance in which the writing is produced, 'pseudo-writing'. Psychologists have used 'pseudo-
writing' to describe children's preliterate scribbling which appears to have mnemonic and semiotic function, if 
only for them. Harris proceeds to extend the term to advertisement copy which takes advantage of the play of 












The distinction between the reading and listening becomes readily apparent, as Taylor's 
transcribed example of 'normal' conversation (p.30) serves to illustrate, when one attempts 
to read a 'direct' transcription of speech which includes all discontinuities. It is a very 
disconcerting process for a reader, whereas someone listening to a tape-recording of the 
sample of speech from which it comes may have no difficulty understanding it. 
Even among linguists, there is a lack of consensus as to the terminology describing 
discontinuity - which Taylor sees as indicative of the broader problem. We (as English-
speaking people) do not often talk about discontinuity, and thus "English has not developed 
an organized terminology for talking about ~t]" (p.32). However, this does not hold true for 
all languages - Taylor cites Brian Stross's work on Tze1tal metalinguistics, which appears to 
incorporate a number of expressions to explicidy talk about discontinuity. 
Without the normative metalinguistic resources in our language for discussing discontinuity, 
Taylor points out that different disciplines in the English academic world (for example, 
psychology) have been free to appropriate the phenomenon for their own purposes. Apart 
from an identity crisis, discontinuity seems to face an ontological crisis - it doesn't really 
exist except in relation to its opposite (fluent speech). It has no independent features, 
presents no real data for inspection. 
In short, the investigator of discontinuity is all the more conscious of the fact 
that that which matters in language is not direcdy observable but is, rather, the 
conceptual product of the way a linguistic culture talks about language, thinks 
about it, and uses it is culturally-defined contexts. [PA2] 
Where does this accepted practice of denigrating/excluding discontinuity in speech come 
from? According to Taylor, historically, the discourse of rhetoric has reinforced the notion 
that the more speech emulates writing, the closer to perfection it gets. Ideal speech is akin to 
reading aloud. Reading out loud is not always a flawless affair, but what is taken to be the 
cause or source of discontinuities (e.g. pauses, mispronunciations) are not to be found 'in' 












What differences do exist between speech and writing are not really an essential feature of 
language, but things that interfere with language. This view is consistent with Chomsky's 
notion of 'performance error' (i.e. discontinuity of speech)23 being caused by interference 
from, for example "memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest" 
(Chomsky 1965:3-4, in Taylor 1997:46), effectively excluding it from the realm of language 
proper, and thus from the linguist's object of study. 
As Taylor points out, it also implies that most of the time we are speaking incorrectly (when 
compared to the standard of well-formed sentences produced by competence grammars). So 
despite the fact that so-called errors are both rife in speech, and every child seems to learn 
regular ways of producing these discontinuities, it cannot be considered a feature of language 
or linguistic knowledge/competence. Discarded by linguistics, speech discontinuity is picked 
up by psychology. 
Psycholinguistics explains it as a discrepancy between planning and execution. Thus planning 
is a type of mental writing in which the perfect sentence is constructed; speech is "the 
reading off of a mental text" (p.S2). In execution however, speech may distort the mental 
writing. The implicit but undemonstrated assumption on which such theories rely is that 
speakers are constantly trying to produce an ideal delivery. Taylor cites Clark & Clark (1977) 
on their justification for this assumption or belief. As he demonstrates, what it amounts to is 
another assumption; that the ideal delivery aids communicative efficacy, and thus fulfills "the 
semantic and social functions of speech" (p.S1). But do deviations from ideal delivery result 
in communication difficulty? The onus is on those who make this claim, Taylor says, 
especially since deviation from ideal delivery would appear to be the norm. In a nutshell, 
the proponent of the theory of the ideal delivery is asking us to believe not 
only that speakers constantly try to do what they almost never do but also that, 
if they fail to succeed, it makes no manifest difference to the success of the 
speech act [p.S1]. 












Put so blundy, the standard psycholinguistic approach seems embarrassingly absurd. 
Assumptions such as Clark & Clark's have the effect of making grammaticality synonymous 
with communicational efficacy. Again, this is a formulation which, on the surface, sounds 
like common sense. Do people not painstakingly learn the grammar of a foreign language in 
order to be understood by its native speakers? Yes, but when a child says 'goed' instead of 
'went', or an adult additional-language English speaker says 'The dogs is barking' instead of 
the 'The dogs are barking', does misunderstanding ensue? But to take an even more common 
example: when someone asks me where I am going, and I reply 'Shopping, to Pick 'n Pay.', 
do they have difficulty understanding because technically this is not a complete, 
grammatically well-formed sentence? 
To make sense of the fact that ungrammaticality doesn't seem necessarily to result in 
communication breakdown, rules governing the practices of 'editing' (m which the speaker 
corrects themselves 'mid-sentence' 24) and 'repair' (in which the hearer effectively 
reformulates in their mind what the speaker has said in a grammatically correct sentence) 
have been postulated - the psycholinguistic realisation of the doctrine of ellipsis. These are 
extralinguistic features which, while providing a form of organisation to conversation, and 
aiding transmission of the sentence, are, Taylor notes, like discontinuities, excluded from 
language itself. 
Taylor concludes his chapter on discontinuity with the integrationist's approach to the topic: 
[I]he evidence reveals (1) that discontinuities can be intentional features of a 
speaker's performance, (n) that they are only disruptive from the blinkered 
perspective of the scriptist conception of the communicative act, and (ill) 
that they may serve interactional aims in speech which, due to scriptism, have 
too often been ignored. fp.62] 
Linell (2005) echoes this approach, in highlighting the communicative function that so-called 
errors have in speech, as part of the online negotiation of meaning that takes place in real-
24 Even the concept of speech being 'mid-sentence' is scriptist, as if the sentence was already 'there' (with 












time interactions. What is significant for our purposes is that Linell emphasises that prosodic 
and non-vocal aspects have semiotic value, and the latter in particular can be utilised by 
those who have difficulty with language (m general, e.g. an aphasic, or a specific language, e.g. 
a foreign language speaker). Ultimately, what is called for is a more nuanced approach to so-
called discontinuities, that rather than lumping all instances together as 'errors', treats their 
significance (or insignificance, as orthodox linguistics would have us believe) as not given in 
advance, but a function of the specific utterance interaction in which they occur (Taylor, 
1997). 
2.8 Signs 
To have meaning is to have semiotic value, to signify - this is the defining property of a sign. 
For orthodox linguistics since Saussure, the value of a sign is determined by its relation to 
(via its non-identity with) every other sign within a bounded system. Thus the value within a 
given system is fixed. A sign itself is a ''bipartite unit" consisting of "a single form (signifianl) 
and a single meaning (signifie)" (Harris, 1995:22); to alter either form or meaning is thus to be 
dealing with a new (or non-identical) sign. 
Semiology - the study of signs - is a field which Saussure (1983[1916]) brought into being by 
his redefinition of language, and in which he situated linguistics. For him, a language (Ia 
langue) was a system of signs (word-forms paired with concept-meanings). If integrational 
linguistics rejects the orthodox Saussurean view of language, then by implication it must also 
reject Saussurean semiology: 
In integrational semiology ... the sign does not exist outside the context which gives 
rise to it there is no abstract invarianfS which remains 'the same' from one context 
to the next. Nor, a fortiori, is there any overarching Saussurean system to guarantee 
that invariance. [ ... ] The integrational sign has no determinate theoretical structure 
of this kind: it is treated as a complex of which any number of different facets may 
25 It is worth emphasising that integrationists do not endorse the idea of invariant signifier with variable 
signified meanings. The notion of invariant form is just as misleading, just as much of a myth, as invariant 












be identified, depending on the purpose of the analysis. /.Harris, 1995:22, footnote 
added] 
Rather than some pre-existing object (physical, abstract or psychological) which we 
manipulate in the course of using language to convey meaning, for Harris the sign only 
comes into being as a sign within an actual communicational situation. It is a sign by virtue of 
the fact that it is treated as a sign - its signhood is conferred by its (successful) role in 
integrating activities in a communicational interaction (Love, 2004; Harris, 2006). This 
integration "typically involves the contextualized application of biomechanical skills within a 
certain macrosocial framework" (Harris, 1995:22-23); successful communication is therefore 
a result not of static linguistic (or other semiotic) competence, as in fixed knowledge, but 
rather a moment-to-moment "integrational proficiency" (Harris, 2006:716). The upshot is 
that words (In the orthodox linguistic sense) are not signs (In the integrational linguistic 
sense); 'words' and 'the language' to which they belong are metalinguistic entities, "second-
order cultural construct[s]" (Love, 2004), a macrosocial factor potentially influencing 
communication (Harris, 2006). 
2.9 Semantics 
Ask the average person what it means to say that words have meanings, and they will 
probably unhesitatingly answer, a word's meaning is what it stands for, or what it refers to. 
But this introduces equally tricky concepts. How does a word 'stand for' or 'refer to' 
something else? Harris (1981) outlines some attempts at solving this. For Saussure, the 
answer lay in psychology, where meaning is equated with concepts; 'items in the heads' of 
speakers, for which words stood. Behaviourism in the 1930s sought to move away from 
explanations that hinged on unobservable mental entities, labelling such speculation 
unscientific. Leading the behaviourist cause, Bloomfield maintained that meaning could only 
be linked to items in the external world, and could only be ascertained definitively if science 
had investigated that item - leaving numerous words for which meaning was uncertain. 
Understandably, linguistics' focus shifted from semantics to describing linguistic forms, 
retaining only that which could be declared utterly separate from the non-linguistic world-












The Chomskyan revolution hailed the return of 'mentalism', but the segregationist stance 
was retained. Under generative linguistics, 'semantic knowledge' was not to be equated with 
knowledge of the world, for this would imply that linguistic knowledge must include 
everything that speakers of that language know about the world. Rather, semantic knowledge 
is perfect knowledge of the self-contained system of linguistic items and their meaning 
relations to each other. Thus the meaning of an utterance is constructed by the abstract, 
bounded system of the language to which it belongs; the speaker/hearer accesses this 
meaning by reference to/activation of their internalised linguistic knowledge, of the words 
Q.exicon) and the rules (grammar), of that language (Harris, 1981). 
But this leaves the gap between language and world wide open. A less popular theory which 
attempts to address this shortfall is truth-conditional semantics, where sentence meaning is 
detennined by knowing the conditions. under which the sentence would be true, i.e. 
correspond to what is in the world (Harris, 1981). The main reason for its lack of appeal is 
probably that it leads to redundant statements of the type '''Snow is white' is true, if, and 
only if, it is the case that snow is white" (Tarski, cited in Harris, 1987:159). 
All of these semantic theories are based on the fixed-code doctrine that has necessitated a 
search for universal, context-free meanings of words, which are often labelled the 'literal' 
meaning of the word. Deviations from this are then labelled 'metaphorical' (more on this in 
Section 2.10 below). But context-free meanings are an "illusory abstraction" (Harris, 
1981:68). While the segregationist sees words and their meanings as detennined in advance 
by the language to which they belong, the integrationist sees a language as the second-order 
product of the way people use words to meaningfully integrate activities. 
That is not to say, Harris cautions, that integrational linguistics subscribes to a view of 
language whereby meaning is to be found in the intentions of the speaker. Firstly, this 
quickly dissolves into 'Humpty Dumpty,26 linguistics, whereby words can mean absolutely 
anything the speaker decides at a given moment. Secondly, it relegates the hearer to a passive 
or non-existent role in meaning making. Thirdly, it is not exactly clear how one would 
express someone's intention 'behind' what they said, except by repeating what it was they 












said. Lasdy, taken to its logical conclusion, this view may even endorse the belief that one's 
intentions are constrained by the language in which one expresses oneself (Harris, 1981). 
Toolan (1996) doesn't reject intentionality outright, instead - paraphrasing Knapp & 
Michaels' (1987) position - he highlights its role in communication, and in writing 
specifically: 
To treat marks as intended, as language, is thereby to assume an intending author, 
regardless of their evident absence. And the basis for deciding whether marks are 
authored, intended and language or accidental, unintended and meaningless ... is 
empirical rather than theoretical ... guided by past empirical experience and the 
larger present context [p.122] 
But for integrationists, "meaning is always 'now''' (p.12S), and therefore Toolan's conclusion 
doesn't contradict Harris's: authorial intention is mediated by the role of the addressee 
(which Knapp & Michaels overlook) in the present context. Furthermore, "[s]ubsequent 
historically situated interpretations of text are not an overlaying of new contingencies on an 
established meaning but a thoroughgoing refonnulation (not a revision in the sense of a 
correction) of what the original meaning is" (Ibid.). 
The theory of intentionality can be understood as derived from the everyday practice of 
using the word 'mean' to convey intention, i.e. 'What did you mean by that statement?'. We 
are not asking 'What was the hidden string of mentalese situated in your head which you felt 
that statement was an accurate expression of?' We are signaling a failed communication 
attempt and asking the speaker to try again. However, (as Taylor and Harris have argued, see 
Section 2.5 above) a metalinguistic analysis of the initial 'What do you mean?' statement has 
led to the second-order notion of meanings hiding in the speaker's head in a different format, 
waiting to be expressed. Similarly, glossing practices are not seen by integrationists as 
evidence of a fixed code, but rather evidence of the resources speakers have for reducing the 
semantic indetenninacy inherent in language. Thus asking 'What does filigree mean?' and 












fixed code theorist's argument, and not the 'Exhibit A' of invariable meaning it is usually 
taken to be. 
2.10 Metaphor 
One of Harris' (1981) conclusions about orthodox linguistics is that adherence to the fixed 
code makes it difficult to give any plausible account of metaphorical language. Metaphorical 
language is supposed to be the use of words in a way that deviates from the fixed code that 
contains their literal meaning. How we can make sense of this language then can only be 
explained by reference to something outside of language, our extra-linguistic knowledge of 
how to use language in everyday situations. That our language is littered with so-called 'dead 
metaphors' makes the task of distinguishing between the literal and metaphorical, and thus 
the code and the use to which it is put, virtually impossible. 
Michael Toolan bravely tackles the minefield of metaphor in Total Speech (1996). He opens 
his interconnected chapters on literal and figurative language with Stanley Fish's provocative 
claim that "there is no such thing as literal meaning" (Fish, 1989, in Toolan, 1996:24), a 
statement that soon wanes in absurdity as one follows the argument through the two 
chapters. He asserts that the stark literal/metaphoric dichotomy is really "a deeply embedded 
convenience of literate Western culture" (ibid.). Its 'convenience' points to its utility, and 
ultimately to its significance: the concept of literal meaning (and thus its contrastingly 
defined other, metaphor) is "an important myth" (p.50). 
Significance in everyday interaction aside, we should not lose sight of the fact that 
"conceptualizations in terms of literalness versus metaphoricality are themselves essentially a 
form of figuration" (p.25) - thus the concept of literal meaning is thoroughly metaphoric; 
there is indeed 'no such thing. Literal meaning is figured as the highly suspect context-free, 
ground zero from which all meaning making starts. Despite the fact that "in practice no such 
domain of context-free meaning exists" (ibid.), most semantic accounts appear, implicidy or 
explicidy, to regard literal meaning as foundational. 
Crucially, Toolan points out that there can be no such thing as invariable identity across 












an interaction or activity may seem, it is not identical with the last time we did it. We are 
different in time, for one. To forget 'the gap' would render our experience of the world 
pathological, without orientation in time and space.27 
The received, orthodox view of metaphorical language holds that metaphorical language is 
"different in kind" from conventional language, and that is made possible by the user's 
"perception of [in contrasting accounts] either anomaly or analogy" (p.59). This provides the 
foundation for the three dominant theories of how metaphor works: substitution, 
comparison, and interaction. 
Componentialist semantics, whereby the meaning of a whole is the sum of its parts, holds 
that in order to derive the meaning of a metaphor, one must cancel out those literal (fixed) 
meanings of the 'vehicle' that don't apply to the tenor. Toolan finds that even pragmaticist 
accounts seem to rely on some notion of literal meaning - a sort of 'literal meaning plus 
context' approach. 
Toolan states the integrational position as follows: 
literal meaning is not an irrelevant category; it plays a role in utterance 
construal, but has no foundational role and is not logically and interpretively 
prior to other supposedly derived meanings ... but influences interpretation in 
that it often encapsulates a familiar and well-established usage fp.44] 
Toolan calls for a focus on use and habituation, rather than pre-given literal meanings, and for 
a relativisation of the literal/metaphorical distinction. In stark contrast to the orthodox 
account, the integrationist take on metaphor is as "neither process nor thing but the name of 
a practice" (p.56), and rather than a deviation from nonnal language use, Toolan 
characterises it as an expression of the nonn of novelty in language. 
He draws a parallel between notions of conventional and non-conventional usage, and those 
of standard and non-standard dialects. There is a tendency to regard non-standard dialects as 












parasitic upon, even altered or warped versions of, the standard (even though such an 
opinion is now largely banished from linguistics); however, its users do not have to refer to 
the standard dialect to 'interpret' the meanings of non-standard words in the dialect - they 
simply use the dialect. That it can be paraphrased into standard dialect is not to say that that's 
what it reallY means - paraphrasing is merely a useful practice for an outsider. That one 
dialect is regarded as standard, and another as non-standard, is a matter of authority and 
politics - it does not embody any empirical fact. So too is the relationship between 
conventional and non-conventional usage. ''Whenever we are the recipients of a creative 
metaphor, we are in the position of familiars of conventional language faced with 
unconventionalism" (p.67). 
Metaphor (or novel/creative metaphor, rather), then, is a risk-taking manoeuvre, with the 
potential reward of enhanced insight or intimacy. And it plays a creative role in the renewal 
and change oflanguage. For this second property of metaphor, Toolan draws support from 
psycholinguistic research that proposes an unconventional way of looking at metaphor: to 
regard the metaphoric term as setting up (temporarily) a superordinate category to which 
both vehicle and tenor belong, and of which metaphoric term is then a prototypical 
exemplar. Thus the influence between vehicle and tenor is bidirectional, rather than the 
orthodox notion of influence flowing from vehicle to the tenor only (1996:70-71). In other 
words, there is nothing necessarily inherentlY similar in vehicle or tenor, but metaphorising 
makes it so. 
Toolan thus challenges the notion that metaphorical meaning is parasitic upon literal 
meaning. In fact, some have even argued that the literal may be derived from the 
metaphorical- viewing it as a narrowing or "pruning" (Kittay, 1987 in Toolan, 1996:69) of 
the broader/more abundant associative meaning held by metaphor. In any case, 
psycholinguistic research supports this challenge to literal meaning's priority; when subjects' 
processing times for literal or conventional metaphoric terms in context are compared, there 
is litde difference (i.e. there is no time for stepwise computation in metaphor). In fact, as 
Toolan notes, idioms have long been regarded as 'long words' in terms of the brain's 
processing. However, this is not true of all cases. The 'ease' or speed of interpretation relies 












the metaphor (whether it flows across sentences, or vehicle and tenor are explicidy referred 
to in one sentence) and power relations between speaker and hearer have been found to 
influence processing time. As Toolan explains, in all these instances, a certain kind of 
performance is being tested ("'Is this sentence a reasonable paraphrase of that one?'" [p.79]) 
- to infer competence from this is somewhat reckless. For the integrationist, there is value in 
such investigations into performance, as long as they are treated as such. (A similar concern 
can be raised about inferences drawn from tests of schizophrenic patients' comprehension 
of metaphorical language, as shall be addressed in Chapter 5, below.) 
In conclusion, then, "[m]etaphorizing is using language, only more so" (Toolan, 1996:92). 
We should be careful of assuming that because a metaphor can be paraphrased into more 
straightforward terms, it is a different kind of language. The integrationist acknowledges that 
it can have special uses, but this is not to say that it 'works' any differendy from conventional 
language. "Paraphrasing is an important language game, but it is not a procedure occupying 
an autonomous position outside all language games, as if it underwrote or monitored them. 
The paraphrase of a metaphor is not equivalent to that metaphor" (p.95). Thus, the 
integrational approach to metaphor seriously calls into question the validity of using 
figurative language as a measure of some dedicated cognitive faculty or ability. 
This approach is supported by subsequent work in cognitive science. Lakoff & Johnson 
(1999), who since the 1980s have consistendy highlighted the fundamental role metaphor 
plays in the way we experience the world, and think and talk about it (e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980; Lakoff, 1987), also question the 'special' status bestowed on metaphorical language. 
They deny the existence of metaphorical language as such, and champion the existence of 
metaphorical thought which, far from being an exceptional case, is our default way of 
thinking. They also deny the strict distinction between perception and conception, arguing 
for a blending of the two; thus language and thought cannot express objective truths about 
the world (truth being one distinguishing feature between literal and metaphorical, the 
former expressing something 'as it actually is in the world', the latter not), because all our 
thinking, and therefore concept formation, is intimately bound up in our sensory perceptive 












embodied nature of language and thought, and will be discussed further in Section 2.12 
below. 
2.11 Language emergence 
While integrationallinguistics spends a great deal of time talking about where our concept of 
language comes from, it doesn't have too much to say about language (however one 
characterises the phenomenon) evolution in the species.28 As mentioned in Chapter 1, 
speculations about language evolution are of particular importance to theories of 
schizophrenic language, because there is evidence to suggest a genetic relationship between 
the emergence of psychosis and language in Homo sapiens (e.g. Crow, 1997; De Lisi, 2001; 
Burns, 2007). There are a number of competing mainstream accounts of language evolution, 
so it is difficult to determine the orthodox position. Nevertheless, there is an overall trend to 
treat language as a distincdy human entity, i.e. there is something about human language that 
no animal communication system shares.29 According to Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch (2002), 
this is the oldest of "[a]t least three issues [that] cross-cut the debate on language evolution" 
(p.1570); the other two are whether language evolution was gradual or represented an abrupt 
change, and lasdy what Hauser et 01. call the "continuation versus exaptation issue" (ibid.), 
that is, is language as we know it the result of an ever-improving system of communication, 
or did it evolve from human abilities/structures/faculties that were initially adapted for 
something else? A belief that human language is unique, in the context of evolutionary 
theory, is the basis for the postulation of a biological endowment -located in the brain -
that sets humans apart from their primate ancestors and modern-day relatives. Oearly a 
belief about what language is, then, is crucial to this project.30 Apart from a measure of 
28 Talbot Taylor has, however, co-authored a book on the ape language debate with Sue Savage-Rumbaugh and 
Stuart Shanker (Apes, Lanll'a!! and lhe Mind, 1998). 
29 Traditionally, language as a unique and sophisticated system, and thus the humans who use it, have been 
regarded as the pinnacle of evolution (Linell [2005] calls it the secular version of language as God-given to 
man), i.e. the ultimate communication system. For theorists like Steven Pinker (1994), however, language is just 
an instinct - for humans - like flying is for birds, or swimming for whales. Thus, according to Pinker there is 
no sense in comparing our communication abilities with those of modem-day chimps (our closest relative, 
evolutionarily speaking) or any other animals - any similarities could be explained just as easily by analogous 
evolution (related in the way bees' wings are related to birds' wings) as by invoking some homologous feature 
shared with a common ancestor. 
30 As Savage-Rumbaugh tl aL (1998) argue in their closing chapter, much of the debate concerning whether 
apes really acquire Ianll'a!! centres around representation, not interpretation of the data, because of the 













uniqueness attached to human language, the other assumption shared by competing theories 
is that the benefits of language must have far outweighed any negative attributes of the 
biological changes that made language possible. 
Toolan (1996) does touch on the subject, although his brief ruminations are a preface to a 
discussion of development of language in children. The development of a healthy child gives 
an opportunity to observe language emerging in an individual - but they are born into a 
'languaging' world; how did language emerge in a language-less people? Linguists and 
philosophers have speculated about this for centuries, and although there is no way of 
knowing for sure, I would argue that Toolan's integrational take on the problem is supported 
by work in evolutionary psychiatry that rivals Crow's (1997) theories (see Section 5.1 on 
Bums, 2007). 
Toolan paints a picture of a pre-linguistic society in which a group of men's regular activity is 
tree felling. He imagines the group consisting of men of different status, if only by virtue of 
their age. Over time, certain sounds (grunts) - especially those uttered by the head (oldest) 
tree feller - may come to be associated with certain manoeuvres, much like other physical 
responses to the activity of chopping, or lifting (for example, bracing certain muscles). The 
link is no more than saying the sound 'goes with' the activity, but importantly what counts as 
the beginning and end of the sound will follow the segmentation of the activity itself (how it 
is thought to consist of different steps or stages by the participants - crucially, there is no 
'natural' division). 
To be sure, the sounds do not enable or even aid the tree-felling activity, and do not have 
significance outside of the immediate activity either, and may have initially been established 
in a ritualistic capacity. But that they have been 'noticed', identified as some thing, is the 
crucial first step towards developing language. The act of picking them out as a separate 
entity allows for them to be consciously/voluntarily wielded or manipulated With the 
passing of time though, eventually these grunt sounds may have come to be treated as 












there are no guarantees ... that the same sounds will be associated with the same 
meanings by every participant. The language will have arisen out of no such 
blueprint of certainties. It will have started with a spirit ... of trust or belief that 
another's pattern of grunts ... are reflective of the different purposes they do so 
accompa~y, in some patterned way [p.l00] 
Toolan's illustration serves to show, firsdy, how the principle of cotemporality is logically 
prior to any displacement property which language may have. Secondly, "language as a mode 
of action" precedes (both ontogenetically and phylogenetically) "language as a means for 
thinking" (p.11 0). 
While he acknowledges that there are difficulties with aligning phylogenetic with ontological 
language development, there are parallels. The apparendy 'effordess' way in which human 
children tend to develop language has led many to conclude that a good deal of language 
ability is innate, considering the 'poverty of stimulus'. But a five-year-old's language ability 
can only be considered equivalent to an adult's if one mobilises a distinction between 
competence and performance (as orthodox linguistics does). Thus, what a child acquires 
'effordessly' is the ability to use form-meaning pairs (language) as an adult does, although 
their proficiency in a language (their native tongue) is still inferior. Integrationists argue that 
this overlooks a large proportion of the input and learning that the child is subject to. As 
Unell (2005) observes, children grow up in an (linguistic and extra-linguistic) information-
rich environment. Coming into language is about more than merely being exposed to a 
sufficient set of sentences made possible by the structure of a given language. Whereas an 
adult may learn to speak a language, for example, English, a child learns to become "an 
English-speaking persotl' (Toolan, 1996:281, my emphasis). Words can only be learnt in 
context (even the dictionary is a context), and learning words is generally impossible to 
isolate from learillng activities (Linell, 2005). 
What is needed for language to develop similarly in most human children is not a shared 
genetically hardwired capacity for language, as in a built-in 'knowledge of grammar' structure 
forming the scaffold for the actual language to which the child is exposed, but rather, Toolan 












makes us "rational, reflective, imaginative, sense-making, pattern-seeking, other-oriented 
individuals" (p.302) - what Linell (2005) calls "a biologically endowed capacity for dialogue" 
(p.ll0) that goes well beyond the verbal. Thus Toolan shifts the onus from language-specific 
(cognitive) to general human (social) capacities. 
By extension then, rather than "rule-governed activity", integrationists view language as 
"hypothesis-backed creativity" (p.317), where our past experience is a useful guide, but not 
completely constraining. "Too often ... human tendencies to develop and observe patternings 
and to be trained in and conform to normative formats are recast in the linguistics literature 
as intrinsically cognitive rather than social" (p.316) - resulting in the mythical mutual 
knowledge which is said to lead to mutual understanding. 
My only objection here is that Toolan is mobilising a more traditional conception of 
'cognition'. There is no need (nor perhaps is it possible) to draw a stark distinction between 
the social and the cognitive individual. Indeed, Stephen J. Cowley a psychologise1 with 
strong integrationist leanings, maintains similar conclusions to Toolan, namely that "[t]he 
child needs, not an adaptation for language, but ways of assessing and managing others that 
sustain encultured and word-based judgements" (2006:217), and yet without clinging to an 
individual-based notion of cognition. Cognition is a social, jointly-achieved activity. While 
Harris casts thinking, in the integrational perspective, as self-communication, there is no 
reason for the definition of cognition to stop with 'self. Linell (2005) regards the view of 
cognition as being located solely in an individual as yet another consequence of the written 
language bias. Rather, dialogism proposes that communication be viewed as "the 
environment for individual as well as collective ('distributed'[ ... J) cognition" (p.97). Thus any 
strict separation of cognition and communication is artificial. The notion of a complete, 
formulated thought awaiting transportation to an interlocutor's mind is patently false - on 
this Linell (2005:99) quotes Merleau-Ponty (1962): "[s]peech does not translate ready-made 
thought, but accomplishes it". The communication of thoughts and feelings, for example, is 
31 Cowley has also studied linguistics, and is the co-ordinator of the Distributed Language Group (Distributed 















also often unavoidably intertwined. Utterances are to be regarded as "meaningful actions, 
rather than plain 'behaviour''' (p.l02). 
Dialogism also opposes the 'brain as computer' model of cognition. Learning, thinking and 
remembering - quintessentially 'individual' occupations - are dynamic activities, involving 
construction and reconstruction, appropriation and participation. Fixed item (verbatim) 
recall only occurs in particular contexts. The mind, seen as the seat of cognition, "is an 
abstract and comprehensive way of talking about the abilities of the ('mindful') person to 
interact with the world" (p.112). Even at the neurophysiological level of the brain, 
connectionism and theories of neural networks provide an alternative to the picture of the 
brain as manipulating representations. For Linell (2007), the brain is thoroughly dialogical, a 
view that accords strongly with Cowley's (2004, 2006), as we shall see below. There is no 
reason why integrationallinguistics should not embrace this view of cognition. Indeed, there 
are indications that some integrationists already do. 
2.12 Language: embodied, embedded, encultured 
Even if not explicidy stated, integrationists are typically sympathetic to interdisciplinary 
studies of human behaviour. Recent investigations into correspondences between 
integrational linguistics and an approach in cognitive science known as 'distributed 
cognition' are thus hardly surprising. Love (2004) is of the opinion that there are definitely 
grounds for a fruitful collaboration between the two fields.32 However, he criticises what he 
sees as the unnecessary attachment that Andy Clark (as one of the leaders in the field of 
distributed cognition) has to the 'classical view' of mind (passive, disembodied, symbol 
manipulator), evidenced in his fixed-code view of language. More than just unnecessary, 
Love maintains that it is detrimental to Clark's main argument the embodied mind and the 
fixed-code view of language are two theses which cannot logically be held concurrendy. 
Broadly sketched, those who uphold the notion of distributed cognition adhere to a belief 
that the mind/brain cannot be studied out of context - the context of the human body. It is 
32 In his appraisal of the conversation between distributed cognition and integrationallinguistics, Harris (2004) 













not an abstract machine, but a situated pattern-completing device, that has evolved out of 
the needs and practices of human beings. And human beings themselves are situated in a 
world 'out there', the bigger context that also has to be taken into account. Distributed 
cognition paints the picture of a mind that uses the world out there to its advantage - as 
scaffolding to enhance its abilities. The mind is 'distributed' because thinking is not restricted 
to the brain, but rather, the cognitive load is shared with the embodied brain's surroundings 
(Clark, 1997a). 
The human mind/brain's design equipping it to exploit its environment often leads to the 
invention of artifacts to further this aim (for example, a calculator aiding mental arithmetic, 
or a souvenir aiding memory). In this regard, Clark labels language as the "ultimate artifact" 
(1997b:193): it provides individual brains with "culturally achieved representation" in place 
of "time- and labour-intensive internal computation" (p.200). Secondly, it enhances the 
brain's cognitive abilities by allowing for second-order cognition; language provides a 
medium for thoughts to be inspected and potentially edited Both of these features, for Clark, 
depend on language being a fixed code, however, internal second-order cognition is only 
possible because language in its original public form, as an external symbolic system, evolved 
to achieve this invariant relationship between form and meaning (for maximum 
communicational efficiency). 
This view of language as artifact designates language as tool and container - a meaning-
holding device. Humans place their meaning inside the language to be passed onto someone 
else (separate in space or time) or themselves, where the meaning can be taken out (a 
reemployment of what Harris would call the 'conduit' metaphor). Love locates the origin of 
the problem in Clark's implicit, but erroneous theory of semiology, where signhood is 
conceived as a property of an object (even if it is an abstract object like a word -linguistic 
signs operate like highly specialised versions of the signs33 we encounter in everyday life), as 
opposed to the integrationallinguistic approach in which signhood is transient, a feature of 
the circumstances in which it arises. Secondly, Love notes that Clark does not distinguish 
33 By this I mean the physical object we call a sign (for example, a sign pointing to the bathrooms) which, 












between speech and writing, and indeed "many of [his] examples of the use of public 
language involve written language" (2004:540). He adheres without real proof to the 
untenable (as Love illustrates) belief that "'linguiform' thoughts are distinct and separable 
from their linguistic 'encoding''' (p.542). Ultimately, Clark has fallen prey to the language 
myth's scriptism. 
Distinguishing whether we are performing second-order cognitive operations on our 
thoughts reified as mentally rehearsed in inner speech or in written-down form doesn't seem 
that important, until one questions, as Love does, whether these "are ... operations on our 
thoughts or on our language" (p.542). 'Our thoughts, of course!' seems the obvious answer, 
until he challenges us to explain the actual difference between editing one's own writing, and 
editing that of another person. We surely can't be editing their thoughts while they aren't 
even in the room? 1bis conundrum disappears when one takes the integrational stance of a 
written text only being meaningful within its embedding in a larger communicational 
interaction. It is the product of our collective, distributed cognition which is a dynamic 
activity - 'thoughts', then, have as much (second-order) reality for the integrationist as 
language; 'meaning' is only to be found in the thinking. 
As Love (2004:542) puts it, 
it is not because a language is a code that we are enable to reify our thoughts. 
Rather, it is because (with the crucial aid of writing) we reify our utterances -
treat them as instances of more abstract entities - that we (think we) develop a 
code. And because we (think we) have developed a code, we become inclined to 
identify as our 'thoughts' the allegedly fixed semantic content that our utterances, 
actual or potential, allegedly encode, and then to think of our minds as, among 
other things, repositories of those thoughts. 
The second-order construct of language, brought about through our metalinguistic activities, 
could perhaps be considered an artifact, but for different reasons; it has profound political 
and normative utility. Conferring signhood, our integrational proficiency, is a fundamental 












revise Clark's theory so that language is understood as a product of our ability to use other 
embodied human minds (and our own mind separated from us in time) as the 'ultimate 
artifact' for enhancing our own abilities. Surely this is nonsensical - another's mind cannot 
be an artifact, for it is not created by someone other than its owner? On the contrary, 
becoming 'mindful' 34 is a mutually constituted process - mediated in part perhaps by 
language, but logically prior. We treat infants as being mindful, their behaviour as meaningful 
actions, long before they acquire language, and this is how they do indeed become mindful -
"caregivers ... treat children as intentional agents" (Cowley, 2004:293), and thus "[m]uch 
development ... is driven by what adults think or want children to feel and mean" (p.294). 
Or, conversely, it is "the infant [who] exploits two brains" (Cowley, 2006:200). 
While Clark treats language as the premium cultural artifact, tools t  alter our cognition, 
Cowley sees words-as-cognitive-tools in human development as secondary to the seamless 
enculturation, the embedding in culture, that takes place with a healthy infant. He maintains 
that "infants do not 'learn languages'. Rather, they take part in social life organized by 
soundings, wordings and a historically derived nexus of beliefs, desires, intentions and ways 
of acting" (2004:295). Treating words as words, or minds as minds, is a cultural belief based 
on culturally appropriate behaviour, which "[w]hile useful in' social life ... are inappropriate 
entities on which to base explanatory theory" (p.296). 
Returning to language itself, Clark (1997) cites tentative work in cognitive science that 
suggested that rather than humans having brains "especially adapted to acquire natural 
language" (p.212), the reverse is true: natural language has evolved to exploit existing 
features and capacities of human brains (this is not to adhere to the long-since discredited 
notion of language-as-organism that holds that specific languages 'adapt or die'), or rather, 
there is a symbiotic relationship between language and user, a bidirectional shaping. Lakoff 
& Johnson's (1999) hefty account explores this in full, applying these insights from cognitive 
science (i.e. cognition is embodied) to the philosophy of language and mind As mentioned 
in Section 2.10 above, their theory hinges on a fresh conception of 'metaphor' - for 
them ,too, the traditional understanding of what figurative language is, is fundamentally 
flawed. 












In a nutshell, what Lakoff & Johnson argue is that our physical bodies are intimately 
involved in concept fonnation because we use the same neural structures for conceptual 
work (cognition) as for sensorimotor work (perception) - "the very properties of concepts 
are created as a result of the way the brain and body are structured and the way they function 
in interpersonal relations and in the physical world" (p.37). Thus in one devastatingly 
brilliant manoeuvre, Lakoff & Johnson attempt to close up the gap between mind and body 
and between language and world. This insight leads to the conclusion that abstract thinking is 
inherently metaphorical, for reasons that are at the heart of the integrational approach to 
language: initially, subjective experience ~ater described in terms of abstract concepts, 
invoking metaphorical language), is conflated with the sensorimotor experience it usually co-
occurs with. Later the two domains are distinguished, but the association remains. Lakoff & 
Johnson use the example of 'Love is Warmth': babies are held close by carers, who express 
their love by cuddles, hugs etc. Thus the concept of being loved is conflated with warmth 
(and closeness) - that emotion of love is always accompanied by the physical sensation of 
warmth; they are one entity. Later, as experience broadens, they are distinguished. But the 
associations which remain are realised at the neural level. 
Like Toolan, Lakoff & Johnson, albeit on a different 'level', provide a model of embodied 
language that is efficient; it 'uses what we've got' rather than positing some extra brain 
module or faculty that explains the nature of language. Lakoff & Johnson do not subscribe 
to a view of language that is wholly in agreement with integrationism, and their differences 
and correspondences provide enough material to warrant an in-depth discussion, for which 
there is no space here. While they oppose the computational model of brain-as-symbol 
manipulator, and explicitly reject Chomsky's model of language for its implications 
concerning personhood, they do still hold to some traditional aspects of language that Harris, 
at least, would reject out of hand. Nevertheless, their insight that abstract thought is bound 
up in perception and the physical world (they inherently fit together) is invaluable in the 
context of studies of psychotic language that have made much of the link between abstract, 
metaphorical thinking and rationality. 
Together, the theories of distributed cognition and embodied linguistic philosophy force 












properties of the entities which they purport to be studying: that language and mind are 
embodied in beings that are encultured in a social context, and embedded in a physical world. 
These features are constitutive, and not coincidental; the Cartesian view of mind, and the 
segregationist view of language, are found wanting. 
2.13 Conclusion: language and rationality 
As should be clear from this overview, ideas about language are inherendy bound up in ideas 
about the mind. If integrational linguistics stands in opposition to traditional orthodox 
linguistics, then by implication, it will oppose the traditional orthodox accounts of the 
language behaviour of the mentally ill, which invoke a segregationist account of what 
language is and how it operates. While no integrationallinguistic account of schizophrenic 
language has been formulated, integrational linguists do call into question traditional 
accounts of rationality; as a human, language-based faculty. 
Harris (1981) points out that, traditionally, although the faculty oflanguage is considered to 
be what makes us unique as humans (and is a key marker of our rational capability distinct 
from all other species), ability to use language is not an indicator of rationality - even 
madmen use language, and can do so to communicate with the sane. 
A typical response to the speech of those presumed to be irrational is, as Trevor 
Pateman has pointed out, to 'invalidate' it as communication by withholding the 
reaction it might otherwise be expected to evoke. Thus a doctor in a mental 
hospital may simply ignore the patient's question 'When am I going to released?'; 
or treat the patient's statement 'My letters are being opened' not as a genuine 
complaint to be investigated , but as a symptom of fears and anxieties. In this 
way madness is, to use Foucault's phrase, 'reduced to silence by positivism'. It is 
as if nothing had been said: or almost. But not quite. For even in these cases, the 
'invalidation' procedure is a way of making sense of what is said. For the doctor 
to treat the patient's statement that his letters are being opened as symptomatic 
of the patient's anxieties is to presuppose that the patient is using the words 'My 













Clearly, it is what someone says that is a key means of detennining their rationality - madmen 
convey their irrational ideas through language. Thus defining rationality as the ability to use 
language is tautological, and doesn't get us any closer to a distinction between the sane and 
the insane. Harris runs us through the options: if, as is often the case, rationality is defined as 
the ability to 'reason cogendy' (expressed in language), and cogendy is taken to mean 
'convincingly', then we could still be mistaken about someone's status as rational or irrational. 
But if 'cogendy' is taken to mean "correcdy, validly, in accordance with the rules" (p.197) 
(and 'rules' here are broadly accepted to be those of logic), this is still not a particularly 
helpful answer. How exacdy does one determine whether someone has followed the rules of 
logic correcdy, when often their thinking or reasoning procedures are not made explicit in 
what people say? 
For the most part, the "rational speaker is envisaged as a competent speaker-hearer 
additionally equipped with whatever pragmatic knowledge will enable him to put his 
linguistic competence to effective use in actual communication situations" (p.198). Thus, the 
irrational speaker lacks the latter knowledge while retaining the former. However, through 
the lens of the language myth, what this linguistic knowledge amounts to is a "system of 
rules generating sentences of a language" (ibid.). Traditional linguistics draws a distinction 
between these abstract sentences and the actual utterances produced by actual speakers in 
the context of actual discourse: "[a]lthough not part of discourse, they [sentences] impart to 
discourse its recognisably linguistic character" (ibid.). As mentioned earlier, this discrepancy 
is explained away by the twin doctrines of ellipsis and the separation of linguistic and 
practical knowledge. Twin doctrines which ultimately undermine themselves in their 
implications of an infinite elliptical regress. 
Their implication for the concept of rationality is no different, as Harris proceeds to point 
out. For to know that someone has followed the rules of logic correcdy (without any room 
for ambiguity) means to know exacdy which utterances stand for which sentences in the 
language (to make their logical steps explicit). But to know this (which utterances stand for 
which sentences) effectively requires that one know what each utterance means; a chicken-












model, we can never ascertain whether someone is rational or not; it is 10 effect a 
meaningless concept within the constraints of traditional orthodox linguistics. 
As we shall see, Harris' verSlon of the orthodox relationship between language and 
rationality is somewhat incomplete. For it is not only the content, but also the form of 
mentally ill patients' utterances that are scrutinized by medical professionals to determine the 
nature and degree of their grasp on reality. The motivation is similar: not only the content, 
but also the form of thought is reflected in their language; deviant speech indicates deviant 
thinking. In fact, when it comes to schizophrenia, the significance of the content of patients' 
speech has been downplayed in favour of the form, in terms of whether it follows that 
language's specific rules of phonology, morphology, syntax, for example. The lack of 
adherence to these rules is postulated as the reason that interlocutors have difficulty 
understanding schizophrenics' speech, despite speaking the 'same' language. The 'level' of 
language most commonly implicated, however, is the level of pragmatics. 
As mentioned in Section 2.3, integrational linguistics glosses 'rationality' as the layperson's 
"everyday assumptions concerning the total behaviour of a reasonable person" (p.165). 
Someone is irrational when there is a lack of fit - or integration - between their linguistic 
and other behaviour, and between their linguistic behaviour and their particular situation in 
space and time. This definition surely provokes the immediate question 'how does one 
determine a ''lack of fit"?', but by now, the answer should be clear. The criteria for 'lack of 
fit' are not given in advance, but are worked out by participants from situation to situation 
(but taking into account their previous experience). Determining irrationality is a 
metacommunicational activity, and not one that involves identifying an inherent property of 
mind or behaviour. 
Furthermore, for the integrationist, 
[a] person who can no longer integrate today's experiences with yesterday's, or 
plan for tomorrow, is a person for whom even self-communication has broken 
down; and any such dis-integration of the self destroys the only basis on which 












The importance of this fonnulation of the relationship between language and rationality 
cannot be emphasised enough. The loss of rationality is the loss of the ability to 
communicate (to integrate activities);35 the loss of communication leads to the breakdown of 
language. In the conventional view, communication failure is the result of language disorder, 
which itself is a marker of confused thinking. In contrast, from an integrational perspective, 
evidence for irrationality, or madness, will be found in communication deficit (i.e. activity-
integration deficit), not 'inside' the language (whether that be in the individual word choice 
or the semantic, grammatical or pragmatic structure), or even 'projected' as part of the brain. 
Virtually every aspect of linguistic behaviour catalogued in this overview has significance for 
research into schizophrenic language. What the following chapters serve to illustrate is that, 
outside of the constraints of the language myth, many of these 'features' no longer make 
sense. Far from being neutral descriptions of symptoms, they are - as any metalinguistic 
analysis only can be - mediated interpretations, since a 'science' of language is impossible. 
35 In this light, it is noteworthy that in 2002 when the Japanese Society of Psychiatry and Neurology decided to 
replace their existing term for schizophrenia, S,ishin Bflnretsll Byo ("mind-split-disease''), in a bid to avoid the 
stigma and ambiguity associated with the old label, they settled on Togo Shilcho Sho, or literally "integration 












3. THE LANGUAGE MYTH BIAS IN STUDIES OF 
SCHIZOPHRENIC LANGUAGE 
3.1 Introduction 
The language behaviour of schizophrenics is an enduring puzzle. Despite more than a 
century of research into the phenomenon, findings have often been inconclusive, 
contradictory (Andreason, 1982). The puzzling nature of schizophrenic language has 
engendered a variety of approaches and theories, which have enjoyed popularity perhaps for 
decades, only to recede into obscurity, and be revived yet again in a new form. The central 
confusion seems to arise out of the ill-defined nature of the terminology and concepts 
employed in exploring the phenomenon. A recent example of this is Marvel (2006:14): 
within the space of just two paragraphs, she employs a multitude of terms almost 
interchangeably - "language deficits", "FrO" [formal thought disorder], "disorganized 
speech", "thought-disordered speech", "linguistic impairments" - to refer to the 
phenomenon under discussion. Indeed, almost every paper, article, chapter, or book written 
about schizophrenia and language finds it necessary to include the caveat that the concepts 
under discussion are somewhat fuzzy and/or subject to debate. Often this extends to an 
assertion that in the past these have been somewhat ill-defined that simultaneously calls into 
question the validity of selected previous studies, and serves to explain the apparent direct 
contradictions that exist in the lite ature. This is usually followed with the reassurance that 
the present study aims to alleviate these problems by defining more definitively the terms 
under discussion. 
While this critical approach may be admired, it does prompt the question as to why clinicians 
and researchers don't seem more bothered by this, what one researcher has termed a 
'persistent plague' (Andreason, 1979), and why attempts to overcome it seem destined to fail. 
My argument in this chapter is that it is largely due to a limpet-like attachment to an 
erroneous underlying conception of language and thought in general (broadly speaking, 
Harris's 'language myth', as explored in the previous chapter), which each subsequent 
revision or refinement still uses as its founding premise. Better defining the terminology or 
concepts amounts to reshuffling a deck of cards in the hopes that the missing card will 












discipline, both individuals from the field, or theories borrowed from it, that has played a 
significant part in this viewpoint's rise to dominance (although it is certainly not solely 
responsible) . 
My first task is to demonstrate that this language myth is present and influential in modern 
mainstream conceptions of schizophrenic language. My second, dealt with in Chapter 4, is to 
ask whether this has always been the case; by reviewing the history of research on the 
phenomenon, I shall demonstrate a narrowing and abstraction of what is considered to 
count as linguistic, particularly after the explicit introduction of linguistic theory in the late 
1960s. However, considering the ancient roots of the language myth, and its pervasiveness as 
common sense, one can expect aspects of it to inform even the earliest accounts of the 
disease. Thirdly, on a more abstract level, in Chapter 5 I will tease out the main themes that 
have preoccupied researchers of schizophrenic language, as well as the topics that are 
conspicuous in their absence or low profile, particularly in recent accounts of SLB, 
demonstrating how both are direct consequences of a segregationist stance on language, 
somewhat, I believe, to the detriment of progress in making sense of schizophrenic 
communication disturbance. 
3.2 The current mainstream view 
If these conceptual and terminological ambiguities abound, how can one hope to elicit or 
define the mainstream view on schizophrenic language? To be sure, to broadly sketch the 
mainstream view is to create a picture of a homogenous, unified approach, which does not 
exist as such - a consequence that is not wholly avoidable perhaps. The easiest place to find 
a concise overview of the mainstream approach to schizophrenic language is in sources by 
authors who disagree with this view, who position themselves as 'outside' the orthodox 
school. Naturally using these alone runs the risk of being accused, like Harris (see Joseph, 












The primary point of agreement between all approaches is that some people diagnosed as 
schizophrenic speak strangelY some of the time. While schizophrenic speech is easily 
recognisable, what it is that makes it so 'strange' has itself been hard to pin down (Lorenz, 
1968). This 'ununderstandability,38 as one clinician termed it, is not akin to listening to an 
expert in their field rattle off jargon as they speak of topics of which you have no 
foundational knowledge, or a foreign language speaker struggling to string a sentence 
together in your native tongue, or a foreign language speaker speaking fluendy in their native 
tongue (which you do not speak). Rather, much like Alice encountering the poem of the 
J abberwock39 ("Somehow it seems to fill my head with ideas - only I don't exacdy know 
what they are!" [Carroll, 1960:197]), listeners describe schizophrenic speech as hard to follow, 
lacking information, difficult to paraphrase, being left with only a vague sense of what is 
being talked about, despite the speaker using recognisable words and sentence structures 
most of the time. In extreme cases of disorganisation, schizophrenic speech is considered to 
be nonsense; non-sense, literally language without meaning. Extreme or not, disorganised 
speech marks a failure of communication. 
Schizophrenic speech has been tackled with three main objectives in mind: one, to describe 
what it is about their speech that deviates from normal; two, to ascertain what it is about 
their speech that makes it difficult to understand; and three, what it is that causes their 
speech to be this way. Historically, objective one has been invoked, either implicidy or 
explicidy, as the foundation for objectives tWo and three. However, objectiv~s one and two 
have a somewhat complicated relationship with each other: the most obviously deviant 
characteristic of schizophrenic speech is that other people find it hard to understand. This 
interpersonal description is not very scientific, and is regarded as having little explanatory 
power as to etiology. Thus, there has been a consistent attempt to objectify this experience 
by locating deviance as a feature of the speech or language itself, or the thought behind it, 
38 Karl Jaspers' term (cited in BentalI, 2003:498). 
39 My reference to The Jabberwock' has significance for the topic at hand; a poem replete with neologisms, yet 
apparently 'grammatical', it is one of the quintessential examples of nonsense poetry in English (in fact it has 
even been 'translated' into other languages, including German and French). 'Nonsense' is a recognised literary 
device where form trumps content as the driving force (Sewell, 1952) (thus it is an extreme realisation of 
'ordinary' poetry, where form partially dictates word-choice, for example [Forrest, 1968]), whether it be Lewis 
Carroll's invention of words (that adhere to the phonotactic rules of English), or Edward Lear's play with 
existing words (in sentences that adhere to the grammar rules of English, but which express a meaning that is 












within the schizophrenic individual (Rochester & Martin, 1979). Consequently, conununication 
failure has been explained as a result of language deviance. Whether this is a problem in itself, 
or indicative of an underlying thought disorder, the reliance on the concept of a fixed code 
to explain ordinary, successful conununication is clear. The transfer of ideas fails due to a 
lack of adherence to a shared code. Schizophrenic speech differs because it breaks the code's 
'rules' and does not appear to contain the same 'word-word' and 'word-concept' 
relationships. Whether schizophrenics no longer possess the code that nonnals do, or simply 
cannot employ or access it in speech is a matter of debate, and thus there has also been 
intense interest in schizophrenics' language comprehension, guided by the thinking that, if 
they can discriminate aspects of the linguistic code in normal speakers' utterances, then their 
underlying linguistic knowledge must be intact. 
Describing or classifying the deviance is what has taken up most researchers' time (McKenna, 
2007). Accurately detennining what makes schizophrenic speech unique has diagnostic 
implications (Covington et ai, 2005). Uncovering similarities schizophrenic speech may have 
with organic disorders ~.e. brain-damaged patients' speech) could point to underlying 
neuropathology (Kuperberg & Caplan, 2003). Which brings us to the way in which objective 
three, the search for etiology, is currently tackled: having isolated the problem within an 
individual, ultimately, it is supposed, the answers - as with organic disorders - will be found 
in the schizophrenic's brain. It is this that underpins a defining feature of the current 
mainstream approach to SLB. McKenna states it quite plainly: "If the mainstream view is 
right and schizophrenia is a biological brain disease, then its symptoms have to be 
explainable in these terms" (2007:256). 
3.2.1 The biomedical approach 
Cherie Marvel, in her entry for the recently published Enryclopedia of Language and Linguistics, 
'Psychosis and Language' (2006), supplies only three proposed explanatory models for 
language disorder in psychosis: the neurop!Jchological mode4 which accounts for language 
disturbance in terms of underlying cognitive impairment (for example, memory, attention, 
and self-monitoring); the connectionist mode4 whereby a word is understood as a cluster of 
interconnected nodes which contribute to/represent its meaning, and semantic deficit is 












evolutionary model, which focuses on the view that language is unique to humans, and thus on 
the role of hemispheric dominance in the development of language. These are clearly not 
mutually exclusive, but ultimately all three of these models are brain based - there is no 
consideration of the social dimension. All displayed linguistic behaviour is considered a 
direct symptom of schizophrenic pathology. The schizophrenic is portrayed as passively at 
the mercy of their associative networks (likely realised at the neural level), cognitive 
functions or other brain anatomy and physiology, i.e. all (linguistic) behaviour is a symptom 
beyond their control. It has no meaning beyond this - its semiotic value is purely diagnostic. 
What Marvel's summary reflects is the predominandy biomedical approach to schizophrenia, 
and consequendy schizophrenic speech, in which the "Holy Grail", as Newby (2001 :344) 
puts it, is successfully identifying the brain pathology underlying linguistic deviance. It 
represents something of a revival, starting in the early 1970s, of Kraepelin's objective, 
descriptive approach, and thus is termed 'neo-Kraepelinian' by many (Bentall, 2003), 
although some critics argue that this label is misleading in that it overlooks many of the 
distinct differences between the modern approach, and Kraepelin's at the turn of the 
twentieth century (see Ungvari et aI., 1997).40 This biomedical approach is predictably 
informed by the concept of mental illness (critics, such as Prow [2001], prefer 'metaphor' to 
'concept'), which despite failing to closely match the "precision of somatic illnesses" (on 
which it is based) in practice (France, 2001:19), justifies its position with the assumption that 
ultimately, psychosis.and neurosis are physiological in origin, whether the exact etiology has 
been discovered or not (an assumption which Kraepelin [1918], a century ago, relied upon, 
but with less confidence). 
Prow (2001) claims that "as a result of the application of a disease model to people's talk and 
conduct, their beliefs and communicated experiences" (quoting Coulter [1973]), disordered 
behaviour is transformed into symptoms, "either as evidence of a disease process, or as the 
illness itself" (2001:277). With regards to schizophrenic language, then, it means that 
schizophrenic utterances are treated as samples, whose characteristics are quantifiable, 
40 Ungvari ,t al (1997) accuse modern psychiatry of "operat[ing] with a highly advanced methodological 
apparatus such as sophisticated statistical analysis, neuroimaging and the like, while the clinical characterization 
of schizophrenic psychoses is almost sketchy and simplified in comparison to those of the founders of the 












recordable, objectively analysable, much like a blood sample can be subjected to testing to 
determine its makeup. Utterances can be 'extracted' from patients, transcribed, passed on to 
other clinicians to analyse, and published for wider inspection. Abnormal characteristics are 
considered symptoms of disease. The ability to treat language behaviour as objective, 
measurable data is considered progress, a shift away from the interpersonal impression, to 
the individual product. Linguistics then, as the science of language, is the perfect tool for this 
purpose. With its model of what language should be like, it can defdy diagnose the deviance 
from the norm. 
Interestingly enough, it is Covington et at. (2005), the paper which explicidy purports to 
present material 'from the linguist's vie~l that illustrates this most clearly, in speaking of 
'linguistic' symptoms as if they existed in and of themselves, as if speech had very litde 
integrated function - when they mention treatment. They report that 'syntactic impairment' 
has been successfully treated with chlorpromazine in acute patients, and clozapine has been 
found to "improve the cohesion of schizophrenic patients' speech" (p.93). 
Language, then, is the output of a broken brain (Bentall, 2003), a tickertape reading 
indicating a distressed machine. The principle author of Covington et al. (2005), Michael 
Covington, is a computational linguist, and the bias is apparent throughout Their conclusion 
is, predictably, an exhortation to future research; their very first suggestion drives home the 
'linguistics as science' approach: 
Tools for all levels of analysis, from phonetics to pragmatics, should be 
computerized Not only is the computer faster than a human analyst, it is also free 
from bias; computer analyses are perfectlY reproducible. Recent advances in natural 
language processing, corpus linguistics, and computer power make analysis much 
easier than before. fp.95, emphasis added] 
That humans would be the ones programming the computers with what to look for (a bias 
in itself), that pragmatics by definition (see Section 3.2.7 below) cannot be computerised, and 
41 The title of their article gives the impression that linguistics is a homogeneous discipline. The linguist' turns 












if the computers' abilities in natural language processing were anything like natural, there 
would be ambiguities (particularly when the spoken is reduced to writing), is overlooked. 
Ultimately, most research into schizophrenic speech depends on a belief that spoken 
utterances can be taken out of their interactional context, converted to written form via 
transcription, without losing their essential meaning or value, for this is somehow 'contained' 
in the utterance. In some instances, schizophrenic utterances are even translated. 
Furthermore, because whether investigations are spurred by a belief in an underlying formal 
thought disorder or simply a speech disorder, the focus is on structure/form, not content of 
speech (and form and content are by and large considered independent of each other), 
context is seen as even less relevant. Thus the standard approach to schizophrenic language 
ignores the principle of cotemporality. 42 Considering the consistently documented 
intermittent nature of disordered speech in schizophrenics, this is even more startling. 
How are these 'samples' extracted? While produced speech is usually gleaned from 
'naturalistic studies' (for example, prompting the schizophrenic patient to speak by starting a 
conversation or asking them to describe/explain a picture, and tape-recording their 
utterances), language comprehension is tested by experiment, which may require a verbal 
response (Rochester & Martin, 1979). Kuperberg & Caplan (2003) place more emphasis on a 
distinction between offline and online studies. Offline methods "do not measure 
psycholinguistic operations at the time they occur" and tend to focus on "what linguistic 
representations a patient can or cannot deal with" (p.449). These often require that the 
patient make conscious, explicit decisions about language. Online methods have been 
developed relatively more recently (1960s onwards). They "require[ ... ] a subject to make 
responses to ongoing language stimuli and to respond to a stimulus in a way that do[es] not 
require conscious consideration of the representation under investigation" (pp.454--455). 
Thus, offline can be said to 'tap into' final representations, while online accesses intermediate 
representations. Speech production is almost exclusively studied offline. It is fairly obvious 
that making conscious decisions about language is hardly representative of everyday language 
use, which is one of the reasons for developing online studies. However, this misses the 
42 As we shall see below in Section 3.2.7, context does have a (limited and delimited) place in discussions of the 












broader reality that the testing situation is never going to accurately represent the everyday 
language situation: it is a situation in and of itself. Lasdy, speech analysis foons the basis of 
all major rating scales to classify patients as thought-disordered (TO) or non-thought-
disordered (NTD) (e.g. Andreason's Thought, Language and Communication Scale; Chen et 
al.'s CLANG scale; Liddle et al.'s Thought and Language Index [cited in Covington et aI., 
2005]). 
While the starting point of investigation is the fact that schizophrenics speak strangely, the 
reason for testing comprehension is to determine whether the problem is actual language 
competence or merely performance. The underlying assumption is that comprehension and 
production are two sides of the same coin: encoding (producing speech) is merely the 
reverse of decoding (understanding speech). Thus reviewers like Kuperberg & Caplan (2003) 
can claim that "there is no loss of semantic information in schizophrenia ... [but rather] [t]he 
problem appears to be one of access/retrieval and of using semantic knowledge effectively" 
(p.4st). In other words, the fixed code must be intact in the schizophrenic's brain for them 
to understand others' speech; the reason their speech is disordered is due to interference in 
transmission. 
3.2.2 Competence/performance 
Deviance (from the noon) tends to be characterised as deficit, impainnent, failure, even 
though the biomedical model doesn't preclude the possibility of compensation or 
overcompensation. So, for example, when Kuperberg & Caplan (2003) report an experiment 
in which TD schizophrenics, manics, and normals were asked to memorise and recall 
sentences, the superior performance of the TD patients in recalling randomly presented 
sentences (as opposed to those ordered within a coherent text) is still related within the 
context of a failure to use the existing organisational structure in 'encoding'. Or when they 
report a short-term memory task involving single words, while normals have a tendency to 
incorrecdy 'remember' words that weren't originally presented to them (but are semantically 
related to the words that were), TD schizophrenics "fail to use semantic information to ... 
elicit false recognitions of targets that were semantically related to the originally encoded 












stilted speech as symptoms of impaired lexical retrieval - they are markers of failure, not as 
potentially innovative solutions to the supposed impainnent. 
All assessments of schizophrenic speech are based on the notion of the ideal sentence/ s, 
generated from items in the lexicon combined with the rules of grammar and discourse, 
from which their utterance, or series of utterances, deviate. One gets the impression, 
according to this model, that the schizophrenic's brain presents a gauntlet of obstacles 
through which 'the message' has to pass in order to come out 'understandable', and in many 
cases, the obstacles prove too much to overcome. In fact, Kuperberg & Caplan (2003) 
identify their approach as to describe and classify language itself within a framework used by 
linguists and psycholinguists to describe normal language structure and processing" (p.446). 
TIlls is the psycholinguistic framework that the authors champion, which involves 
"identify[ing] language processing deficits (e.g. semantic, syntactic) at the three basic levels of 
the language code: simple words (the lexical level), sentences (the sentential level), and 
discourse (the discourse level)" (p.447). 
For tests and experiments to be viable, they need to discriminate between healthy 
individuals' and schizophrenics' performance. Thus the commonplace use of a normal 
control group in tests of SLB would seem to contradict the claim that schizophrenics are 
being compared to an 'ideal speaker-hearer', or their utterances to ideal sentences. However, 
as was established in Chapter 2, the notion of 'speech error' has its origins in the speech of 
normal speakers. Sledge et al's (2001) 'levels of deviance' (described in more detail in Section 
3.2.5 below), whereby measurement of deficit is literally a function of how many changes are 
required to 'restore' the utterance to grammatical correctness, are perhaps the clearest 
illustration of the ideal being used as a measuring tool. Interestingly, the authors found that 
even normal speakers' utterances included the severest type of deviance (although less 
frequently than schizophrenics). While Sledge et al make the somewhat bizarre claim that 
schizophrenics experience "an episodic failure in language capacity, i.e. competence" (p.373), 
the mainstream view tends to be that schizophrenic deviant language behaviour is a failure 
of performance, in what McKenna calls "[t]he process of finding the right words to convert 












3.2.3 The schizophrenic speech circuit 
While research on schizophrenic language has its origins in dialogue (the listener's experience 
of 'incomprehensibility,), this interaction is prompdy erased by theoretical approaches which 
locate deviance solely <within' the individual. The 'normal' listener is retained in some 
accounts, which explicidy invoke an embellished version of Saussure's speech circuit, the 
sender-receiver model, in which A has a thought, converts these concepts to sounds 'sent' to 
B, which in turn trigger the same concepts in B's mind when they receive these sounds, due 
the possession of a shared code: 
The starting point of investigation is the knowledge that B, as receiver of schizophrenic A's 
message encoded in sound, appears to have either confused, unusual or no thoughts 
triggered in their mind. It would be absurd to say that B is the one with the problem, 
because we know that A is sick, and/or such breakdown only occurs when B is in 
conversation with A (not others). Therefore A must be responsible somehow for the 
communication breakdown. The question is whether it is at the point of converting concepts 
to sounds, or the point of thought itself, or possibly even before, when A is in the role of 
listener before becoming a speaker. The role of the (normal) interlocutor is obscured - as 
listeners they are cast as completely passive receivers: they are exposed to confusing speech 
with unclear references; their needs are not met (Covington et ai, 2005); as speakers, they are 
transmitters of ideal speech, machine-like, neutral, to which the schizophrenic responds, 
inappropriately. 
This line of thinking is illustrated, quite literally, by Walsh (2001), who attempts to sketch a 
'communication processing model' of schizophrenic language, adapted from Christopher 
Frith. Her model is the inverse of the classic speech circuit, in that it runs from 
comprehension to expression, from 'input' to 'output', within the schizophrenic. It is 
reproduced here as Figure 3.1. The shaded areas indicate possible points of communication 
breakdown. 
The diagram is accompanied by a description of various 'levels': Level 1 involves 
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Figure 3.1); Level 2 involves runrung the message 'through' the filter of social/world 
knowledge, and adding any perceiving extralinguistic clues from the speaker 
(COMPREHENSION OF MESSAGE IN1ENT to MESSAGE DECODED); Level 3 involves 
determining the nature of response required - if it unspecified, the hearer has to generate an 
additional idea, apart from just responding (RESPONSE REQUIRED); finally, Level 4 involves 
constructing the response using linguistic and pragmatic skills (FORMULA1E APPROPRlA1E 
RESPONSE to ENGAGE IN DISCOURSE). The disclaimer that "[t]he model is presented 
sequentially for illustration purposes ... [and] it is important to keep in mind that processing 
at different levels goes on simultaneously, with levels being activated as required, depending 
on the complexity of the communication" (p.3S4) effectively undermines the model, and 
wisely is not dwelt upon. 
The more levels requiring activation in the schizophrenic, the more likely there will be a 
breakdown in communication. Thus, for example, Walsh describes metaphor as involving 
more processing at more levels than literal language, which explains schizophrenics' apparent 
tendency to struggle to understand figurative language - adhering to the orthodox notion of 
metaphor as being a deviation from the literal nonn. Her model also adheres to the 
orthodox constructs of 'message' and 'code', and draws a clear distinction between linguistic 
and extralinguistic. Astonishingly, even while pointing out the interpersonal nature of the 
interaction, it IS simultaneously obscured: for example, 'response required: 
specified/unspecified' is clearly jointly constructed with the interlocutor, not the 
schizophrenic subject alone, but it has been 'located' in the schizophrenic individual. 
As Rochester & Martin (1979) realised, a dialogic setting makes analysis of discourse, as 
"connected, ongoing texts ... [that are] spoken rather than written" (p.S1) somewhat difficult 
to do. In fact, the design of their widely-cited study of schizophrenic discourse was based on 
"speakers who produce largely uninterrupted productions in the presence of a listener" (ibid.). 
Furthennore, "the person doing the interview made an effort not to interrupt the subject" 
(ibid.), motivated by the assumption that their ''best chance of finding samples of incoherent 
speech was to provide a nondialogic situation" (p.52). To be sure, the authors display an 
awareness of "its limitation as a study of everyday language use" (ibid.), but considering that 












design of modem studies (e.g. Oh et al, 2002), this awareness has not been transformed into 
action. Conversations are interactions between at least two people, featuring stops, false 
starts, interruptions, requests for clarity, repetition. The test situation in studies of 
schizophrenic speech are geared towards produang the phenomenon they purport to be 
studying; for the interlocutor to interrupt/interfere/assist would be obscuring the data. 
We return to a discussion of discourse in Section 3.2.7 below, and although it should already 
be apparent that the mainst;ream view of schizophrenic language relies heavily on an 
orthodox linguistic account of what language is, to drive the point home, we now turn to 
instances where a definition of 'language' is made explicit. 
3.2.4 Defining language 
By this point, the objection might be raised that 'the language myth' is about the construct 'a 
language', not language in general, which is what psychiatrists are interested in. Indeed - the 
notion of 'a' shared language is such a fundamental assumption it almost goes without saying. 
While there have been a few misguided attempts to argue for the existence of a 
schizophrenic language (Wolcott, 1970) or langue (Wr6bel, 1990), in general, schizophrenic 
language is considered so puzzling because they appear to be speaking 'the same language' as 
the interlocutor. Thus, while the mainstream account's neglect of this matter, in acting as if 
a) the world was monolingual, and b) that languages are fixed and bounded entities, shall be 
dealt with in more detail in Chapter 5, I think it safe to assume, based on their use of terms 
like 'the lexicon', 'the phonological rules of English', for example, that when authors speak 
of 'language', they mean the language in which the schizophrenic and their interlocutor speak. 
Where authors do find it necessary to define language (most appear to get by on the 
assumption that what language is is common sense [Sledge et al, 2001]), they usually rely on 
a more-or-Iess orthodox linguistic account. Kuperberg & Caplan'S (2003) description of 
'normal' language as a "code" (p.447) adheres quite closely to what integrationists would 












regard is Chomsky. Their scriptist bias is apparent in the three levels of the code they 
distinguish: words, sentences, discourse. Sledge et a/"s (2001) offering is even more explicie3 
Speech is a specific behaviour based on the rules of language. Language is the 
rule-governed system which employs discrete units of utterance (and their 
representation in writing) combined in a particular, systematic and rule-governed 
fashion in order to represent meaning. Language is conventionally divided into 
phonological (sound), semantic (word) and syntactic (grammar) domains. They 
are universal rules common to all languages as postulated by the transformational 
grammarians and others ... fp.373] 
This is a fairly clear summary of key points of the segregationist approach to language, 
underpinned by the language myth: languages are rule-governed, they are distinct systems, 
they represent meaning, the langue/parole distinction is invoked, speech is primary (their 
reference to 'sound'), and writing is merely a representation of speech, with no special 
characteristics or semiotic significance of its own. Their mention of the structure of language 
is echoed by other sources. Covington et a/"s introduction to their overview of the linguistic 
traits of schizophrenic speech is a particularly vivid example: 
Since ancient times, grammarians have noticed that human language has a multi-
level structure. The facts that describe any language tend to cluster into levels 
that make little reference to each other. Most of the phonology of any language 
can be described without any reference to its syntax, and vice versa. The levels 
interact largely through the lexicon (vocabulary), which tells us, for instance that 
the sound sequence /mren/ (phonology) forms the word man, which is the 
singular of men (morphology), a noun (syntax) that signifies a male human being 
(semantics) and is relatively unrestricted as to style and connotations (pragmatics). 
[2005:89] 
43 In fact, based on this explicidy orthodox definition of language, Sledge et aL (2001) feel justified in making 
the startling claim that "[w]ith few notable exceptions ... language has not been a particular focus for the ~tudy 
of psychopathology" (p.371). Instead, what others have studies has amounted to "descriptions of speech acts 












Where and how these clustering facts are to be found we are not told; language is depicted as 
a type of exotic architecture discovered deep in the jungle by exploring grarrunarians long 
ago, a fairly 'concretised' abstraction. The scholar of language is clearly not considered to 
have played any role in constructing this 'multi-level structure'. 
This inevitable reference to language's level-by-Ievel hierarchy usually serves as an organising 
tool for material too (e.g. Kuperberg & Caplan, 2003; Covington et ai, 2005; Marvel, 2006), 
and yet what soon becomes apparent in longer articles is just how quickly this separation 
breaks down. For example, in Covington et ai (200S),prosoefy and voice quality are listed under 
'Phonetics and phonology', the authors noting under prosody that "the pauses of the 
schizophrenic may be at least pardy the result of difficulties at the semantic or pragmatic 
level, rather than a specifically phonological impairment" (p.90). The examples under 
'Morphology' are evaluated as potentially "disruptions of syntax (wrong part of speech) or 
lexical retrieval (using words that are semantically right but syntactically off-target)" (ibid.). 
Nevertheless, they never miss an opportunity to promote the value of linguistics, and caution 
that prior to the 1970s (linguistics' introduction of the field of pragmatics), "pragmatic 
phenomena were lumped with semantics, or simply ignored, in earlier literature" (p.92). By 
implication, the linguist is once again able to prove their indispensability by being able to 
separate out these two levels. While the authors intend this as a criticism of research 
antedating the involvement of linguistics as a discipline, I would argue that it is indicative not 
solely of conceptual or methodological flaws on the part of earlier researchers, but also of 
the near impossibility of extracting pragmatics from other 'levels'. Kuperberg & Caplan 
(2003), at least, more readily acknowledge that pragmatics is difficult to distinguish from 
semantics (in fact, they claim that semantics has relevance at the three major levels of 
language they have distinguished).44 
3.2.5 Grammaticality 
Indeed, semantics does have a tendency to 'get in the way'. Sledge et ai's (2001) attempts to 
isolate grammaticality from other aspects of language - in order prove impaired 'language-
44 Despite the authors' repeated acknowledgement of the 'fuzziness' of boundaries of concepts which they 













generating capacity' - are almost comical in the lengths to which they have to go. Their 
concerns are that "an analysis of schizophrenic language was at risk of being contaminated by 
ideational bizarreness. A comprehensive grammar of standard English, moreover, is not 
available in order to decide issues of grammaticalness in every case" (p.379, emphasis added). 
Their aim is to measure syntactic rule violations, using a three-level rating scale ''based on 
the degree of abstractness of the underlying structural rules violated to produce the 
deviance" (p.380). Levell is 'minimally ungrammatical', requiring change to a single word to 
restore grammaticality; Level 2 is 'moderately ungrammatical', whereby there are two ways 
that the sentence could be corrected to make sense and be grammatical; and Level 3, 'highly 
ungrammatical', where "the deep structure is not discernable at the level of the phrase 
structure" (p.382). 
To their surprise, not only do normal speakers make the Level 3 deviations, but their speech 
sample raters ("four college undergraduates, native speakers of English, who had no prior 
formal linguistic or clinical experience" fp.384]) failed to achieve acceptable levels of 
reliability, even when the task was simplified. What they succeed in demonstrating 
(somewhat perversely with respect to the authors' intentions) is that grammaticality is not an 
essential feature of normal speech; therefore, measuring it does not enlighten one on the 
subject's supposed 'language-generating capacity'. Secondly, levels of grammatical deviance 
based on Chomskyan syntax have little reality for the lay speaker. Thirdly, grammaticality 
cannot be assessed or determined without reference to semantics. If the normal lay language 
user is the person who 'picks up on' the strangeness of schizophrenic speech in the first 
place, it is surely not due to what these authors construe as 'grammaticality'. 
In contrast, Covington et al. maintain that while it may be simplified, syntax remains largely 
intact, quoting an example of 'word salad' from Andreason (1979): "If we need soap when 
you can jump into a pool of water, and then when you go to buy your gasoline, my folks 
always thought they should get pop, but the best thing is to get motor oil ... " (2005:91), as 
illustration. Their appraisal of the 'incoherent' (Andreason's term) piece is that "[t]his is a 
wild series of changes of topic, but there is nothing ungrammatical about it, bearing in mind 
that people need not speak in complete sentences" (ibid.). At what point then, according to 












of ordinary speech can always be invoked? Their biased selection of material is apparent in 
that, in the very next section, on semantics, they quote from an article (Oh et al., 2002) 
whose main conclusion - that syntactic deviance is likely a feature of both thought-
disordered and non-disordered speech - they fail to mention. Again, my point is not that 
either Covington et al. or Sledge et al. are right, but rather that, based on similar data, and 
using similar supposedly scientific linguistic categories, they come to different conclusions. 
As Taylor maintains, grammaticality is not "a property of the sentence itself but rather of 
how we reflexively characterize it" (1997:23). 
3.2.6 Schizophrenic semantics 
When semantics is 'extracted' from the other levels of language, the mainstream account is, 
predictably, quite orthodox, whereby meanings belong to words, words have 'core meanings' 
(Covington et al., 2005:94); these words and meanings are context-neutrally stored in the 
brain - however this semantic memory includes "representations of objects, concepts, word 
meanings, and their relationships" (Kuperberg & Caplan, 2003:448) from where they are 
accessed; in combination with pragmatic abilities, the contextually-dependent meaning of a 
word is ascertained; in some theories, a language's lexicon is stored mentally as an associative 
network (Covington et aI., 2005); sentence meaning is propositional, "determined by the way 
the meanings of words combine in syntactic structures" (Kuperberg & Caplan, 2003:447). 
Ultimately, what makes something meaningful, is its adherence to the rules. Interpreting 
something as meaningful requires having the rules internalised and accessible. 
Schizophrenic semantic impairment, then, is a deviation from this normal state of affairs. 
The problems that arise in extracting semantics from other levels are well illustrated by 
Covington et al.'s attempt to clarify the topic. The authors quote a patient from Oh et aI., 
([2002:235; original authors' insertion]2005:92): "Oh, it [life in the hospital] was superb, you 
know, the trains broke, and the pond fell in the front doorway", presenting the utterance as 
an obvious and unambiguous example of semantic impairment. Their assessment of why it is 
semantically impaired differs quite markedly from Oh et al.'s (2002) own: "the clause 'the 
pond fell in the front doorway' is semantically deviant because the propositional features of a 
pond do not allow it to fall in a doorway" (p.235). Covington et aI., on the other hand, ask 












falling in the front doorway?" (2005:92, original emphasis). Their answer confuses matters: 
"Perhaps not. Not only words, but even thoughts are semantic. That is, they encode 
concepts and can refer to real-world objects" (ibid.). In fact their statement leads one to ask 
whether their words mean anything at all - how exactly does a thought 'encode' a concept or 
'refer' to external objects? One can only assume they are inferring some kind of mentalese, 
such that thinking is a form of internal symbol (consisting of a thought-concept/ object 
pairing) manipulation. These claims are presented as self-evident. 
They use this statement to tie in studies that have "suggested that schizophrenia is 
fundamentally a semiotic disorder, a disorder of the recognition and use of sign relations 
(word-to-object, thought-to-object, and object-to-object)" (ibid.). While the notion of a 
semiotic impairment is not unreasonable in itself (see Chapter 5), Covington et al.'s 
interpretation of it is: a schizophrenic's words at times have no meaning, because they 
express/ stand for thoughts that have no meaning. Their thoughts have no . meaning because 
they fail to encode concepts or refer to real-world objects. But whether they are determining 
if the individual words have meaning, or whether the words strung together have meaning is 
not clear. In addition, do they mean a lack of meaning for the schizophrenic, the listener, or 
just meaning in general? Their theory of semantics comes across as a (con)fusion of 
Chomskyan rules operating on fixed-meaning symbols, intentionality, and truth-conditional 
semantics. 
Neither Oh et al. nor Covington et al. find it necessary to entertain the possibility that the 
patient perhaps has delusional beliefs about ponds, or that they said pond when they really 
meant something else. My point is not about the patient's intention, nor the authors' correct 
or incorrect interpretations, but rather that the classification 'semantic deviation' is 
interpretation in the first place. 
3.2. 7 Schizophrenic pragmatics 
The general consensus in mainstream accounts of SLB is that it is the higher levels of 
language that are more often affected (Covington et aI., 2005; Marvel, 2006; McKenna, 2007). 
The definitions of what exactly constitutes these higher levels are less clear and overlapping 












'linguistic' are being touched upon. In fact, I would argue that this is where much of the 
confusion as to whether SLB is indeed a speech or a thought disorder originates. 
Kuperberg & Caplan (2003) conceive of the discourse level as including "information about 
the general topic under discussion, the focus of a speaker's intention, the novelty of the 
information in a given sentence, the temporal order of events, and causation" (p.448): For 
them it clearly forms the boundary between linguistic and extralinguistic: its "structure and 
processing ... involve many nonlinguistic elements and operations, such as logical inferences, 
as well as more purely linguistic operations" (ibid.). Pragmatics, on the other hand, as "social 
and real world knowledge" (p.448), is definitely extralinguistic, although its boundaries with 
semantics are blurred. 
Covington et aL (2005), too, Vlew pragmatics as not-quite-language, calling it "the 
relationship between language and context" (p.92, my emphasis). 'Context' emerges from their 
discussion as co-textual (discourse structure: its cohesion and coherence) and social 
(conversational rules/structure), whereas Kuperberg & Caplan focus almost exclusively on 
the co-textual. While the inclusion of the role of context may seem a deviation from the 
stance incorporated by the language myth, it is very clear that what counts as context is set out in 
advance, and becomes another rule against which deviant speech can be measured. nus is 
particularly apparent in Covington et al.'s discussion of the violation of Grice's maxims. 
"Talking is a cooperative human activity" (2005:93) we are told - a nod to the interpersonal 
nature of speech - but schizophrenics are uncooperative in this respect. nus introduces the 
odd claim that "Grice's maxims [of effective communication] do not function normally in 
schizophrenia" (ibid.). The maxims are presented as strict rules, which "[m]ore than any 
other area of pragmatics ... involve extralinguistic conscious thinking" (ibid.). A maxim 
would seem by definition not to be something which can junction, as such. After all, these are 
a set of principles not describing what people do, but a summary of what we expect others 
do to, and what we assume others expect of us. Schizophrenics' failure to "follow the 
maxims when producing speech" (ibid.) is not clarified. For all we know, schizophrenics 
continue to follow the maxims, but cannot ascertain how much information is adequate, and 












interlocutors. Grice's maxims are completely contextually based - what counts as adherence 
to them is not given in advance. Failure can only be judged by the participants of a situation. 
Beyond this, Covington et aL have misrepresented the argument of De Decker & Vande 
Craen (1987), whose work they are summarising. If one reads the original piece, it is clear 
that the authors are speaking not about conversation in general, but conversation in the 
therapeutic setting. They are not making claims regarding the general structure of 
schizophrenic speech. In fact their conclusion is that Grice's maxims are of little relevance in 
the schizophrenic therapeutic setting, and holding to them obscures what the patient is really 
trying to communicate. This misrepresentation is highly significant in terms of the point 
being made here. This is one of the Covington et aL's few references to a work that does not 
approach schizophrenic language from the purely biomedical perspective ~t is tided 'An 
Interpersonal Theory of Schizophrenia', although De Decker & Van de Craen do introduce 
the concept of hemispheric over-activity in the second half of their paper), and it is grossly 
misrepresented to fit in with the dominant view of language as being rule based, and 
schizophrenic language as rule breaking. 
Lasdy, their claim that "pragmatic phenomena were lumped with semantics, or simply 
ignored, in earlier literature" (2005:92) is more than a little odd; as we shall see in Chapter 4, 
from the very earliest reports on schizophrenic language, its 'lack of fit' with context and 
inappropriateness to the situation has been highlighted, albeit without use of the term 
'pragmatics'. 
Psychology has operationalised this pragmatic ability to an extent as the construct 'theory of 
mind' (TOM). Defined as the ability (or more specifically, a "cognitive mechanism" or 
module evolved in the human's 'social brain' [Bums, 2007:136]) to "represent one's own 
mental state ... and also, crucially, the mental states of others" (McKenna, 2007:257), it has a 
role in "facilitating interpersonal communication" (Bums, 2007:136). Evolutionarily speaking, 
while limited TOM skills are found in apes, full TOM skills are the possession of humans 
alone (Bums, 2007). Originally developed by Frith in the context of autism, in schizophrenia, 
impaired TOM is implicated in negative symptoms (due to "lack of awareness ... of own 












intentions''); incoherence in speech and language ("failure to take account of the listener's 
lack of knowledge"); and positive symptoms like delusions (residual TOM knowledge - as a 
once-functional adult -leads to false inferences, which can manifest as paranoid beliefs or 
delusions about 'receiving messages,) (p.137). 
Schizophrenics tend to perform poorly on tests measuring TOM; however, one recent study 
(McCabe, Leudar & Antaki, 2004) found that TOM skills remained intact in chronic 
schizophrenics, despite the persistence of delusions, and the realisation that these were not 
shared by their healthy interlocutor - thus, as a model, TOM is not beyond reproach. In 
addition, some refute that it is a domain-specific module of the brain, and invoke a broader 
system of integrated cognitive functions called 'existential TOM' (ETOM) "that allows 
individuals to perceive meaning in certain life events" (Bering, cited in Burns, 2007:148), 
defining a meaningful life event as "one that implies purpose or intention as the causal 
force" (p.148). Thus language use would be included in this definition. 
3.2.8 Written language 
Not surprisingly, research into SLB displays the same curious paradox surrounding written 
language as does orthodox linguistics. Despite a few oblique references to schizophrenics' 
written communication, material covered by the three reviews (Kuperberg & Caplan, 2003; 
Covington et al., 2005; Marvel, 2006) reflects that the overwhelming majority of research 
centres on schizophrenics' speech (and yet, that for purposes of analysis, their speech is 
always converted into a textual product is not considered problematic,45 reinforcing the 
belief that writing serves only to record speech). And in the very few articles that do assess 
schizophrenics' written language, their adherence to an orthodox account of writing is 
absolute. 
A case in point is Herbert & Waltensperger's (1980) motivation for deciding to restrict their 
focus to "a written corpus ... of letters written by the subject to his psychiatrist over [a] 
three-year period... because of the greater reliability of the transcribed written riatd' (p.82, emphasis 
4S One might ask, on a practicalleve1, how things could be done differently. Surely including a tape-recording, 
or even video-recording, were it feasible in the academic publication context, would still amount to extracting 
and abstracting from the flow of communication? My point is less that it should be MtII differently, than that 












added). The authors qualify this assertion by explaining that "the transcription of oral data is 
complicated by the subject's more frequent use of neologisms in speech and the general 
problem of the transcription of suprasegmentals, essential to the character of schizophrenic 
speech" (1980:82-83). Finally, that "the primary use of written data should, in principle, 
provide more direct access to the schizophrenic's 'competence' as opposed to the initial 
performance characterizing schizophrenic speech" (p.83) is presented as common sense, and 
the authors see no need for further justification. Quite simply, writing is a more accurate 
reflection of what goes on in a person's mind, and contains less of the 'noise' present in 
speech. 
Having noted clear differences between the modes of writing and speech, Herbert & 
Waltensperger proceed to treat this as having little significance when it comes to grammatical 
structure - a mode-transcendent feature of language. The authors have no qualms about re-
transcribing the subject's written output, whatever their misgivings about converting speech 
into a textual product. Although they describe some of the features of his original letters, 
including inconsistent spatial organisation and orthography, and note that "[t]he varying 
appearance of the subject's letters may be correlated with his emotional state at the times of 
their composition, but there is no way of verifying this interpretation" (p.84),46 again these 
features are tacirly dismissed as not central to their concern, which is grammatical structure. 
In addition, there is little consideration given to the broader communicational situation, for 
example, was the therapist writing back to the patient? 
Although Herbert & Waltensperger constitute an exception to the rule which declares 
speech alone of importance when it comes to schizophrenic language, nonetheless, the 
actual research process relies heavily On the written form, and subsequenrly, schizophrenic 
utterances are treated as 'texts' to be analysed. Lasrly, in the context of testing, despite a few 
indications that whether material is presented visually or orally makes a difference to 
schizophrenics' comprehension (e.g. De Lisi, 2001:492; Kuperberg & Caplan, 2003:454), this 
point is usually overlooked in test design, or barely mentioned as a consideration when 
46 They add that "the content of all letters is similar; there is no evidence of increased paranoia in the context of 
the more disordered arrangements" (p.84), and thus make their double standard clear. That the subject's mental 
content/mental state can be directly inferred from the textual product (language reflects thought) is 












discussing results (from passing references one can glean that research may take the form of 
a pencil-and-paper test, spoken response, or even pushing buttons). It is clear that 
researchers regard language as language, whatever the medium; the essentials of speech 
(structure) are captured by writing, and writing has no semiotic significance beyond 
recording speech. 
3.2.9 Formal thollght disorder 
Formal thought disorder (FID) forms the centrepiece of most accounts of schizophrenic 
language. As we shall see in Chapter 4, the term has come under repeated attack, but remains 
in use today. It is "a disorder in the form of thought, not the content' (Covington et ai, 2005:86, 
original emphasis), which focuses on "the way ideas, sentences, and word are put together" 
(Kuperberg & Caplan, 2003:445). Most reviewers of theories of SLB equate the 
phenomenon with formal thought disorder. None draw particular attention to the fact that 
disorders of language have been found in both thought-disordered (ID) and non-thought-
disordered (NTD) schizophrenics (e.g. Rochester & Martin, 1979; Oh et aI., 2002). McKenna 
(2007), for example, discusses speech disorder exclusively within the context of formal 
thought disorder, of which he gives the following account 
The simplest cognitive neuropsychological explanation of thought disorder -
which is so simple that few have ever subscribed to it - is surprisingly well 
supported Thought-disordered schizophrenic speech features genuine linguistic 
abnormalities and cannot always be distinguished from dysphasia. But at the 
same time, there are features such as intact comprehension and sparing of 
naming that make it different from any neurological form of fluent dysphasia. 
Nor is language disturbance the whole story. [ ... ] There is of course no reason 
why language abnormalities should not combine with an executive impairment, 
especially in a disorder where the pathological process is reputed to involve both 
the temporal and frontal lobes fp.257] 
While authors will in passing mention studies that have distinguished between TD and NTD 
schizophrenics, and emphasise that speech does not have a one-to-one relationship with 












of disorganised thinking (whatever that means). Marvel (2006) actually characterises negative 
FrO as "impoverished thought content' (my emphasis) and maintains, that despite the debate, 
"~]t is nevertheless uncontroversial that linguistic disturbance in schizophrenic speech follow 
a general pattern of anomalies that are related to the presence of FrO" (p.14). Kuperberg & 
Caplan (2003) introduce the problematic nature of 'thought disorder' (they distinguish 
between formal and content, and claim in practice these tend to be blurred), but proceed 
with the assumption that it is just another term for disorders of speech output and 
processing. 
Covington et al (2005) warn that "~]n the psychiatric literature, many of the abnormalities of 
language in schizophrenia are lumped together as formal thought disorder" (p.86); the 
implication is that the linguist will be more discerning. However, the authors proceed to then 
lump all features of Fro under 'language disorder' by virtue of the fact that there is 
linguistic terminology to describe the phenomena. Adherence to the belief that FrO is 
primarily responsible for disorganised speech is not possible without some notion that 
speech is first planned, then executed. If speech is the "reading off of a mental text" (Taylor, 
1997:52), underlying Fro points to the 'writing' of the mental text that goes awry, while 
speech disorder hypotheses focus on the 'reading'. 
One of the standard tools used to determine whether a schizophrenic is thought-disordered 
is Nancy Andreason's Thought, Language & Communication Scale (cited in Covington et aJ., 
2005; Marvel, 2006), based on the 18 types of disorder she identified in a separate paper 
(Andreason, 1979). Bentall (2003) summarises these types in a table reproduced here (Table 
3.1). Her groundbreaking work aimed to overcome some of the difficulty in identifying the 
'strangeness' that characterises psychotic speech. Crucially, Andreason demonstrated that 
Fro is not unique to schizophrenia - manics also display numerous of these traits in their 
speech. Despite this revelation 30 years ago, it is almost completely ignored even in the very 
latest reviews (Kuperberg & Caplan [2003] do however report mixed findings). Perhaps the 
disease model of schizophrenia cannot make sense of the fact that a supposedly central 












Table 3.1 Andreason's (1979) main types of thought, language and communication disorder 
Type of disorder Definition Example 
Poverty of speech Restriction in the amount of 
spontaneous speech. Replies to 
questions are brief and concrete. 
Poverty of content Speech that conveys litde 
of speech information. Language is vague and 
over-abstract. 
Pressure of speech An increase in the amount of 
spontaneous speech compared to 
what is considered customary. 
Distractible speech During mid speech, the subject is 'Then I left San Francisco and moved to ... 
changed in response to a stimulus. Where did vou get that tie?' 
Tangentiality Replying to questions in an oblique, Q: 'What city are you from?' A: 'Well, that's a 
tangential or irrelevant manner. hard question. I'm from Iowa. I really don't 
know where my relatives came from, so I don't 
know if I'm Irish or French.' 
Derailment Ideas slip off the track on to another 'The next day when I'd be going out you know, I 
which is obliquely related or took control, like uh, I put bleach on my hair in 
unrelated. California.' 
Incoherence (word Speech that is incomprehensible at Q: 'Why do people believe in God?' A: 'Because 
salad) times. making a do in life. Isn't none of that stuff about 
evolution guiding isn't true any more.' 
Illogicality Conclusions are reached that do not 
follow logically (non sequiturs or 
faulty inductive inferences). 
Clanging Sounds rather than meaningful 'I'm not trying to make noise. I'm trying to make 
relationships appear to govern sense. If you can make sense out of nonsense, 
words. well, have fun.' 
Neologisms New word formations. 'I got so angry I picked up a dish and threw it at 
the geshinker.' 
Word Old words used in a new and 'His boss was a seeover.' 
approximations unconventional way. 
Circumstantiality Speech that is very indirect and 
delayed at reaching its goal 
Excessive long-windedness. 
Loss of goal Failure to follow chain of thought to 
a natural conclusion. 
Perseveration Persistent repetition of words or 'I think I'll put on my hat, my hat, my hat.' 
ideas. 
Echolalia Echoing of others' speech. Q: 'Can we talk for a few minutes?' A: 'Talk for a 
few minutes.' 
Blocking Interruption of a train of speech 
before completed. 
Stilted speech Speech excessively 
formal. 
stilted and 'The attorney comported himself indecorously.' 
Self-reference Patient repeatedly and Q: 'What's the time?' A: 'It's 7 o'clock. That's my 
inappropriate1v refers back to self. problem.' 
Phonemic Mispronunciation; syllables out of 'I slipped on the lice and broke my arm.' 
paraphasia sequence. 
Semantic Substitution of inappropriate word. 'I slipped on the coat, on the ice I mean, and 
paraphasia broke my book.' 












While Andreason doesn't make use of linguistic terminology in her descriptions, hers is 
broadly a pragmatic or discourse-based assessment of psychotic speech. Words like 'goal', 
'off the track', 'conclusion' indicate a belief that normal speech follows a particular discourse 
plan, with a pre-set goal; psychotic speech may start with this plan, but gets derailed or 
disrupted. The reason for the interlocutor's confusion is finnly located in deviant speech; 
schizophrenics appear unable to follow not the rules of language, but conversation. What is 
of particular interest to integrationists is that most of these descriptions are actually 
interpretations - the use of words like 'inappropriate', 'unconventional', 'vague', 
'incomprehensible', 'irrelevant', 'unrelated', 'natural' indicate an assessment at a 
metalinguistic level, which could not be made without the engaged involvement of the 
interlocutor. And although characterised as an assessment of the form of language/ thought, 
assessment can only be achieved by simultaneously evaluating the content. Ultimately, that the 
lack of objectivity makes it no less useful a tool in assessment is significant. 
3.2.10 Language evolution 
As mentioned in Section 3.2.1, the evolutionary hypothesis posits a link between the origin 
of psychosis and the origin of our capacity for language as humans. In a nutshell, theories 
such as Timothy Crow's (1997), attempt to account for the fact that despite the fitness and 
reproductive disadvantage that schizophrenia confers on an individual, the disease persists in 
the population, and has a relatively stable incidence across the world Thus whatever genetic 
mutation gave rise to the possibility of psychosis must have resulted in a benefit that 
outweighs this cost, and have occurred at the dawn of our species. It is likely linked to the 
genetic coding for that which many consider the distinguishing feature of our species - our 
capacity for language, enabled by hemispheric lateralisation, in which the two brain 
hemispheres are specialised according to function. It is not surprising then, that 
schizophrenics display language abnormalities. In Crow's formulation, 'schizophrenia ~s] the 
price Homo sapiens pays for language'. 
Crow's hypothesis depends on the assumption that "our species arose suddenly and 
decisively, thus marking a distinct separation from our hominid ancestors" (Bums, 2007:58) 
and he also "relies upon [this] discontinuity in evolution to explain the emergence of 












communication system that came before it, distinguished by its generativity, what Crow 
(1997) defines as "the capacity for recombination" (p.133), and arose due to specialised 
language areas in the brain; it is largely autonomous from other functions or 'modules'. To 
make his case, Crow explicidy builds on two of the cornerstones of orthodox, psychologistic 
linguistics: Chomskyan generativism a,nd Saussureansigns. 
Although one hemisphere is dominant (usually, the left), "~]anguage ... is a whole brain 
function" (p.134); there are areas in both hemispheres dedicated to a particular aspect of 
language, which are linked via commissural connections. These two aspects of language are 
its temporal and its spatial characteristics respectively. The temporal, one-dimensional linear 
phonological form of language is located in the dominant hemisphere, while the spatial, two-
dimensional, logical form is located in the non-dominant. According t  Chomsky, the logical 
form "represent[s] the assembly of the lexical and syntactic components of the sentence" 
while the phonetic form is the sentence's "phonetic expression" (p.135). Furthermore, 
"~]ogical form precedes, and interacts with, phonetic form" (ibid). A related theory which 
Crow draws upon is Paivio's idea that "cognitions exist in two interconnected forms - verbal 
('logogens,) and non-verbal ('imagens')" (ibid). The former corresponds with the dominant 
hemisphere, and the latter, the non-dominant. Crow presents these ideas as essentially 
technical revisions of Saussure's definition of the sign, whereby the 'logogens' or phonetic 
expression is the signifier, and the 'imagens' or logical form is the signified. The spatial 
arrangement of the non-dominant hemisphere allows for parallel processing (which saves 
time), but finally its information needs to be 'sent' to the dominant hemisphere to be 
converted into linear form. 
Predictably, in schizophrenia, with a lack of hemispheric specialisation, this process goes 
awry. One theory is that "the left hemispheric consciousness becomes aware of an influence 
from an 'external' force, which in fact, is the right hemisphere" (p.137) which leads to the 
Schneiderian first-rank symptoms (detailed in Chapter 1 on page 11) of delusions of control 
and thought insertion. Thus for Crow, these symptoms provide "clues to the cerebral 
organisation of language", and their "significance ... is to chart out the boundary conditions 












Crow then goes on to speculate as to the details, wholeheartedly dealing in some of the 
prime misconceptions which integrationists have sought to dispel: 
A feature of human language is that it is a two-way system - sounds are decoded 
and generate meaning, and meanings are encoded into sound - the so-called 'hi-
directionality of the Saussurean sign' (Hurford, 1992). The general principle of 
linguistic communication is that symbols are held in common by speakers of a 
given language, and by means of the bi-directional mechanism can be used as 
exchangeable tokens. However, as Hurford points out, there is a class of words, 
the deictic (or indexical) pronouns'!' and 'you', for which this is not true. The 
referent is not fixed, and in the course of a two-way conversation, the meaning 
to be attached to these symbols must be switched back and forth, according to 
whoever is the speaker. It is an aspect of this process that has become deviant in 
association with the first rank symptoms - meanings and intentions that are 
internally generated are attributed to another person or outside agency [p.13?] 
Hemispheric specialisation for the components of language function achieves completion at 
about the time an individual reaches sexual maturity. Crow & Done "speculate that it is 
those in whom this process is delayed or incomplete who are at risk of psychotic illness" 
(1997:66). From this perspective then, it might seem that people who go on to become 
psychotic have never reached full linguistic competence. The authors argue the opposite -
that schizophrenics actually have a superior capacity to generate complex sentences, but 
"later encounter inflexible limits" (p.67) in language production - although they use pre-
schizophrenic children's written essays (retrospectively) as evidence. Considering the study 
reported by De Lisi (2001) in which ''when given a writing task, patients with schizophrenia 
wrote with as much complexity as controls, yet their speech, which depends on working 
memory and attention for focused fluent production, was less complex than that of 
controls" (p.492), it could be argued that recognising the distinction between writing and 












Nevertheless, to sununarise their position: 
those predispositioned to psychosis have a genetically determined mismatch 
between their capacity to generate linguistic stnictures (sentences or discourses) 
of a target level of complexity and an informational channel (possibly inter-
hemispheric) through which this informationpasses [1997:68] 
Ultimately, then, schizophrenic linguistic difficulties are characterised as an infonnation-
processing difficulty. Schizophrenics have trouble getting information 'out', which leads to 
confusion within. 
Crow and his colleague'S theory gives a rather brilliant account of the existence of 
hallucinated voices, and in contrast to most mainstream accounts, ties this in with theories of 
language disorder, rather than treating them as two separate phenomena. What his theory 
doesn't account for though, is the content of the voices - why are they so often persecutory, 
for example? Nevertheless, the implication of his theory is a combined explanation for 
Schneiderian first-rank symptoms (delusions about one's thoughts, auditory hallucinations) 
in tenus of failed or incomplete hemispheric differentiation, and the deviant fonn of 
schizophrenic speech (like lack of syntactic complexity). In fact, the nuclear symptoms of 
schizophrenia are explained ultimately as the result of language disorder (Crow, 2000). 












4. THE CHANGING CONCEPT OF LANGUAGE IN 
SCHIZOPHRENIA 
Having established the current mainstream view of SLB, and its language myth bias, one is 
prompted to ask the question that chips away at the inevitability with which most 'facts' are 
presented: "Has it always been this way?", which is closely tied to: "Is this the only way of 
approaching it?" While the answer to the latter should already be clear within the context of 
this thesis, the answer to the former in this case is both 'yes' and 'no': the seeds of the 
current dominant approach can be found at the inception of the disease as a unitary concept 
(and even before this); however, at this time, a number of other ideas (now discarded) were 
of equal standing. The section begins with the works of Emil Kraepelin (the first to group a 
collection of symptoms together as a disease he called dementia praecox) and Eugen Bleuler 
(who coined the term 'schizophrenia' to replace Kraepelin's 'dementia praecox,). It then 
continues through the studies in the first half of the twentieth century, to the early 1960s, 
which marked a watershed moment both for linguistics as a discipline, and studies of 
schizophrenia, for different reasons (the triumph of generative linguistics for the former, the 
introduction of antipsychotic medication for the latter). The 1970s saw the first linguist 
investigate schizophrenic language,47 which broadened interest in the phenomenon and 
generated fierce debate well into the 1980s. By this stage, new-generation atypical 
antipsychotic medication and advances in brain imaging technology reinforced the 
burgeoning biomedical approach to language, and it is at this point that psychiatry's version 
of linguistics and language became cemented - it is very rare to find references to linguistic 
theory dating after the 1970s even in mainstream schizophrenia work published recendy. An 
oversimplification perhaps, but there is a sense in which Chomsky cracked the code, and to 
fill the gaps, there's Grice on pragmatics and Halliday & Hasan on discourse cohesion - a 
clear-cut instance of what Harris terms the "fixed-code plus" approach to language. 
4.1 The early years 
Although Kraepelin and Bleuler were contemporaries, Anglo-American psychiatry did not 
gain access to their works simultaneously; Kraepelin's text was translated into English in 
47 This oft-repeated 'fact' is something of a myth itself, if one considers that, as Jenkins (2004) reports, Edward 












1919 (m Britain), but it was more than 30 years later that Bleuler's monograph received the ' 
same treatment (m the United States).48 In any text on schizophrenic symptoms, the author's 
beliefs about language and the mentally ill are revealed as much by the content of their work 
as by the form. Thus particular attention will be drawn to the way in which descriptions of 
the linguistic features of schizophrenia are organised. While in some ways it is unfair to 
compare an entire monograph on a subject with what is essentially just a chapter extracted 
from a larger work, Bleuler's treatment of the disease - and the role oflariguagein particular 
- is both quantitatively and qualitatively different from Kraepelin's. Even a quick page-
through of the books gives one an impression of the differences. Littered with graphs, 
diagrams, writing samples, even photographs (mosrly of patients), Kraepelin's work 
exemplifies his biomedical scientific leanings. His few chapters, studded with umpteen 
subheadings, read like a catalogue of symptoms. Bleuler's work, on the other hand, is a 
carefully structured argument. No illustrations to embellish or explain, but rather an attempt 
to introduce us to a strange world, populated by unique characters. That the same 
phenomenon or symptom appears under different categories is testament to his more 
integrated approach. 
Kraepelin and Bleuler provide a description of similar phenomena; but their descriptions are 
infused with interpretation, explanation, assumption (mdeed, it is debatable whether there is 
such a thing as a 'neutral' description of a symptom - one of the central themes of this 
thesis), and this is where their differences become apparent. Both believed in an underlying 
biological cause, but for Bleuler, this didn't preclude a psychological explanation for 
symptoms and their relationships with each other. Despite their differences in approach, 
there remains an underlying similarity in their broader conception of language, and its 
relation to thought. 
Most of Kraepelin's discussion of all things linguistic is confined to his chapter on 'psychic 
symptoms' (as opposed to 'bodily symptoms,); thus the organisation of his text conforms 
nearly to the Cartesian mind-body split, with language clearly disembodied, a psychological 
48 The place of publication is more likely indicative of a receptive audience, and not the reason why Kraepelin's 
influence held sway in the UK while American psychiatry (primed by exposure to Freud) followed the 












property of the individual. Within this chapter, he doesn't seem to find the unsignalled, 
almost imperceptible shifts between discussions of thought and speech/writing problematic, 
and a distinction between these categories is made occasionally, and not as a rule. It is taken . 
as given that the only access we have to thoughts is through speech or writing, which in tum 
reflects thought, for the most part, faidyaccurately. 
Earlier, he introduces his second chapter with the following: 
The complexity of the conditions which we observe in the domain of dementia 
praecox is very great, so that their inner connection is at first recognizable only 
by their occurring one after the other in the course of the same disease. [p.5] 
He is not working at the level of individual patients, but of the disease itself (and this is an 
approach evident throughout his work - once a patient is diagnosed as suffering from 
'dementia praecox', all their behaviour is potentially evidence of it). The concept of 'the same 
disease' thus forces the search for 'inner connection' between conditions. However, because 
it is Kraepelin's contribution to medicine that these conditions do form one disease, this 
premise goes unquestioned, and it is with the search for 'inner connections' that Kraepelin 
chiefly concerns himself. That the search is usually fruidess emerges as one of his defining 
characteristics of the disease. We are not told here what exacdy constitutes an 'inner 
connection', but a meaning can be extrapolated from his repeated use of the term. 
His inner/outer dichotomy is worth spelling out. 'Inner' refers both to within the mind (not 
direcdy accessible by others) and what is 'intrinsic', although the two senses are not unrelated. 
Outer is related to what can be perceived direcdy by the observer's senses (i.e. sounds, forms 
of writing), and is extrinsic. Thus there is a distinction between concepts and the forms 
which house them when expressed - connections between the former are essential, between 
the latter, peripheral or arbitrary. A foregrounding of the peripheral at the expense of the 













Bleuler (1911[1950]), on the other hand, divides symptoms up into the categories 'primary' 
and 'accessory', whereby the latter arise out of the former - thus the clinical picture of the 
disease is a combination of the two. Although there is a linguistic dimension to various of his 
categories, speech and writing in and of themselves are discussed as an accessory symptom. 
The disturbance of association, for Bleuler, defines the disease, and is the symptom from 
which all others stem. Associative threads, which ordinarily "guide our thinking" (p.14), can 
be "disrupted" (ibid.), singly or as a group, they can be "ineffective" (pol 7), even 
disconnected. Ultimately, associations established by experience no longer hold sway or 
dominate, they are "loosened", allowing for novel associations to intervene or appear. Thus 
thinking is illogical because it follows associations that deviate from "those which experience 
has taught us" (p.80). The impression with which the schizophrenic's interlocutor is left is of 
a general idea perhaps, but no clear purpose or goal. 
Neither Kraepe1in nor Bleuler spend much time discussing formal aspects of language 
structure, although these do secure a mention. Although Bleuler dedicates a substantial 
section to disorders of speech and writing, for the most part, he contends that "[t]he 
abnormality does not lie in the language itse(f, but rather in its content" (1950:147, emphasis 
added) - under this he includes "blocking, poverty of ideas, incoherence, clouding, delusions, 
and emotional anomalies" (ibid.). He does make note of grammatical errors, which he calls 
paragrammaticisms: 
A special confusion is introduced into speech by the fact that ideas designated by 
correcdy chosen words are distorted by the structure of the sentence. Also, in the 
construction and use of neologisms patients may select the correct root but 
vitiate the meaning by use of incorrect suffixes, conjunctions, etc. [pp.152-153] 
Thus neologisms, in some cases, are blurred with grammatical anomalies. Kraepelin 
describes similar linguistic features under "disorders of internal speech, of the 
transformation of ideas into linguistic movements of expression" (1918:67), a much broader 
category than Bleuler's 'paragrammaticisms'. Although this is not explained, one gathers 
from the paragraphs that succeed it that this is an intermediate stage between thinking and 












substitution, neologisms, which he defines as "senseless collections of syllables, here and 
there still having a sound reminiscent of real words" (p.68), some of which perhaps express 
"more complicated or morbid ideas, for which no words exist" (ibid.), and finally gibberish. 
Related to this is what Kraepelin calls 'akataphasia', where the appropriate expression of 
thought cannot be found, and something similar is uttered instead. Disorder extends in some 
cases to sentence construction, manifest in disturbed syntax, a telegram style, which may 
degenerate further into complete lack of sentence-formation. 
For Bleuler, most 'linguistic' features are described in terms of their relation to other actions 
or behaviour. So, for example, depersonalisation may lead to patients losing track of time 
and space, and their self - thus instead of labeling these patients' speech as 'displaying an 
incorrect use of pronouns', their speaking of themselves in the third person is contextualised 
as "the expression of a real alteration in personality" (p.144). One example which contradicts 
this approach is what Bleuler claims is a misuse of auxiliary verbs, whereby patients display a 
confusion between "to be" and "to have", so that "I am England" means "England belongs 
to me" (p.153). 
Kraepelin, on the other hand, whether illustrating anomalies of language or thought, tends to 
treat utterances as decontextualised symptoms. A typical example: 
The most different ideas follow one another with most bewildering want of 
connection, even when the patients are quite quiet. A patient said "Life is a 
dessert-spoon," another, 'We are already standing in the spiral under the 
hammer," a third, "Death will be awakened by the golden dagger," a fourth, 
"The consecrated discourse cannot be over split in any movement," a patient, "I 
don't know what 1 am to do here, it must be the aim, that means to steal with the 
gendemen. fp.57] 
To be sure, it is difficult to imagine the circumstances in which such individual utterances 
may have occurred. Yet their complete divorce from context (both co-linguistic and 












as demonstrating a complete 'want of connection', Kraepelin sees no need to contextualise 
them, and simply reels them off as examples of deviant discharge. 
Both Kraepelin and Bleuler do mobilise 'context' to explain the deviance of schizophrenic 
speech, particularly in excited states. Kraepelin notes "a prodigious flow of talk" (p.56) in 
patients ''which does not correspond to a need for expression, but usually unburdens itself 
without any reference to the surroundings" (ibid.). Similarly, Bleuler observes that 
For the most part, they do not thereby want to convey anything to, or 
communicate with their environment. Their thoughts are transformed into 
speech, without relation to the environment. Or such a relation may be entirely 
one-sided, as when a patient asks a question which is somewhat suited to his 
interlocutor but shows no need for an answer; he gives us no time for one, nor 
does he listen. The presence of a person often serves as a stimulus to mere 
speech activity, not as a motive for saying something. Many patients are 
constandy uttering chains of words; they talk but do not say anything. [p.147] 
Anomalies of vocal speech production too (speed, rhythm, cadence), which Kraepelin calls 
'derailments49 of linguistic expression' are characterised as deviant due to their lack of fit: 
"individual peculiarities of vocal speech are changed without relation to each other or to the 
psychic occurrences by which they are usually ruled" (p.66). 
For Kraepelin, ultimately much of what schizophrenics say is meaningless deviance. Bleuler 
maintains it only seems that way: 
The emergence of an idea without any connection with a previous train of 
thought, or without any external stimulus, is... so foreign to normal 
psychology that one is obliged to look even in the patient's seemingly most far-
fetched ideas, for the associative path originating in a previous concept or in an 
external stimulus." [1950:22] 












Meaning is there for the finding, although this may be an almost impossible task for the 
clinician. 
Both Bleuler and Kraepelin regard speech as an expression of thought, but don't assume a 
one-to-one relationship between the two. Abnormal speech is not necessarily an indication 
of abnormal thinking. As already mentioned, Kraepelin distinguishes between 'derailments 
of linguistic expression' and 'disorders of internal speech'; his third point of breakdown is in 
the train of thought itself. Bleuler, too, draws a distinction between 'misdirected talking' and 
'misdirected thinking', or linguistic versus conceptual disturbance. 
What Kraepelin considers a case of "[t]he feeling of the disease tak[ing] on insane forms; the 
brain is burned, shrunken, as if completely gone to jelly, full of water, the mind is 'drawn like 
rags from the brain'; the patient 'has only a little knuckle of a brain left'; the nerves are teased 
out. The tongue is made of iron ... " (1919:26), Bleuler describes as a case of metaphorical 
language actually altering thought, resulting in bodily delusions: "Their bones have turned 
liquid; their hearts have turned to stone. (Change from the originally symbolic to the literal 
meaning.)" (1950[1911]:123). Similarly, what Kraepelin would describe as distraction by 
'outer' properties of words (''linguistic constituents" [p.19]), due to "a failure of attention" 
(p.20), and consequent communication breakdown (resulting in "a completely unintelligible 
and aimless series of words and fragments of thoughts" [ibid.]), Bleuler characterises as an 
actual change in thought, allowed by the loosening of association - "the concepts themselves 
are altered" (1950[1911]:76). 
He counters the notion that in schizophrenia, "words lose their meaning until there remain 
mere chains of word-husks" (p.150), claiming that, for the most part, patients produce 
"striking words and phrases", which "can hardly be looked upon as empty shells but rather 
as shells which conceal a content different from the usual" (ibid.). Bleuler also describes what 
he perceives as the loosening of "the connection between concept and linguistic expression" 
(p.149). However, he continues, "there need not be any correlation between the degree of 













Both note that the anomalies found in speech can also be found in writing, although this is 
not necessarily the case - a patient who cannot express themselves in one medium may have 
no trouble in the other. Indeed it would appear that this was often how both clinicians 
determined whether the problem was conceptual/thought-based or merely 
linguistic/expressive. Both also make reference to a patient's behaViour as giving clues to 
rationality - Krapelin mentions rational behaviour in the presence of confused speech; 
Bleuler reports physiological signs giving away a mute patient's comprehension, or a patient 
experiencing blocking being able to continue expressing the thought through gestures. 
Indeed on this point, Bleuler draws attention to the often stark distinction between what 
seems and what is. While Kraepelin does acknowledge that mutism can be the result of 
voices forbidding the patient to speak., for the most part, monosyllabicism, mutism, lack of 
initiation, hesitating speech, and dull facial expression are evidence of "[t]he cessation of the 
need to express oneself' (p.55, emphasis omitted). Bleuler's approach is a litde more 
sensitive. Patients speak. of "thought overflow" (things escape their mind), "pressure of 
thoughts", "collecting of thoughts" (p.29). The observer may conclude the patient is 
thinking less not more (since not much is forthcoming), while the patients themselves report 
a compulsion to think. This is typical of Bleuler's regard for patients' experience of their 
disease, not shared by Kraepelin. 
Bleuler notes that our access to hallucinations is problematic: voices forbid the patient from 
sharing, or patients fear they will be judged crazy by disclosing the presence of voices. 
Interestingly, Kraepelin does not appear to regard hearing voices as an automatic marker of 
irrationality: he cites a patient, "quite reasonable and sensible", who took notes of what his 
hallucinated voices said - the result was "detached sentences without connection" (p.10) 
which the patient himself could not explain. However, in some transcriptions of hallucinated 
speech one is able to find "a certain connection, if only external, of the ideas which follow 
each other" (poll, emphasis added). There is a striking similarity between reported 
hallucinated speech, and transcribed schizophrenic speech as reported by Kraepelin 












Bleuler is acutely aware of the impact of both the internal and the external environment on 
many patients. Internally, they may be preoccupied with their thoughts, or have emotional 
associations to the topic of conversation. Externally, they may overwhelmed by the 
immediate or surrounding stimuli, so for example, will name everything they see, rather than 
respond appropriately to what is being said to them. 'This compulsive 'naming' has a 
tactile/motor component to it, namely, 'touching' - a patient's compulsion to feel whatever 
he or she sees. Bleuler links this phenomenon to the content of auditory hallucinations - in 
which patients hear a running commentary on their actions - as well as to echolalia and 
echopraxia, in which the patient imitates or acts out what they see and hear. He explains: 
"Every idea has a motor element; in the actions he sees performed before his very eyes, in 
the words he hears spoken, this component is quite obvious in the healthy person" (p.29). 
The opposite to this 'hyper-integration' also exists; patients may appear completely oblivious 
to their environments too - which Bleuler termed 'autism', "a very peculiar alteration of the 
relation between the patient's inner life and the external world The inner life assumes 
pathological predominance" (p.63). Autistic thinking obeys its own special laws: patients 
think in symbols, analogies, fragmentary concepts, make accidental connections. However, 
they can return to 'normal' logical thinking - whether this is an act of the will is unclear. 
To sum up, then, for both Kraepelin and Bleuler, grammar does affect comprehension; 
schizophrenics tend to disobey the ules of language which can make their speech difficult to 
understand. For both, linguistic abnormality can exist without underlying thought or 
associative abnormality. Speech can even seem to take place in the absence of thought or 
intention (that this is by definition pathological implies a belief that normal utterances are 
intentional/ convey thought). The divide between conceptual abnormality (train of thought) 
and content abnormality (delusions) is hardly gaping; for Bleuler at least, these influence each 
other. The relationship between hallucinations, speech abnormality and delusions is not as 
remote as in modern accounts. Also, that writing is afforded more than a mere mention 
(Kraepelin even reproduces samples as photographs) is in distinct contrast to current 
approaches to schizophrenic language. 
For Kraepelin, breakdown in the rules of logic, language and discourse, result in 












For Bleuler, although words may no longer 'contain' the usual meaning (a splitting of the 
bipartite sign, which in Saussurean terms would imply the schizophrenic is in possession of a 
different langue), meaning is largely to be found in the associations behind the schizophrenic 
speech, pardy because these associations are peculiar to the patient, and not the ones shared 
by most due to shared experience. Associations which may have occurred by chance 
(perhaps due to 'outer' similarity) take on meaning when they are 'retained' (i.e. reused). For 
both, unique experience may necessitate the use of neologisms. 
Without consideration of the immediate environment, emotional complexes, even regional 
slang, Bleuler contends one will struggle to make sense of the patients' utterances. A· 
patient's own account of experience is valuable, even if they only have insight into this in 
remission. Neither Bleuler nor Kraepelin were aware of their co-constructive role in making 
meaning; rather an utterance can be analysed to 'find' its meaning. 
For both, there is clear evidence of a fairly classical view of language, as consisting of rules 
for combining words, which themselves have meaning because of the concept to which they 
are conventionally 'attached'. These concepts are located in the mind, whereby they are 
transformed into words (Kraepelin's inner speech), and then expressed as outer vocal speech. 
Using modem terminology then, both competence and performance may be affected 
However, there is no sense of violence being done to some abstract entity called 'the 
language'. Incomprehensibility is as much a function of breaking the rules of language and 
logical association as flouting the norms of utterances 'fitting' with their situation. 
Although Kraepelin and Bleuler dominate any discussion of the formative years of 
schizophrenia as a disease-concept, these giants of early psychiatry do not account for the 
full picture. Kleist was possibly the first to remark upon similarities between SLB and 
aphasia (pointing to potential organic causes), and he was also one of the early proponents 
of theory that implicates disorders of the frontal lobe with the disorganisation apparent in 
schizophrenia. Unfortunately, Kleist's ideas were not accepted by the mainstream during his 
lifetime (McKenna, 2007). In addition, Bleuler saw his work as an application of Freud's 
theories - it is usually maintained that their work diverged quite considerably in the end, 












psychoanalytic theories (Zilboorg, 1957). Freud attempted to use his work on the neuroses 
to formulate a theory of psychosis (pao, 1973). Linguistically speaking, he maintained that 
the problem of schizophrenic speech is an inability to be interested in people and 
things outside the self so that the qualities of words superseded their socially 
accepted, symbolic significance and disrupted the relationship between sign and 
signified which non-psychotic speakers and listeners take for granted. The 
psychotic speaker then relates to words as things themselves rather than words as 
signifiers. The properties of words for sound, ambiguity or idiosyncratic meaning 
rather than the meaning of the word for the occasion become more important in 
the determination of use. [Sledge et aI., 2001 :372] 
Freud's theory quite explicidy relied on classic semiology and orthodox Saussurean 
linguistics - schizophrenia, for him, it would seem, is an inability to treat signs as signs: a 
semiotic disorder. It is likely that mainstream American psychology's gradual acceptance of 
psychoanalysis in the wake of Freud's lecture tour in 1909 (Von Falkenhausen, 2008) paved 
the way for a greater affinity to Bleuler's approach. The psychoanalytic influences in 
American psychiatry'S approach to schizophrenic language were still strong in the 1940s,so as 
evidenced by the work to which we now turn. 
4.2 The 19408 
In 1944, JS Kasanin, an American psychiatrist, published an edited collection of papers by 
leading authors in the field, entided Language and Thought in Schizophrenia (1964a[1944]), which 
provides a fairly good picture of American psychiatry's position on language and 
schizophrenia towards the middle of the twentieth century. Presumably no parallel 
publication appeared in the UK around this time, because, following Kraepelin, language and 
communication was not considered central to the disease. Kasanin, on the other hand, 
clearly aligns the volume's work with the Bleulerian tradition, barely mentioning Kraepelin, 
and labelling Wundt's speculation about the pathophysiology of schizophrenia as somewhat 
"obscure" (Kasanin, 1964b[1944]:1). He also cites the influences of Freud, Jung and (in 
particular) Meyer, who according to him, maintained that schizophrenic speech has a 












"definite meaning", but this may be "distorted and incomprehensible to the observer" (p.2). 
In other words, although pathological, there is a level at which schizophrenic speech 'makes 
sense', or can be interpreted. 
In the preface, Nolan DC Lewis clearly outlines his conception of language (and, presumably, 
he speaks for the collected authors). He notes that although there are competing theories, it 
is generally agreed that ''language is the expression of human thought" (Lewis, 1964[1944]:v), 
and through language we 'interchange' thoughts. Stricdy speaking, language consists of 
"signs of thought" (p.vi) such as words and sentences, although it may be broadened to 
include other forms of communication, such as gestures and facial expressions. Language is 
"imposed from without" (ibid.) on the individual mind by the culture in which the person 
grows up, and with it, to an extent their knowledge. 
And yet while Lewis's ideas may at first seem to be a straightforward expression of the 
telementational and determinacy fallacies, with language a fixed code handed down from 
generation to generation, his ideas are far from being that black and white. For he also claims 
that "~]anguage is a type of social action" (p.vii) and asserts that "~]f language is but the 
instrument for the expression of thought, it then comes to be just what the users make it" 
(p.vi). Furthermore, language is for Lewis a function of its context; "utterance and situation 
are bound up intimately with each other" (p.vii). And in both normals and schizophrenics, 
"[w]ords are symbols ... used in different patterns and levels of meaning. Their significance 
must be ascertained by a thorough study of their functional roles" (p.viii). Thus language 
structure (as it is conceived of today) is of litde interest to these clinicians, rather treating 
language as an encultured action or behaviour is the approach they find meaningful. It does 
remain, however, the vehicle of thought, and speech, the exchange of these thoughts. Kasanin 
confirms this in his concluding chapter: "language represents external manifestations of 
thought" (1964c[1944]:124). 
Lewis characterises SLB as follows: "They often use words and sentences the meaning of 
which is not familiar to the normal or average person. Many if not most of these words are 
peculiar to the patient and usually have a special significance" (p.viii). Due to their disturbed 












connections do not exist in their own minds. Thus, meaning is hidden, not immediate to the 
listener but there for the finding in the patient's mental associations. Here too, are echoes of 
orthodox semantics - meaning is depicted as being discovered, not constructed or emergent. 
The volume focuses overwhelmingly on the psychological realm of schizophrenia. In fact, in 
his 'Concluding Remarks', Kasanin (1964c[1944]) notes that "irrespective of its origin, 
[schizophrenia] will always remain ... a psychological problem" (p.124). He discusses the 
papers' approach to schizophrenic thought and language separately ("although by and large 
one is an aspect of the other" [p.12S]). What follows is a summary of the main theories and 
theorists included in this collected work. 
For Goldstein, abstract thinking is necessary for the ego's detachment from the outer world, 
enabling one to actively engage with the world, but maintain some control and distance. He 
focused on the concrete nature of schizophrenic language - a seeming inability to abstract or 
generalise, due to a compulsion to pay attention to everything at once. What schizophrenics 
say is thus understandable in the context of their immediate, concrete experience of the 
world. Goldstein proposed both a biological and a psychological cause for this behaviour. 
Similarly, Kasanin himself drew attention to the erasure of the schizophrenic's ego-world, or 
figure-background boundary, and the blending of imagination with reality. He explains 
schizophrenic language's literalness in psychoanalytic terms - it stems from fear ("to learn, 
generalize, and make definite conclusions" [p.13l]), and "a defense against his own 
ambivalent tendencies" (ibid.). Literal language is construed as the default option of meaning, 
in keeping with the orthodox understanding of figurative language, where metaphorical 
meaning is a departure, requiring effort. 
Benjamin also commented on the schizophrenic's tendency towards very literal thinking, and 
his "refus[al] to understand symbols, although he may use them a great deal in his own 












Domarus Principle) was that schizophrenics' thinking follows the distortion of paralogic, 
whereby subjects' identity is based upon the identity of their predicates.51 
There runs through the papers a sense that schizophrenic language is, at least in part, 
deliberate, and not just the brain's malfunctioning language faculty. As Kasanin puts it, "[t]he 
schizophrenic. . . has no intention of changing his highly individual method of 
communication and seems to enjoy the fact that you do not understand him" (p.129). 
Sullivan interpreted the schizophrenic's highly individual language as a source of security, 
protection from the world obtained by cutting off communication, allowing language to take 
on a magical dimension. Kasanin summarises Sullivan's theory of 'consensual validation': 
"The process of communication depends upon a feeling that when you say something the 
person who listens to you feels and thinks the same way you do and that you understand 
each other" (p.128, emphasis added). Significandy, here, as with Toolan's (1996) and Iinell's 
(2005) conception of 'other-orientation', communication does not depend on shared 
knowledge, but shared expectation. In schizophrenia, consensual validation is absent. 
Somewhat confusingly, Kasanin characterises Cameron's opinion of the schizophrenic's 
language as "neither irrelevant nor incoherent" and yet "his speech lacks unity and synthesis" 
(p.129).Clearly here, coherence of language refers more to intelligibility than to the actual 
'overall structure' to which Covington et oL (2005) apply the term. For Cameron, the speech 
makes sense within the context of the patient's experience. 
Angyal's idea that disorder starts with disintegration at the level of the whole, and results in 
the breakdown of component functions (rather than the other way round) leads Kasanin to 
muse whether "the disturbances of language and thought are the effect of schizophrenia or 
the cause of it" (p.128). At any rate, he is of the opinion that "[t]he disturbances oflanguage 
are essentially evidences of the disturbance in the function of communication which is the 
cardinal problem in schizophrenia" (ibid.). It would appear then, that for Kasanin, 
communicational competence precedes linguistic competence. 
51 Instead of the usual 'All men are mortal Socrates is a man. Therefore Socrates is mortal.' line of logic, the 













Kasanin's concluding paragraph calls for an investigation into conceptual thinking in 
nonnals, particularly the cultural influence on this, as well as more research comparing 
schizophrenia with organic psychoses. His use of the term "fonnal thought disorder" (p.133), 
and his conclusion that the collected papers have described quite well this phenomenon 
indicate just how much this fuzzy term has changed over the years. Except for Cameron's 
mention of 'lack of unity and synthesis' in speech, and the various indications that the 
schizophrenic speaker fails to take the listener into consideration, there is very little in 
common with the modem definition of FfD. In closing, Kasanin sums up all the 
approaches in the book: ''We all agree that the most important cause of disturbances in the 
thought and language of schizophrenia is the disarticulation of the patient from his social 
context" (ibid.). 
4.3 The 19608 
Just two decades later, much had changed in the fields of both psychiatry and linguistics. 
Generativism had trumped behaviourism in linguistics, and antipsychotic medication had 
begun to show positive results in psychiatry. The former is explicidy Vetter's motivation for 
producing his collation of already published papers CV etter, 1968a); noting that the last 
substantial collected work on the matter was that by Kasanin (1964a[1944]), he asserts that a 
new collection of articles on the topic of language and psychopathology is warranted by the 
massive progress that had been made in the understanding of language, by psychologists, but 
particularly by linguists. In fact, for Vetter linguists offer "a dimension of linguistic 
sophistication that was notably lacking in earlier studies" (1968b:viii). He attributes the 
absence of dialogue between the two disciplines pardy to psychologists' lack of knowledge of 
what was available, but largely to linguistics' somewhat autistic behaviour in the first half of 
the twentieth century: 
With their gaze turned inward upon the continuing upheaval produced in 
structural linguistics by the revolutionary innovations of generative grammar, 













This sense of hope in the promise of generative linguistics is palpable in Pavy's review (1968) 
of then-recent studies of 'verbal behaviour in schizophrenia', published in the same year. 
Pavy's main argument is that work in the field had hitherto focused solely on behavioural 
aspects of speech production, to the neglect of linguistic structure, summarising existing 
studies under the topics of word associations; ambiguity and metaphor; information content 
and textual constraints; and the role of contextual constraints in speech perception. 
Vetter, like many others in his volume, finds 'schizophrenic language' problematic - "a 
misleading term" which has the effect of blurring "three interlocking areas of investigation", 
namely ''language behavior, pathologies of thought, and communication processes" (p.viii). 
However, he acknowledges the difficulty in separating these in practice, and on this he 
quotes Maher (1966): 
Investigations of thought processes have leaned heavily on the analysis of verbal 
statements made by the patients, and it is frequently a matter of the researcher's 
choice whether or not he regards his work as bearing upon thought rather than 
language. [in Vetter, 1968b:viii] 
Maher's suggested solution is to distinguish between studies that are primarily based on 
verbal statements and those that use categorisation/conceptualisation as their main source of 
data, although this too, as Vetter notes, is not foolproof - but at least a step in the right 
direction. 
Vetter (1968c) introduces his collection by summing up the dominant approach at his time 
of writing, covering Goldstein, Kasanin, and Von Domarus, but also including a few later 
theories. Arieti proposed a dynamic approach whereby schizophrenic language is seen as 
primarily motivated by "the removal of anxiety" (p.7); since it is functional, and not organic, 
it is impermanent (thus degeneration is not inevitable). The features of this language are the 
impairment of the ability to abstract, symbolize and socialize or integrate into society 
(adapted from Vetter's list, p.8). Arieti seems to hint at a bidirectional influence between the 
loss of socialisation and the breakdown of language: ''When the schizophrenic loses the use 












schizophrenic becomes more desocialized, the understanding of his language becomes more 
difficult, reaching a peak in the word salad" (p.l0). Cameron's position is updated as the 
"hypothesis of overinclusion" (p.13), in which a lack of structure allows the immediate 
environment to determine the form and content of schizophrenic thinking. Despite an 
ability to define words, the schizophrenic fails "to integrate [these] words into meaningful 
communications" (Cameron 1944/1963, in Vetter, 1968c:14). 
Vetter balances his summary of these approaches with criticism, starting with Brown's 
insight that the notions of 'abstract' and 'concrete' are terms of convenience that instead of 
describing some inherent quality, really designate membership of one of two categories: "the 
healthy, civilized adult" human (to which the researcher invariably belongs) and everybody 
else (children, primitives, the diseased, animals). Thus: 
Each category lacks one attribute of the category to which the researcher himself 
belongs. There is a beautiful simplicity in the notion that all departures from 
ourselves are basically the same kind of departure. [ ... ] The result is that concrete 
and abstract name all sorts of behaviors having no clear common properties. 
[Brown, 1950, in Vetter, 1968c:ll] 
Brown also calls into question the diagnostic reliability of tests that demonstrate statistically 
significant differences between normals and schizophrenics on abstract/concrete measures, 
but also considerable overlap. 
Maher criticises Arieti's conflation of paralogic with paleologic, firsdy because even though 
Von Domarus considered paralogic a feature of the thinking of "primitive people or higher 
animals" (p.10), he never intended the concept to have regressive connotations, and 
secondly, because it easier to explain the concept in terms of behaviourism. Paralogicality is 
really an example of "extended stimulus generalization" (p.12) to a limited stimulus that 
would not likely elicit a response in a normal person (this is what makes it pathological), and 












Moving away from theories of schizophrenic thinking, Vetter indicates something of a 
consensus in the relationship between socialisation and ability to use language: impairment in 
one leads to impairment in the other, and he summarises this interpersonal approach, most 
notably Bateson's, for whom it begins in childhood, through involvement in double-bind 
type communications from an early age. 1bis double-bind hypothesis contends that a child is 
caught up in a communicative situation (usually with the mother) in which conflicting 
messages are transmitted, i.e. what she says, and how she behaves, are incongruent with each 
other. Whichever message the child responds appropriately to, the overtly verbal message of 
love, or the covert behavioural message of hostility, the child will be punished. The only way 
out would be for the child to discuss his double bind situation, but this would be regarded as 
criticism, and he would be punished accordingly. Thus "[t]he child is not allowed to talk 
about the situation in order to resolve it" (p.16). He or she grows up an incompetent 
communicator and metacommunicator, ''his [or her] ability to communicate with others 
about their communication with him [or her] is gready impaired" (ibid.). In fact, according to 
Bateson and Ruesch, most psychopathology is a consequence/manifestation of disturbed 
communication. 
Concerning the shift that the concept of language underwent in psychology in the first half 
of the century, Vetter's opinion is that lillie except terminology actually changed. 
Behaviourism's "verbal behaviour" didn't differ substantially from language as "a vehicle for 
expression of ideas" (p.23, original emphasis omitted). Considering "linguistic phenomena ... 
[to be] symptoms of underlying pathological conditions" (ibid., original emphasis omitted) 
remains the outcome. 1bis is an attractive approach for a number of reasons: the data are 
easily observed and gathered, and the diagnostic and predictive value is clear. Despite the 
amount of data that has been generated, there is still no clear demonstration of how the 
form and content of what schizophrenics say is related to the underlying pathology. His 
conclusion is that treating linguistic phenomena as merely symptom or verbal response will 
not be fruitful, and an interdisciplinary approach is called for. 
Vetter's summary,· and the papers he chose to reprint in his collection apdy illustrate the 
threshold on which theories of SLB stood at the end of the 1960s. There is a call to move 












instead its expressive (Lorenz, 1968) or 'poeitic' function (Forrest, 1968). Richman (1968) 
explores 'symbolic distortion', Chapman (1968) and Eliseo (1968) investigate schizophrenics' 
difficulty with figurative language, and a number of papers (mcluding Mednick, 1968, Staats, 
1968, and Salzinger, et ai, 1968) use learning theory (derived from behaviourism). Notably, 
two papers investigate multilingual patients, one in terms of gibberish (Robertson & Shamsie, 
1968) and the other in terms of hallucinated voices (Schaechter, 1968). 
Pavy is not so generous (his review includes some of the work featured in Vetter's edition of 
collected papers). In dismissing (following Chomsky) the "implicit finite-state model" of 
language employed by Salzinger et al (1968), his disdain for behaviorism is quite apparent, as 
is his sense that its proponents engage in a futile task when trying to account for verbal 
behavior: "even a verbal behaviorist needs a model if he is going to j ust with the windmill 
of language" (p.173). This finite-state model paints a picture of "an automaton designed to 
produce sentences with only the knowledge of (or transitional probabilities based on) words 
previously uttered [whose utterances] would probably be considered pathological" (ibid.). 
Pavy effectively styles the behaviourist's speaker as a 'communicational cripple' in much the 
same way as Harris does Chomsky's ideal speaker-hearer. 
'Contemporary linguistics', on the other hand, views language as "an unbounded system 
based on a highly specific and limited set of rules. .. Innovation is the essence of actual 
language" (p.171). This focus on innovation, novelty, creativity might seem well in 
accordance with integrationist linguistics. However from the following passage his deviation 
from integrationist sympathies becomes clear: 
Such a theory [of speech in schizophrenia] must begin with a theory of 
general competence of the speaker. Then by the inclusion of other factors 
involved in speech production in schizophrenia (attention, short-term 
memory, anxiety, motivation) one can move to hypotheses about the 
interaction of behavioral factors with the structure oflanguage. fp.174] 
The equation of the normal speaker with the ideal speaker is all but total. What it also 












affected. Pavy sees the division of labour as follows: while the linguist's task is to produce a 
model of competence, the psychologist is responsible for detailing a performance model, 
which will be dependent on the linguist's offering. 
Pavy does caution, however, after championing Chomsky's significance, that he does not 
regard the "introduction of linguistic theory into the study of speech in schizophrenia will be 
a panacea for problems of the field" (p.174). In fact, he makes the following rather insightful 
contribution (an easy-to-overlook half paragraph, considering the main thrust of his 
argument): 
If subsequent investigations of the sort suggested here, based on the best insights 
the theory of nonnallanguage can offer, continue to fail to define the disorder, it 
is possible that attention should be turned to the interactional aspects of the 
phenomenon. It is suggested that it might be as useful to attempt to account for 
the diagnostician's perception and categorization of speech as it is to study the 
patient's production. fp.176] 
Ironically then, given the sununaries above of the two men's positions, Vetter is perhaps 
ultimately more optimistic about the involvement of linguistic theory, expressing a hope that 
the "conceptuallink[s]" (1968b:ix) between what he has designated the 'three interlocking 
areas' of schizophrenic language (and therefore three fields of psychology, communications, 
and linguistics) will one day be discovered, and that linguists have much to offer in this 
regard. 
*** 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the 1960s also saw the rise of a different sort of revolution, the 
anti-psychiatry movement. While this was not chiefly concerned with theories of SLB, their 
views do represent an extreme counter-proposal, that was quickly quashed, to the biomedical 
bias beginning to gain popularity in psychiatry and linguistics. The Scottish psychiatrist RD 
Laing in particular had risen to prominence through a series of publications, starting with The 












In 1974, the likes of Pavy and Vetter's call for linguistic involvement was heeded. Elaine 
Chaika had no doubts about linguistics~ significance, nay, indispensability, when it came to 
making sense of psychotic language behaviour. In her later book (Chaika, 1990), fleshing out 
and refining her earlier theories, she quotes Caplan (1980) on the value of linguistic analysis: 
it utilizes psycholinguistic and linguistic constructs derived from scientific studies 
of language structure and processing rather than intuitive taxonomies and 
analyses. As a result it achieves ... specificity in the description of the linguistic 
and psychological deficits. [p.3] 
Furthermore, her work is based on the assertion that "[s]tructurally deviant speech is a 
symptom in and of itself and, as such, must be analyzed in its own right. This necessarily 
entails examining speech without reference to the thought behind it" (p.31). Linguists would 
not be content to just 'help out'; they aimed to stake out territory for themselves. 
Her seminal paper was prompted in part by a statement made by Roger Brown (1973), a 
psychologist reporting on a brief period spent observing patients in a mental institution, that 
although he "encountered plenty of schizophrenic thought" he was compelled "to conclude 
that there is no such thing as schizophrenic speech" (p.397) - Chaika begs to differ. As such, 
she "attempt[s] to describe the data in purely linguistic terms, treating language as a 
competence in itself' (1974:258-259), and is concerned with "the nature of the deviance in 
linguistic code, and the regularity of that deviance over a particular population of patients" 
(p.257). Her data is derived from a single patient, during a floridly psychotic episode. 
Explicidy relying on generative linguists Chomsky & Halle (1968) and their notion of ''words 
having deep structures upon which phonological rules operate" (1973:263), Chaika explains 
gibberish, for example, as "a disruption in the ability to match sound strings to actual words" 
(ibid.) and is perhaps "an intermittent form of aphasia" (p.265). They are not likely 
neologisms, because no explanation of their meaning is offered (and if they are neologisms, 
then this failure to notify in itself is deviant), nor slips of the tongue, because patients do not 












Based on the "aberrations [detected] in [patient] X's code" (p.260), Chaika concludes with 
what she considers to be the six defining features of deviant schizophrenic speech (adapted 
from p.275): 
1) sporadic disruption in the ability to match semantic features with sound 
strings comprising actual lexical items in the language 
2) preoccupation with too many of the semantic features of a word in 
discourse 
3) inappropriate noting of phonological features of words in discourse 
4) production of sentences according to phonological and semantic features of 
previously uttered words, rather than according to a topic 
5) disruption in the ability to apply rules of syntax and discourse 
6) failure to self-monitor, e.g. not noting errors when they occur 
Thus, SLB is a series of serious speech errors, a performance failure describable in terms of 
its deviance from the rules of syntax and discourse, and evidence perhaps of temporary lack 
of access to deep structures of language in the brain. 
Chaika's paper ignited fierce debate about whether schizophrenic speech was indeed 
indicative of an underlying FfD or was a speech disorder in itself, and prompted renewed 
comparisons to aphasia (a debate that lives on into the twenty-first century, e.g. Oh et al, 
2002). Notably, Chaika never denied that a thought disorder existed, merely that deviant 
speech was not sufficient nor necessary to prove its existence, nor was its existence necessary 
to explain speech disorder. Fromkin (1975) promptly launched a critique of Chaika's work, 
arguing that five out of her six featured 'errors' are found in normal speech, the only 
exception being "the disruption of the sequencing of ideas in discourse which can be 
attributed to nonlinguistic factors" (p.498). In other words, there was nothing particularly 













Lecours & Vanier-Clement (1976) responded to both Chaika and Fromkin with an 
exhaustive comparison between normals, jargon aphasics56 and schizophrenics, concluding 
that except for error 2, there is a large degree of overlap (schizophasia is mostly characterised 
by errors 2, 3 and 4, while jargon aphasia mostly displays errors 1, 4 and 6), while error 6 
they feel was an erroneous attribution to schizophasia altogether. They agree with Fromkin 
that most of the errors are also made by normals, but are much less common or 
characteristiC.57 However, the authors make it clear that while their conclusion is about ways 
in which one could identify schizophasic or jargonaphasic speech from a transcript, these are 
not necessarily purely 'linguistic' judgements, and indeed in practice, inferences about 
patients' intentions and behaviour also playa role. 
Sherry Rochester (1978) investigated whether schizophrenic speech could be characterised as 
an 'information-processing disorder', whereby short-term memory deficits result in failures 
to account for the listener's needs. The next year saw the publication of two groundbreaking 
studies: first, Andreason's (1979) attempt to clarify F1D by classifying it in terms of the 18 
types of what she called disorders of thought, language and communication - developed into 
a rating scale for distinguishing between ID and NID schizophrenics still in use today. 
Second, Rochester (a psychologist) teamed up with Jim Martin (a linguist) to produce a 
systematic and detailed investigation into schizophrenic speakers' discourse. 
Although not the first to note the tautological reasoning involved in the concept of F1D, 
Rochester & Martin (1979) produced a particularly damning critique of the circularity of 
equating F1D with speech disorder: "the assessment of 'thought disorder' is based on an 
inference from talk not thought; and... 'talk failures' are inferences based on the listener's 
experience of confusion" (p.3). Nevertheless, they remark that the inferential tradition, 
which "relies on the profound sensiti'rity of native members of a culture" (ibid.), although 
troublesome, displays a degree of sensitivity yet to be replicated or captured by linguists and 
psycholinguists. 
56 Patients who speak fluently, as if what they say is understandable to themselves and others, but whose speech 
is filled with inappropriate words, gibberish words, or even sounds 'standing in' for normal words. 
57 Although they feel she takes it too far by asserting errors 2-4 are 'normal' by invoking Lewis Carroll's 












The authors' aim was to "develop[ ... ] an account of how speakers fonn coherent 'texts' -
stretches of speech which fonn a [si~ more or less unified wholes for the listener" (p.50). By 
applying Halliday & Hasan's (1976) theory of "cohesion devices" (ibid.), detailing speakers' 
strategies for linking clauses together within their discourse, as a tool for analysis of 
schizophrenic speakers' discourse, Rochester & Martin discovered that it was not the 
presence or absence of these cohesion devices that affected textual cohesion, but rather the 
/PC!) they were used. Crucially, their use of cohesive ties as an' analytic tool served to 
distinguish on some measures between schizophrenics (TD and NTD) and normals, and on 
other measures between TD schizophrenics and the other two groups. 
Comparing the three groups, they found that "[i]n narratives, schizophrenic speakers relied 
less on cohesive tying than nonnal speakers" (p.169) - in the case of NTDs this is likely due 
to the fact that they produced less speech compared to others groups. Secondly, while TD 
speakers displayed high lexical cohesion in interviews, NTD speakers hardly used lexical ties 
at all (normal speakers fall in between). Thirdly, TD speakers appeared to presume the 
hearer knows more than they do, making indirect, obscure references, while NTD speakers 
presumed too little. Lasdy, TD speakers made numerous exophoric references, and both TD 
and NTD tended to rely on nonverbal resources (for example, pointing to rather than 
naming what one is referring to). Covington et al (2005) remark on these differences that it 
almost seems that the NTD speaker is ''keeping things simple on purpose" (p.92). 
One of Rochester & Martin's conclusions seems to be routinely overlooked by reviewers: 
that linguistic theory wholly constrains one's oudook.58 
The conclusion that the problem in thought disorder or 'schizophasia' exists at 
the level of thought, not language, involves an assumption about the scope of a 
language system. The conclusion implies a system of language that is unable to 
account for language use beyond the clause or sentence. This is the case for 
standard transformational theory. Thus, for Fromkin and others who follow a 
version of this theory, problems beyond the level of the clause must be beyond 
the level of language. From within the framework of such a theory, there is no 












way to dispute the assertion that the problems encountered by 1D speakers are 
not based in a language system. However, if one embraces a wider theoretical 
system that postulates linguistic rules at the level of discourse - rules about the 
linkages among clauses and among sentences - then the problems encountered 
by 1D speakers can be conceptualized as language problems. fp.188] 
Their ultimate conclusion was that 'thought disorder' is a misleading and unhelpful 
construct; research instead should focus on what makes their speech difficult to understand 
(Bentall, 2003). Rochester & Martin had successfully brought the data back into the ambit of 
linguistics. 
FID continued to come under fire in a series of papers in the early 1980s. Chaika (1982) 
made a renewed argument for the case of speech disorder over FID, again invoking the 
autonomy of language as "a self-contained system with no inherent reference to thought or 
the outside world" (p.587), and thus Occam's razor. Andreason (1982), for different reasons, 
argued for a revision of the term 'thought disorder', which she still found too imprecise. 59 A 
third influential paper published in the same year, Steven Schwartz's 'Is There a 
Schizophrenic Language?' (1982) provided another wide-ranging review of the literature, and 
drew response from researchers representing a similarly broad range of disciplines. Schwartz 
maintained that there is schizophrenic speech and there is possibly schizophrenic thought, 
but it makes no sense to speak of schizophrenic language, because schizophrenics' language 
is intact; their 'bizarre' communication is all down to performance, not competence. Despite 
dissent in the 'Open Peer Commentary' following the article, this competence/performance 
distinction has largely been upheld in mainstream approaches. 
Lanin-Kettering & Harrow (1985) criticised Chaika's (1982) work, arguing for a focus on the 
thought behind the words, but as Chaika & Lambe's rebuttal (1985) of their critique 
59 She evaluated the alternatives: 'speech' is not broad enough; 'language' is not directly observable, but is 
inferred from speech; 'communication', "the rule-governed sharing of information between people, primarily 
through the use of language" (p.296), is perhaps too broad; 'thought' is not scientific or medical enough, but 
rather a "philosophical term" (ibid.); and 'cognition' is more scientific, but again too broad. Her two solutions 
were either to combine some of these, for example, thought, language and communication (ILC) disorder, or 
to come up with new terms entirely, for example, r!Jsphasia (covering abnormal speech) and r!Jslo!fa (covering 












correcdy points out, they misrepresented her argument, and ultimately brought nothing new 
to the debate. Harrod (1986) introduced fresh argument on the back of this exchange, 
asserting that schizophrenia is best characterised as a semiotic disorder. It is a disorder of 
language-in-use, of "saying something about something to someone" (p.12), which is 
primary to the oft-described disorders of discourse or syntactic structure. Although 
provocative, his argument reliant on Peirce's classic semiotics, is skeletal at best. Ultimately, 
though, he misinterprets both Chaika & Lambe and Lanin-Kettering & Harrow as 
characterising schizophrenia itse!f as either a speech or a thought disorder respectively (as 
both sets of authors point out in their rebuttals [Chaika & Lambe, 1986; Harrow, Prather & 
Lanin-Kettering, 1986]). Despite the lengthy debate surrounding use of the term 'thought 
disorder', it enjoys obstinate longevity, and remains in use today. Not surprisingly, 
McKenna's (2007) appraisal of this decade's worth of exchanges is that "the arguments 
revolved around the fine points of linguistic theory and none of them decided the case either 
way" (p.241). 
By the turn of the decade, Chaika had refined her .ideas quite considerably. Still adhering to 
the belief that disordered speech is exacdy that (tndependent of a potential underlying FID), 
her admiration for Chomsky had waned considerably in the intervening years since writing 
her seminal paper. In fact, her monograph Understanding P-!)chotic Speech (1990) was sub tided 
'Beyond Freud and Chomsky'. She positions herself as a pragmatist, and argues for the 
deeply entwined nature of semantics and syntax, and the undeniable influence of context on 
meaning. Ultimately, for her disorganised speech is the result of failure to control speech 
production. 
The 1980s featured numerous studies probing the linguistic features of psychotic speech, 
often comparing it to the speech of aphasics. The general consensus is that there is a clear 
difference between aphasia and schizophrenic speech (schizophrenics' speech, for one, 
displays a control and awareness of language that far outstrips aphasics' abilities) (Covington, 
et ai, 2005). This surely only served to reinforce the tendency to treat it as evidence of a 
thought disorder, which remains popular. While this decade also saw the publication of a 
rather dense collection of papers which argued for an interdisciplinary approach to 












imaging allowing for investigation of real-time brain function, and non-invasive structural 
exploration, the medicalisation of mental life had already gained significant momentum, 
culminating in what would come to be termed the 'decade of the brain', the 1990s (Estroff, 
2004:282).60 Although it had long been known (via autopsy) that schizophrenics' brains tend 
to display abnormallateralisation (the source of the emergence of evolutionary theories of 
schizophrenia beginning in the late 1970s) and ventricle volume, new technology provided 
unparalleled access to an organ that had been shrouded in mystery for so long. The 
discovery of abnormal brain structure and function is presented as the ultimate rebuttal to all 
the purely psychological, interpersonal, social theories of schizophrenic language, to all the 
skeptics that questioned the very disease's existence. This is not to say everything is known 
about the schizophrenic's brain and how it relates to symptoms, but the sense that 
researchers believe it is only a matter of time is almost palpable. With regards to SLB then, 
psycholinguists' contributions are welcome insofar as they can make actual links between 
their theories and abnormal brain structure and/or function. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This whisde-stop tour through a century's worth of research on SLB has served to 
demonstrate the changing concept of language within research in this field. In the early days, 
there were two distinct perspectives - the Kraepelinian biomedical approach, in which 
language is understood as the output of a damaged brain (the location and source of damage 
as yet unknown), rendering utterances relatively meaningless; and the more integrated 
Bleulerian approach, in which the disintegration of language is seen as intimately tied up in 
the disorganisation and disintegration of emotion, behaviour, association, volition, and the 
individual's relationship to his or her world, rendering the schizophrenic's utterances as 
potentially meaningful. 
Here already are clear indications of the language myth's influence; language is considered 
the expression of thought, words have definite meaning, and transgressing the code results 
in speech that is confusing for the listener. However, their work, the originals published just 
60 This is evident in the schizophrenic symptoms listed in the latest revision of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual in 1994 (DSM-IV): Jenkins (2004) reports that "'characteristic symptoms involving multiple 
psychological processes' such as alteration in 'sense of self" were omitted, while "'associated laboratory 












before Ferdinand de Saussure's Cours (1983[1916]), also bear evidence of ideas that 
contradict the psychologistic view of language that has come to dominate linguistics. For 
example, writing is not seen as speech's poor stepchild, and the normality of language is 
judged according to its fit with context, while adherence to abstract rules takes a backseat, as 
does an appeal to an internalised grammar. 
The Bleulerian tradition largely dominated research on language and schizophrenia until 
advances in both medical science and linguistics provided the Kraepelinian approach with a 
reason to be interested in SLB. As the neo-Kraepelinians came to dominate the field, what 
schizophrenics said faded into insignificance compared to how they said it; the linguistic 
structure of a decontextualised transcribed utterance could provide clues as to the 
organisation and function of the schizophrenic brain. Research also became consumed in a 
debate about the boundaries of language: narrowing it too much would make linguistics 
irrelevant to deviant speech; broadening it excessively would threaten linguistics' claim to 
scientific status. While linguists in the field may have sought to prove their indispensability, 
by and large psychiatry has co-opted linguistics into its project to medicalise experience, 












but rather, that linguistics has given psychiatry the ammunition it needed to treat the 
schizophrenic subject as purely a medical problem. All the subtleties of meaning making can 
be reduced to brain function versus malfunction when language is cut off from its 
experiential base. 
Implicit in drawing up the 'mainstream' view is the fact that there are schools of thought that 
do not subscribe to these ideas. As hinted at earlier, there is indeed a growing body of 
thinkers, some of whom, trained in the mainstream approach, voice concern over its 
limitations and flaws, while others, applying their knowledge from their home discipline, find 
the biomedical approach to both normal and schizophrenic experience problematic. By 
extension then, they take issue with the mainstream approach to SLB. However, these either 
rely on a classical conception of language which is counterproductive in terms of the other 
claims they are making, or they do not explicitly espouse a theory of language; in both cases, 
they stand to benefit from the integrationallinguistic approach to bolster their position. 
5.1 Evolution 
Even in the 'scientific' realm of human evolution, theories about language have shaped the 
course of research into the potential origins of psychosis. Crow (1997, 2000) locates 
language breakdown as at the root of communication breakdown, as well as other first-rank 
symptoms of schizophrenia. However, his ideas about how language operates in the brain 
are wholly constrained by an orthodox account of what languages are: systems of a finite 
number of signs, with the rules to combine them in an infinite number of ways, both of 
which must be realised in the brain somehow. Despite this implicit foundation, Crow never 
speaks about languages, as such; in fact, his theory assumes the monolingual individual as the 
norm (a general trend in linguistics - see Love, 2009:30). 
Crow's reliance on an orthodox account of language implies all that goes with it - in 
particular, that language is a distinct, humans-only capacity, an astonishingly powerful ability 
made possible by brain organisation, that is defined by its fundamental difference to any 












Jonathan Bums's (2007) 'social brain' hypothesis 61 is one that not only does not need 
orthodox theories of language to explain itself, but is largely compatible with theories of 
language that reject the orthodox account. 
Bums does not reject Crow's theories wholeheartedly - on the contrary, "it is in the detail 
and emphasis that [they] differ" (p.181). He agrees that "madness constitutes a cosdy price 
paid by our species for our extraordinary cognitive superiority" (ibid.), but it is what that 
cognitive superiority entails that draws the batde lines. Or as Bums puts it, the "differences 
boil down to a basic philosophical divergence on the issue of what specific quality defines us 
as human" (ibid.). For Crow it is language (and a very circumscribed idea of it at that); for 
Bums it is a "capacity for complex social and interpersonal relationship" (ibid.) - brought 
about through evolved brain reorganisation - that defines humanness. He explains: 
In this view, all of the abilities routinely cited as uniquely human are, in fact, 
secondary to the fundamental human capacity for complex social cognition. 
Thus what makes language unique to our species is the 'elevation' of generic 
animal communication by a highly social human mind. (In other words, 
communication + social cognition = language.) likewise I would argue that 
individual self-consciousness is only possible in the context of existing 
interpersonal consciousness. [pp.181-182] 
The parallels with Linell's (2007) 'dialogical brain' and integrational linguistics' idea that 
"~]anguages presuppose communication" (Harris, 1998:5) are clear. Bums, as a psychiatrist, 
provides detailed evidence in terms of brain function of both humans and higher apes to 
motivate his claim that humans have evolved a 'social brain'. From the integrational 
linguistic perspective, Crow, blinkered by the orthodox mantra that languages are what 
makes communication possible, has focused too closely on the second-order construct of 
'language' itself, and has ignored that which makes it possible in the first place. As shall 
become clear in this chapter, Bums's approach to the evolution of psychosis has broader 
implications for a number of features of SLB. 
61 Burns is not the first to put forward a 'social brain' hypothesis, but he does direcdy position his theory as an 












That said, Bums does rely heavily on the concept of 'theory of mind', or rather existential 
TOM,62 which ultimately, cannot be supported by integrationists. For while at first the idea 
of using other minds may seem to dovetail perfectly with integrational linguistics and 
dialogism's arguments, ~t is, like Clark's version of distributed cognition, still rooted in 
representationalism and the classical mind. Cowley (2004) has no problem with 'theory of 
mind' used as a metaphorical device, but when it is invoked to posit some actual adaptive 
module in the brain, that allows the simulation or representation of other minds, in order to 
'see' the intentional states of others, one is dealing with what he calls a "magic bullet" 
explanation (p.280). Using the example of prelinguistic infant communication, he finds no 
evidence, nor any reason to believe that representations of minds and intentions are what 
bring about the complex social interaction, epitomised by talking, of which humans are 
capable: 
[C]hildren ... act ... as if using output from a socio-cognitive adaptation. From the 
derived point of view, the model provides a reasonable way of conceptualizing 
how they act. To see it as an explanation, however, is to fall into what Ryle 
(1949) calls the 'category mistake' of thinking that babies access inner intentions, 
beliefs, and wants. fp.293] [ ... ] Adult belief in intentionality ensures perspective 
taking develops by the middle of the second year. By the age of four, similar 
mechanisms lead children to belief in selves and minds. fp.294, emphasis added] 
No internal representation required. 
5.2 The biomedical approach 
While it would be patently absurd to claim that orthodox linguistics is single-handedly 
responsible for the biomedical approach to schizophrenic language, there is no doubt that it 
has significantly contributed towards this perspective's support. The treatment of 
decontextualised utterances' structural properties as symptomatic of brain disorder, is an 
approach that one critic says 












bypass[es] the possibility that what [the c1inician] takes as 'symptoms' to be 
related back to allegedly determinant antecedents, are aspects of those people's 
communicative relationship and have a sense apart from their being produced by 
physical organs - i.e., an interpersonal meaning or significance. 
[Coulter in Frow, 2001 :278] 
The result of all this is that "the ill patient need not be 'heard' beyond the stage of diagnosis" 
(Frow, 2001:278). Furthermore, from the highly decontextualised approach, suggestions like 
Covington et ol.'s (2005) that ultimately a machine could analyse the structural elements of 
someone's transcribed speech to achieve systematic and unbiased diagnosis, are not that far 
off. The depersonalisation of the schizophrenic condition would then be complete - even 
the 'stage of diagnosis' would not involve 'hearing' the patient. 
Taken to its logical conclusion, the symptom approach to utterances leads to claims such as 
we saw in Chapter 3, that certain neuroleptic medications effect improvement in particular 
structural aspects of schizophrenic speech. As Burns (2007) points out, neuroleptic 
medication is often administered based on its apparent results ("evidence-based practice" 
[p.8]), not on a deeper understanding of how it works. This leads to "psychiatric services that 
rely exclusively on neuroleptic medication, and which make little or no effort to respond to 
patients' psychological needs" (Bentall, 2003:499). It is this - the reliance on "physical 
treatments at the expense of treating people with warmth and humanity" (p.498) that 
prompts the likes of Bentall to champion the 'post-psychiatry' movement, which is in direct 
opposition to the neo-Kraepelinian approach. 
Post-psychiatry does not seek to deny the biological reality of schizophrenia, but merely that 
this will never provide the full picture, because the biological is intimately bound up in the 
psychosocial and environmental aspects of being human in the world. It rejects the outright 
dismissal, based on the potential for victim-blaming, of social or environmental accounts of 
schizophrenia; the fact that we are by our very nature influenced by our environment does 
not amount to accusing a schizophrenic's family of deliberately damaging their loved one, or 
insisting that the patient's illness is intentional or their own fault. Ultimately, not only is one 












(and thus SLB) , to make such a choice denies the reality of the phenomenon under 
investigation (Bentall, 2003). Furthermore, it rejects "the epistemological separation of inner 
mind from outer world", and the mind "regarded ... as a 'thing'" (Thomas, Bracken & Leudar, 
2004:14). 
The post-psychiatry approach, then, is closely aligned with the integrational approach that 
envisions communication as governed by biomechanical, macrosocial and circumstantial 
factors (Harris, 1998) - an approach that will never be content with a merely biological 
account of schizophrenic language, nor will it exclude such an account in favour of the 
interpersonal. Rather, as the name suggests, it seeks to integrate them. The move in cognitive 
science towards embodiment and embedding of cognition (e.g. Clark, 1997; Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1999) described in Chapter 2 provides clues as to how this might be possible. 
5.3 The deficit model 
The deficit model pervades research on schizophrenia, and consequently research on SLB 
largely amounts to a description of what is missing (compared to normal utterances, or 
discourse, or syntax, which in turn is haunted by the figure of the ideal-speaker-hearer as the 
degree zero against which actual language behaviour is compared). However, as Rochester & 
Martin (1979) point out, "one cannot hope to provide an adequate account of behavior 
simply from an account of what is 'deviant' about that behavior" (p.49).63 Lorenz (1968) 
makes a similar point about the description of schizophrenic language and thought in terms 
of 'literal' and 'concrete'. As Taylor (1997) observes with relation to discontinuity and speech 
errors, she remarks that the 'deviance' -focused approach renders what is there invisible. 
Bums, too, draws attention to the problematic approach of characterising all symptoms as 
deficits or deficiencies, which ultimately "reinforce[s] the age-old notion that psychosis is a 
degenerate condition characterized by 'a paucity of psychological activity or even a dimming 
of subjective life, perhaps especially of higher forms of consciousness or mental life' (Sass & 
Pamass 2001 [cited])" (Bums, 2007:150). It presumes diminished experience - precisely the 
631bis is echoed by Jenkins's (2004) contention that there is a need to focus on "not only the extraordinary, 
but also ... the everyday dimensions of schizophrenic experience" (p.31), and maintains that "in certain ways" 












approach taken by Kraepelin, in contrast to Bleuler's refusal to take apparent absence of 
function at face value. 
Those working in the field of aphasia studies have also criticised the simplistic deficit 
approach to language behaviour. Wilkinson, Beeke & Maxim (2003) note that whether 
linguistic fonus or pragmatic/ communicative/ social difficulties are focused on, aphasic 
linguistic behaviour is usually described as 'symptoms' of brain damage, i.e. what you are 
observing is a direct result of damage to a certain part of the brain. Whether this is the case 
is up for debate. Goldstein, in the 1940s, was already arguing that what we label as a 
symptom of destroyed tissue could also just as plausibly be "the attempt by the person to 
adapt to come to terms with that damage" (p.60). Others after him have postulated that at 
least some of the deviant linguistic production is an attempt to 'ease the communicative 
load' or 'prevent computation overload' (ibid.). Even the behaviourist account of 
schizophrenic language behaviour allowed for an interpretation that went beyond deviance: 
Mednick (1968) maintained that disorganised thinking (evidenced by disorganised speech) 
reinforces itself, because irrational thinking is an anxiety-reducing mechanism for the 
schizophrenic. 
There is evidence that at least some aspects of SLB are explicable in tenus of coping, not 
merely deficit. For example, Rochester & Martin's (1979) findings that schizophrenics tend 
to rely on pointing to things instead of naming them can be interpreted as a means of 
achieving distributed cognition - in other words, using the world 'out there' in combination 
other minds to complete a 'thought', to communicate successfully in lieu of speech. Or that, 
aware of their communicational difficulties, NTD schizophrenics' apparent striving to keep 
things simple on purpose is also strategic. Similarly, Schoeman (2008) reports that 
schizophrenics choosing to speak in their less-fluent second language have traded 'correct 
speech' for improved cognition and communication, by deliberately slowing themselves 
down. Even the more florid examples of SLB, like glossomanic chaining, could potentially 
be explained in terms of attempting to cope - the apparent failure to 'edit' their utterance 
internally before saying it out loud could also be seen as an attempt to direct their thinking 












there is reason to believe that schizophrenics, like aphasics (Goodwin, 2003b), can 
potentially make use of resources in their environment to achieve meaning. 
Since the integrational approach contends that no strict dividing line can be drawn between 
the verbal and the nonverbal, someone relying on traditionally-styled non-verbal elements 
does not need to be described in terms of deficit, since the verbal and the non-verbal are 
seamlessly integrated, according to the principle of cotemporality. The schizophrenic is 
actively choosing the means of communication that they can make work, thus ,they retain 
integrational proficiency in such instances, if they are able to integrate activities. 
Integrationists wouldn't assume, on the basis of comparison to some ideal, that all deviance 
from the norm is a case of deficit. They would evaluate the situation on an individual basis. 
5.4 The not-so-ideal (excluded) real 'speaker' 
References to multilingual patients are found as far back as Bleuler (1950[1911]): he 
remarked that, in writing, "[m]ultilingual patients freely intermingle language or use the 
tongue with which they are least familiar" (pp.157-158), and further that generally, in 
bilinguals, compulsive speech would only occur in their mother tongue. Thus, given that 
monolinguals constitute the minority of the world's population (De Zulueta et aI., 2001) (and 
thus a roughly similar ratio should be reflected in the schizophrenic population), and that 
this is hardly a newly discovered phenomenon, one is prompted to ask why there is so little 
literature on this topic, and why none of the recent wide-ranging reviews of language in 
schizophrenia (e.g. De Lisi, 2001; Kuperberg & Caplan, 2003; Covington et aI., 2005; Marvel, 
2006) even mention multilingual schizophrenics. Admittedly, the paucity of literature on the 
topic must be partly due to practical or logistical problems in the availability of bilingual 
clinicians and researchers (Schoeman, 2008), but this cannot serve as a global explanation for 
the lack of interest in this area. For the few studies that do exist have produced findings that 













The albeit sparse literature on the topic points to the fact that multilingual schizophrenics 
can present differendy in their different languages64 (e.g. Schaechter, 1968; Hemphill, 1971; 
De Zulueta et ai, 2001; Schoeman, 2008). This seems to be particularly true of those who 
have learned a second language relatively late in life (i.e. in late childhood). Speaking and/or 
being addressed in. their first language, a multilingual schizophrenic may appear floridly 
psychotic, express delusions, complain of auditory hallucinations, and display disorganised 
speech, and even difficulty in comprehension. The same patient, when speaking and/or 
being addressed in their second language, may display and report few psychotic features, and 
their speech, while perhaps not technically 'correct' or fluent, does not leave the interlocutor 
with a general sense of confusion. In addition, Schoeman (2008) reports on three patients 
who seemed to actively choose to speak in their imperfecdy acquired second language starting 
in the prodromal phase of their disease. Furthermore, there is evidence that second-language 
acquisition in adults already diagnosed as schizophrenic is not impaired (Bersudsky et ai, 
2005). These findings throw a rather large spanner in the works of most mainstream theories 
of schizophrenic speech. 
If a language is a fixed and bounded code, then there would be litde significance as to what 
language the patient spoke, beyond perhaps when the patient does not speak the same language 
as the clinician, which according to orthodox views, would prohibit communication 
altogether. Otherwise, as long as the patient is sufficiendy proficient in the same language 
(even if it is not their mother tongue) as the clinician, he or she should be able to 
successfully 'send' the content of his or her thoughts encoded in this language to the 
clinician, who will decode the message and determine w:hether the content and/or the form 
is psychotic or normal. Studies of multilingual schizophrenics pose a threat to these generally 
accepted ideas of SLB, i.e. that the speech produced by schizophrenics is a good indicator of, 
or even a reflection of, strangely or deviandy formed thoughts which are formulated prior to 
expression. While there is a sense in some of these studies that a second language 'masks' 
psychotic symptoms, an integrational approach would conclude that, since the patient is able 
to successfully integrate activities, i.e. communicate, when speaking their second language, 
64 I use the term 'languages/a language' in the sense that it has reality for the lay language user, and without 












they do not simply appear less mad - they literally are less or not at all psychotic. Thus, it also 
poses a challenge to the traditional mad/normal dichotomy. 
These findings should not come as a surprise to integrational linguists, who recognise that 
'coming into' language (usually roughly designated as a particular language, although this may 
involve more than one) as a child is simultaneously a coming-into personhood (Toolan, 
1996) and an embedding in culture and society (Cowley, 2006). Thus, even on a neural level, 
networks related to what it means to be a person, what it means to be an I in the presence of 
a You, and all the myriad subdeties related to being in the world which we take for granted, 
but which seem to disintegrate in schizophrenics (what Sass [2004:305] calls the ''loss of 
natural self-evidence''), are intimately bound up in the first language one learns. On the other 
hand, one's experience of a later-learned language may be more abstract, code-like, 
particularly considering the way additional languages are taught in literate cultures. 
Interestingly, studies of multilingual aphasics are much more common. Clinicians have 
documented the peculiar phenomenon that an aphasic may be left with one language intact, 
or during, recovery, regain use of one language before another (Aglioti et aL, 1996). 
Considering the numerous studies comparing aphasics and schizophrenics, particularly since 
the mid-1970s, it is even more surprising that multilingualism is a topic that has received so 
litde attention in schizophrenia studies. I suggest that it is very a specific idea of the 
relationship between language and thought, and the relationship between cognition and 
communication, that drives the downplaying of studies of bilingualism in schizophrenia, but 
not in aphasia. For bilingual aphasics, different performances in different languages can 
simply be explained as a case of one route to expression being temporarily blocked (or cut 
off forever), resulting in pre-existing thoughts being channeled through the other available 
route - it poses litde challenge to orthodox linguisticS.65 If, however, the thoughts or their 
form are what is problematic in schizophrenia, how could they come out 'normal' in another 
language? Clearly, speaking in a language is not simply a case of thought expression or 
transference. One's thinking is intimately bound up in both the language one is spoken to, 
and the language one speaks. From the integrational and dialogic perspectives, the 
65 1bis is not to say that all research on aphasia relies on an orthodox account of what languages are and how 












thought/language divide melts away. If thought is achieved, in part, through communication, 
particularly the kind of cognition that goes on around conversation, then an inability to 
communicate successfully is an inability to achieve (distributed) cognition. Paradoxically then, 
speaking 'poorly' (In a second language) may aid both thinking and communication. 
Similarly, research on deaf schizophrenics does not garner a mention in any of the major 
reviews mentioned above. Admittedly, deafschizophrenics are a minority, and here again, the 
lack of hearing clinicians who can sign is a factor contributing towards the dearth of 
literature. However, as with writing, considering the spatial nature of sign language, one 
would imagine that research in this field would be extremely valuable in providing a measure 
of perspective to field dominated by speech-based linguistics (which in turn is itself biased 
towards a writing-based account of language). 
Unfortunately, existing research (Thacker, 1994, 2001; Trombetta et 01., 2001) seems to be 
concerned with demonstrating that the 'same' features are found in the speech of hearing as 
in the signing of deaf schizophrenics. The potential for a shift of focus that studies of deaf 
schizophrenics pose risks being obscured by their being made to fit within the existing 
categories, rather than allowing them to mount a challenge to the orthodox view. An 
integrational approach to sign language would steer away from superimposing upon it these 
pre-ordained linguistic categories. While I am not aware of a comprehensive integrational 
linguistic account of sign language, such an account would surely make use of some of 
Harris' (1995) insights (made within the context of writing) into the temporo-spatial realm of 
communication. 
5.5 Writing 
What should be clear from Chapter 3, is that there simply is no theory of schizophrenic 
writing. While the tenns 'schizophrenic language' and 'schizophrenic speech' have been used 
almost interchangeably over the last century (except where authors are making a point about 
a distinction between competence and performance - e.g. Schwartz [1982]), schizophrenic 
speech has almost exclusively provided the data for theories of schizophrenic language. And 
yet, schizophrenics' writing was described in the earliest literature. Kraepelin (1919) observed 












and noted schizophrenics' ''whimsical misuse of punctuation" (p.66), invented orthography, 
weird fonns, unusual pressure or speed. Bleuler (1950[1911]) described similar features 
(catatonics, for example "love to play with punctuation marks" [p.188]), and recorded 
instances of where patients could express themselves clearly in writing but not in speech, or 
VIce versa. 
To be sure, numerous studies have required that schizophrenic subjects write their response 
(e.g. paper and pencil tests), or the linguistic material they are being tested on is presented in 
written fonn, but that the written fonn is being used is almost never regarded as a significant 
feature of the test design. Part of the problem, if Harris (1995) is anything to go by, is that 
no suitable, systematic theory of 'normal' writing (as a means of communication 
independent of speech) exists. 
Both De lisi (2001) and Crow & Done (1997) make reference to studies which have 
involved writing; Crow doesn't emphasise writing's significance in any way, while De lisi 
puts superior performance in written tasks down to writing's lower demand on working 
memory. While that surely plays a role (speech is only retained in the memory for a few 
seconds, while writing 'lasts' beyond the communication event - Auer, 2009), it is fairly 
reckless to tidy away such findings without a thorough investigation. In addition, if one 
considers the supposed hemispheric division of the spatial and temporal characteristics of 
language, on which theories such as Crow's (1997) depend, that the temporo-spatial 
dimension of writing has not been considered significant enough to warrant special attention 
is indeed surprising. Predictably, an integrational approach would treat schizophrenic writing 
as a means of communication in its own right, using Harris' (1995) integrational account of 
writing as a starting point. 
5.6 Auditory hallucinations 
It is quite strange that current overviews of SLB do not include a discussion of auditory 
hallucinations. There is a tendency to treat 'hearing voices' as a completely separate 
phenomenon to disorganised speech. Perhaps this is pardy due to auditory hallucinations 
being a first-rank symptom, while disorganised speech is not. More than likely, it is also due 











linguistics. The main exception to this rule is Crow's theory which posits a similar and 
related cause behind disorganised speech, auditory hallucinations, and other delusions of 
thought. 
Auditory hallucinations and SLB have not always been regarded as such separate entities. 
Although McKenna (2007) treats discussions of FID and hallucinations as two distinct 
categories, he does make mention, unlike the reviews of SLB used in Chapter 3, that there 
are theories which characterise auditory hallucinations as a type of talking to oneself - some 
patients appear to be subvocalising what they report as auditory hallucination (m fact 
amplifying their subvocalisations in some cases reveals a two-way conversation between 
expressed speech and inner voices). However, these theories' failure to provide proof in the 
face of scientific experiments means that there "is a hint - no more - of a relationship with 
inner speech" (p.224) - a hint which most accounts of SLB simply choose to ignore. 
Another big hint, discussed above, are the findings based on multilingual schizophrenics, 
whose auditory hallucinations seem intimately related to the particular language they are 
speaking and/or are spoken to (e.g. Schaechter, 1968; Schoeman, 2008). 
If, as integrationallinguistics holds, thought is a form of self-communication, and (through 
its alignment with distributed cognition) speech is a form of distributed/socially achieved 
thought, it seems clear that from an integrational perspective, these two 'symptoms' of 
schizophrenia surely cannot be treated as wholly independent. To be sure, not all patients 
with FfD hallucinate, and vice versa, but that by and large these variables have not been 
controlled for in studies of schizophrenic disorganised speech is in itself problematic. In fact 
one very recent study illustrates just this: DeFreitas et al (2008) found that while "semantic 
dysfunction was significandy correlated with level of hallucinations" (p.307), no such 
relationship was established between semantic dysfunction and FID severity. 
An organisation like Intervoice66 (lntervoice, n.d.) is evidence that auditory hallucinations, at 
least for some people experiencing them, have meaning, and can even be construed in a 
66 Intervoice is an international organisation that provides support and a forum for voice hearers (this is not 
restricted to schizophrenics) - without assuming the experience is negative and needs to be solved with 











positive light. Jenkins (2004:36-38) tells of a voice-hearing psychologist whose copmg 
strategy is to engage with the voice as meaningful, in order to deal with the incongruity that 
it appears to be alien to herself, although she 'knows' otherwise. From an integrational 
proficiency point of view, for a voice hearer, the interaction may not be that different from 
conversation with another individual. In fact, as Thomas, Bracken & Leudar (2004) put it, 
such a so-called symptom "may better be understood as part of a series of processes that are 
reconstitutive of the self" (p.18). 
5.7 Metaphor 
Although the current mainstream (Anglo-American) approach does not place too much 
emphasis on schizophrenics' ability to cope with metaphorical versus literal language, both 
the former popularity of investigating schizophrenics' abilities to deal with figurative 
language (best illustrated in the preoccupations of the papers collected in Kasanin, 
1964a[1944]), and its decline, can be attributed in some measure to attitudes underpinned by 
the language myth. The common thread running through these theories is that 
schizophrenics tend to misinterpret metaphorical language literally. 
Metaphor, as we have seen in Chapter 2, poses a problem for fixed-code linguistics, and it is 
possible that this contributed to the decline in interest after linguistics became intimately 
involved in theories of psychotic language. That metaphor dominated the early years of 
research into schizophrenic was based on the underlying misconception that metaphor is a 
deviation from normal language use that requires specific abstract thinking abilities. 
Fallacious concepts of metaphor have been expressed in terms of information processing 
Qiteral meaning must be processed before metaphorical meaning can be accessed - e.g. 
Walsh, 2001), in single-word (m the context of a sentence) testing and the ''long tradition" of 
proverb testing (pavy, 1968:166), and in the treatment of the content of schizophrenic 
speech as delusional, by default ~.e. a belief that schizophrenics cannot handle metaphorical 
language implies that everything they say that is not literally true must therefore be delusional 











A more recent67 approach to this topic is the hypothesis that difficulty with metaphor is the 
result of impaired theory-of-mind ability (Brune & Bodenstein, 2005). Apart from the fact 
that integrationists do not endorse the TOM construct, this explanation relies on the notion 
of words having fixed meanings, and that to understand metaphor the hearer needs to realise 
(by being able to adequately form a representation of their mind) that the person using it 
does not intend the words to have their 'usual', literal meaning, but a 
special/ extended/ different one. This study does insightfully acknowledge that proverbs are 
not merely samples of metaphorical writing, but rather that they have a social function. 
Nevertheless, these continue to be treated as decontextualised samples. 
That so-called metaphorical language has a particular purpose in communication - the fact 
that metaphor is, according to Toolan "the name of a practice" (1996:56), and not a thing or 
a quality - has been overlooked. This is not to say that investigations of figurative language 
have no place in an integrational account of schizophrenic language; rather, it has been a 
case of barking up the wrong tree. If, as Toolan claims, metaphorical language is a risk-taking 
manoeuvre, there is reason to believe, for example (based on Rochester & Martin's [1979] 
findings), that non-thought-disordered schizophrenics would avoid using metaphorical 
constructions, or presuming that someone else was using them. Similarly, if metaphorical 
language has the potential of enhanced intimacy, there are perhaps legitimate reasons for 
some schizophrenics to avoid using metaphor, or perhaps, to use it a great deal. 
Interestingly, in one of the few approaches entertaining the possibility that schizophrenics 
may be using metaphor some of the time, and that their content may actually be of 
importance, Forrest (1968) relays authors Bruch & Palombo's findings that adult 
schizophrenics tend to make use of 
clusters of metaphors which derive their material from the topological 
relationships by which infants between the ages of eighteen months and two 
years must order space, being as they are ignorant of perspective and geometry. 
67 It would seem that the literal/metaphorical dichotomy still holds some interest for European scholars, 
considering the source of recent publications on this topic, e.g. Bergemann, It al (2008); Rapp, It at (2008); 











These relationships involve 'the properties of figures which are conserved 
through any deformation which maintains the singleness of the figure, namely 
relationships of closeness and distance, separation, sequence, continuity and 
enclosure.' [Bruch & Palombo, 1960, quoted in Forrest] In other words, these are 
qualities of travel, of mapping, of opening and closing and containing; and, in a 
less mathematical sense, of texture and the touch of surfaces. These are 
properties that one does not have to see to know. They cannot be known at a 
distance, but require palpation. [p.177] 
While I cannot verify this with corroborating evidence, such claims - for which an orthodox 
account of metaphor simply has no place - are surely of interest to integrational linguists, 
particularly within the context of what Lakoff & Johnson's (1999) embodied philosophy has 
to say about the intimate relationship between perception, metaphor and cognition, and 
Cowley'S (2004,2006) theory of human development. 
5.8 Meaning 
Questions like "Does this schizophrenic's utterance contain meaning?", or observations that 
the schizophrenic uses a known word but with a different/peculiar meaning to what it is 
assigned in that language, or speculation that it appears a word has become separated from 
its meaning within the schizophrenic's brain, only make sense within the framework of the 
language myth. To be sure, schizophrenics do appear to have difficulty with achieving 
meaning in communication, but that does not automatically validate the idea of a 
disintegrating mental dictionary. Such descriptions need to be seen for the metalinguistic 
attempts to make sense of the situation (on the part of the listener) they are. In addition, to 
speak of pragmatic difficulty or discourse disorder or contextual processing failure all still 
smack of some 'applied language centre' in the brain that has broken down. Crucially, it 
ignores the integrational linguistic/dialogistic insight that meaning is situationally and 
collaboratively achieved. It is a fundamental difficulty with meaning-making, not with 
decoding or encoding, that characterises SLB. 
While the characterisation of schizophrenia as a semiotic disorder (Harrod, 1986) has not 











'symbolic distortion', and a "retreat into a world of words" (Richman, 1968). 1bis, much like 
Freud's conception of the disease, gives the impression that the schizophrenic is in some 
sense operating purely at the second-order level of language championed by orthodox 
linguistics, and merely simulating68 language. Thus in these moments they embody Harris's 
'communicational cripple', who has a perfecdy intact mental dictionary and mental grammar 
book, and yet can't engage in the flow of communication that most humans find effordess. 
A more acerbic equation of Chomsky's theories with severe impairment is found in Chaika 
(1990): 
There is no context-free meaning. There is no context-free syntax. There is no 
meaningless generative cycle which produces an infinity of sentences. Actually, I 
should amend that last sentence. It seems to me that psychotic glossomania is 
the archetypal meaningless generative cycle which can be uttered as an infinite 
number of sentences. fp.101] 
Harrod's lone contribution to the language/thought debate that raged in the early 1980s 
could be revived within an integrationallinguistic account of SLB. There is no doubt that the 
schizophrenic may experience a shift in signification. Some report that in the prodromal 
phase 'everything seemed strange' (Covington, et aI., 2005) - apparendy neutral items or 
events took on special meaning. The schizophrenic is unwittingly creating signs in situations 
that having meaning only for them. Based on the 'other-orientation' that integrationists posit 
is necessary for communication, it is not hard to see how this could lead to delusions about 
some entity 'sending' messages to the schizophrenic (without invoking a TOM brain 
module). 
Many theories of SLB characterise the schizophrenic as being distracted by or preoccupied 
with one half of the biplanar sign (either sound/form or meaning - e.g. Chaika [1974]), or 
that he or she experiences a splitting of the sign (which in modern accounts is translated into 
hemisphere miscommunication - e.g. Crow, 1997); in integrational semiology, this makes no 
68 The notion of 'simulating language' was sparked by a quotation in Rochester & Martin (1979:179), where 












sense, since the sign only comes into existence within the situated communicational context. 
The schizophrenic who has difficulty communicating, fails to adequately create signs. With 
altered social cognition, other-orientedness, they are potentially impaired in their capacity to 
assign signhood, in the moment. Thus successful communication for the schizophrenic, as 
for the 'normal' speaker, does not rely on a static body of knowledge housed in the brain 
(forcing theories to account for why it is not always 'available'); it is a moment-to-moment 
integrational proficiency, and an interaction in which the healthy partner is also implicated. 
5.9 Context 
Although an awareness of the significance of context was apparent in the works of Kraepelin 
and Bleuler, it is only in recent years, after the lustre of Chomskyan linguistics had faded, 
that 'context' has reemerged in accounts of schizophrenic language behaviour. Few 
researchers of SLB would adhere to a stricdy context-neutral view of meaning. Being able to 
use and understand language appropriately in context - pragmatics - is often noted as 
something with which schizophrenics struggle. Nevertheless, the scriptist approach that 
allows utterances to be treated as decontextualised 'texts' contributes a version of context 
that is clearly separate from text, and is fixed in advance. 
While the usual approach is to simply note difficulties in context processing (as Kuperberg & 
Caplan [2003] do), Rochester & Martin (1979) evince a much more nuanced understanding 
of this entity. Firsdy, they make the contrary claim that "TD [thought disordered] speakers ... 
show a profound sensitivity to context" (p.187); however, miscommunication may result 
from what 'context' entails for the participant themselves. That is, 
the listener is continually evaluating the salience of participants, based on the 
context in which the discourse is occurring. But if context for normal speakers 
means primarily 'foregoing verbal context' and if for schizophrenic speakers it 
means 'nonverbal and verbal context,' then there may be many miscalculations of 
salience by normal listeners fp.173] 
In addition, "TD speakers," they tell us, "depend less on their own verbal context and more 











Toolan (1996) has made the integrational approach is clear - we cannot be too confident 
about the line between text and context. Such distinction cannot be given in advance. Thus 
what is salient as context is not a constant across situations. While they still reify context, the 
sensitivity displayed by Rochester & Martin is a good start. However, there is another 
dimension to context that is almost universally ignored by theorists of SLB: the gathering of 
linguistic data. 
Apart from the fact that the implied demands of the testing situation may elicit "irritability, 
frustration, defensiveness, which quickly leads to resistance" (Lorenz, 1968:37), or that from 
a behavioural point of view, it has been argued that when clinicians pay particular attention 
to feature of a schizophrenic's speech, they can end up reinforcing ~s behaviour (Staats, 
1968), whether interview or pen-and-paper test, the situation is always dialogic. Ultimately, 
there is no neutral testing ground. The dialogical nature of communication always implicates 
the researcher as within-context, even if they are analysing transcribed speech, and they have 
never met the patient on whose utterances the text is based. In this latter case, assessment is 
yet another communication situation, in which traces of the schizophrenic's speech activity 
are reintegrated as signs in the new context. 
Furthermore, tests geared towards measuring schizophrenic language often require that the 
schizophrenic treat language as a decontextualised entity. Thus in patients who are already 
having difficulty meaningfully integrating verbal activity in interaction, this surely would 
exacerbate the problem. In other cases, in order to allow for a long enough piece to 
transcribe, the speaker is not interrupted. To be sure, in such instances, the normal speaker 
may not make the same quantity of 'errors' of whatever type of being measured. But the 
testing situation itself is, in part, eliciting the problematic speech. Thus it is not generalisable 
to other contexts. 
Schegloff (2003), within the context of aphasia research, highlights this lack of awareness 
that the testing situation is a particular interaction in itself. 'In-frame' ('Please say as many 
words as you can think of beginning with the letter N.) and 'out-frame' ('Yes, you may go to 
the bathroom.,) utterances tend to be treated separately, by both tester and subject (even 











unrecognised that sustaining this separation, and the test itself, is an achievement on the part 
of the impaired person, and evidence of their 'pragmatic' ability (p.27). 
Swartz & Swartz (1987), in one of the few articles that look at metacommunication in 
psychotic individuals (their subject suffers from mania), provide a fascinating account that 
illustrates just how aware their subject is of the usual context of data collection - their 
psychotic patient attempts to take on the role of the interviewer, since they (one of the 
authors of the paper) are not performing in accordance with her expectation (the usual batch 
of questions). Her apparendy incoherent discourse is largely a metacommentary on the 
conversation in which she finds herself situated. I make no claim that all psychotic patients 
have this level of insight or awareness, merely that there is no a priori reason to assume that 
schizophrenics are not capable of engaging, if not wholly successfully, in the 
metacommunication that is an inherent, structure-giving feature of communication itself 
(what Taylor [1997] calls its 'exoskeleton,), that may well be apparent if one looks beyond 
'deficit'. 
A particularly vivid illustration of this is an anecdote originally reported by Kraepelin, and 
subsequendy analysed by Laing (1960[1975]),69 in which a young schizophrenic is brought in 
front of a group of medical students and asked a question, to which he responds with a 
barrage of utterances that Kraepelin judges to be pathological, while Laing interprets them as 
commentary on the bizarre form of communication (endless questions, instructions, but no 
real conversation) to which the mental patient is constandy exposed in the context of the 
asylum. An excerpt: 
When asked where he [the patient] is, he says, cy ou want to know that too? I tell 
you who is being measured and is measured and shall be measured. I know all 
that, and could tell you, but I do not want to.' When asked his name, he screams, 
'What is your name? What does he shut? He shuts his eyes. What does he hear? 
He does not understand; he understands not. How? Who? Where? When? What 
does he mean? When I tell him to look he does not look properly. You there, 











just look! What is it? What is the matter? Attend: he attends not. I say, what is it, 
then? Why do you give me no answer? Are you getting impudent again? ... fp.29] 
On an even broader scale, mainstream studies of schizophrenia largely ignore the context of 
culture.70 Invoking the cultural dimension of human and thus schizophrenic experience goes 
beyond the more banal observation that schizophrenic symptoms' 'content' differs from 
cultural context to cultural context, 71 or that in some cultures, seemingly schizophrenic 
symptoms are given special significance (Helman, 2001). Much more fundamentally, if, as 
Cowley (2004, 2006) maintains, one's embedding in culture is begun and sustained by joindy 
constructed activity (i.e. not passive), then any apparent disembedding must be joindy 
constructed too. However, there is no culture-neutral way of being human, whether 'sane' or 
'insane' - individuals may however find themselves "at the margins of culture, at the very 
edge of meaningful experience" Qenkins & Barrett, 2004:5). Although "the subjective 
experience of persons with schizophrenia is forged at the nexus of culture and agency, desire 
and attachment, none of which are annulled by disease process" Qenkins, 2004:30), the 
mainstream discourse on schizophrenia characterises schizophrenics as "livl.ing] in private 
worlds, largely cut off from culture and history" (Hoerl,2001:83). 
S.10 Interpersonal accounts 
The overwhelming focus on, and location of symptoms within the individual has all but 
obscured the role of 'normal' interlocutor in studies of SLB. Thus even a study like 
Rochester & Martin (1979), which aims to account for the normal listener's experience of 
schizophrenic speech, in practice attempts to remove the interlocutor from the equation as 
far as possible. "The modem preoccupation with individuality... is really just a fantasy, a 
form of self-delusion, since all individual expressions, achievements and freedoms depend 
primarily on social expressions, achievements and freedoms," Bums (2007:182) tells us. If 
these positive, supposedly individual characteristics are really social in nature, then it follows 
that so too are supposedly individual deficits and failures. This does amount to blaming the 
70 Just like 'a language', I use this tenn without the assumption that 'a culture' is a homogenous entity; rather, 
particularly on the smaller interpersonal scale, 'a' "culture may be contradictory, fragmented, contested, and 
politicized, rather than necessarily coherent or uniform" Oenkins & Barrett, 2004:5-6). 
71 For example, Roman Catholic schizophrenics from Northem Ireland are more likely to have delusions 












interlocutor for communication failure, but merely acknowledges that what poses as 
description of communicational behaviour in the individual is really culturally-infused 
metacommunicative interpretation. In psycholinguistic terms, the listener's confusion is put 
down to the schizophrenic's failure to edit. The integrationist is curious: why is it not as 
much a failure of repair on the listener's part? And is the listener not failing to anticipate 
something of the schizophrenic speaker (a skill which could be improved with familiarity and 
practice)? 
That schizophrenia, as a disorder characterised by altered subjectivity, and thus also by 
altered intCfSubjectivity,72 has by definition an interpersonal dimension to it is clearly not 
appreciated by current mainstream theories. Burns (2007:75) agrees: "Cartesian dualism is so 
pervasive in our psychiatric attitudes, language and culture that we are oblivious to the 
interpersonal, social and existential aspects of our patient's experience". Once-popular 
accounts that may have espoused such a view are lucky if they get a mention in modem 
mainstream reviews. Thus, Bateson's double-bind, Fromm-Reichman's schizophrenogenic 
mother, and Laing's theories of communication have all been summarily discarded. To be 
sure, many of their findings are unproven and unprovable, their methods generally 
unscientific (Frith & Johnstone, 2003), but this is partly the point; these theorists were 
touching on something quite fundamental that has been all but overlooked by the 
biomedical, individualised version of SLB - the clinician is the measuring tool. That 
'something' is partially captured by the long-documented 'praecox feeling' (Rumke, 1941 in 
Ungvari, et aJ., 1997), an uneasy feeling and lack of empathy produced in the clinician in the 
presence of a schizophrenic, and embodied by the 'inferential tradition' - whereby clinician's 
impressions are transformed into symptoms belonging to the patient (Rochester & Martin, 
1979:3) - that still characterises SLB theories, whether it is acknowledged or not. There is no 
neutral way of defining 'symptoms' of communication; they are always, already interpretation, 
infused with the trace of the clinician's participation. 
As Pavy (1968:176) predicted 40 years ago,73 the time has come to "account for the 
diagnostician'S perception and categorization of speech as it is to study the patient's 
72 See Jenkins's (2004:47) reference to Jessica Benjamin's work. 











production". Thanks to the involvement of the orthodox linguistics, theories like Sullivan's 
'consensual validation' (Kasanin, 1964c[1944]) - whereby communication is based on shared 
expectation, not necessarily knowledge - have had to wait for the wheel to be reinvented in 
order for their value to be recognised. Thus, an impression that it is as if their imaginary or 
internalised auditors are like themselves, and thus at odds with the real auditors 'out there' in 
the world (Forrest, 1968, discussing Sullivan's theory), has clear parallels with Frith's 
application of 'theory of mind' (McKenna, 2007), or Bums' (2007) 'social brain'; perhaps if 
psychiatry hadn't been mesmerised by codist approaches to language, these ideas would have 
come to the fore decades ago. 
From an integrational perspective, it is our sustained communication with others, an ability 
to integrate our activities with them (enabled by our genetically endowed human capacity for 
dialogue [Line11, 2005] or other-orientation [Toolan, 1996]) that upholds and reinforces our 
'languaging' ability - not the other way round. Gillet (2004:29), although not an integrationist, 
captures this sentiment quite poetically: 
Psychotics think and move in strange ways, sketching and filling in their 
perceptual worlds differendy from those of us who march to the beat of the 
shared cognitive drum. This difference alienates them from the rest of us, and-
they experience the confusion and distress of being apparendy abandoned in a 
world that has not only lost its familiarity but in which they are cast adrift from 
the guides that would normally sustain their participation in it. 
Furthermore, sensitivity to others, the sense that something may be 'not quite right', is part 
and parcel of our responsive 'languaging' interactions with others. Since integrationists 
define rationality in terms of the fit of behaviour (linguistic or not) with context, determining 
rationality or irrationality is very much a situated, interpersonal activity. 
5.11 Debate 
That the question 'is there a schizophrenic language?' was even treated seriously in the first 
half of the twentieth century is a result of the language myth. The reason for its largely 











"schizophrenic dictionary" (Forrest, 1968:154). TIlls hasn't stopped a few lone voices 
attempting to argue the case (e.g., Wolcott, 1974; Wr6be11990). The more sustained debate 
has focused on whether there is something unique about the way schizophrenics speak, and 
whether this is a feature of their speech or their thought. While McKenna dismisses much of 
this debate due to its having "revolved around the fine points of linguistic theory" 
(2007:241), Rochester & Martin (1979) see this not as grounds for dismissal, but a crucial 
point worthy of recognition. 74 On this, the integrationist couldn't agree more; however, their 
ultimate goal reveals them to still be mired in the segregationist mindset. By expanding the 
definition of language (in an attempt to 'stay in the game' - see Martin [1982]), they tack on 
another level of rule-based behaviour (discourse/pragmatics), but keep the overall orthodox 
abstraction intact, ultimately violating the integrationist 'principle of non-
compartmentalisation' which claims any separation between linguistic knowledge and 
pragmatic knowledge is artificial.75 
The 'fine points of linguistic theory' around which the debate has centred are entirely the 
product of the language myth, the second-order abstractions from actual language 
experience. Within the context of integrational linguistics, and its conception of what a 
language is and how communication happens, the endless back-and-forth distraction of 
attempting to classify SLB as evidence of a speech disorder, thought disorder, semiotic 
disorder, or information-processing disorder, to name a few, fades into insignificance. Rather 
than quibbling about labels and levels, what is of significance is to give an account of the 
actual lay language user's (both normal and schizophrenic) experience - their first-order 
reality. 
5.12 Conclusion 
From the integrationallinguistic perspective, some of the approaches that have in the past, 
or still do dominate mainstream research on SLB, are unthinkable. To attempt to explain a 
disintegration within an individual, and of their connections to society and environment, by 
starting with a model that is already segregated, disintegrated, is absurd. In addition, some 
74 See quotation on pages 126-127 above. 












approaches that have not been given time of day by the mainstream approach hold interest 
for integrationists, particularly in the potential they have for showing up why the orthodox 
account is flawed. 
The now long-standing tradition of comparing schizophrenics to aphasics has an added 
dimension of insight to offer, in the recent publication of a Conversation Analysis approach 
to aphasia (Goodwin, 2003a). Taking its cue from such work, an integrational approach 
would balance the prevailing biomedical view with the added interpersonal and 
environmental dimension. But, by its very nature, integrationism doesn't see these as three 
separate categories, but that they are intrinsically interwoven - in fact to treat them as 
separate makes no sense; it denies their very nature informed by the fact that bodies, brains, 
and world have co-evolved. 
It would pay real attention to lay expenence of the schizophrenic and the normal 
interlocutor, their metacommunicative strategies at achieving meaning, and not privilege 
orthodox linguistic theories' versions of events. While it is hardly noticeable in the 
mainstream literature, schizophrenics can and do think and talk about their experiences of 
communication. Estroff (2004) gives an uncompromising account of how keenly aware 
schizophrenics are that not only are they not understood, they are not listened to; their 
experience is completely disregarded. 76 More than that, "the suffering of persons with 
schizophrenia is substantially constituted by others' ... cultural ambivalence and reluctance 
to grant them full 'human' status" Oenkins, 2004:43). It is here that long-since-discarded 
interpersonal theories like those of R.D. Laing could be revived - without conceding a 
wholesale acceptance of his views. 
That an integrational account of psychotic language behaviour is overdue is not merely being 
argued for the benefit of insight in psychiatry. Integrationallinguistics itself has to be able to 
give an account of all language behaviour. It cannot pre-classify rational and irrational speech 
on the basis of diagnosis. Rationality 'exists' (or rather, is joindy constructed in an encultured 
way) from moment to moment, and a diagnosis or label like 'schizophrenic' should not be 
76 Also see Jenkins's anecdote (2004:43) regarding a schizophrenic who declares with relief that the 











used as invisible parentheses around every aspect of such an individual's language behaviour. 
To do this, Schegloff (2003) says, is to dismiss these individuals as little else that (impaired) 
language users, and not "actors with things to do, lives to live, things to give and to request 
and to tell and to promise, memories to share and call upon in getting their interactional 
business done, with language among the resources to do those things" (p.44). Thus we 
should recognise the role that both researchers' and lay interlocutors' metalinguistic 
strategies towards schizophrenics' language behaviour play in determining whether they are 












If there is one word that summarises schizophrenia, it is 'strangeness', both for nonnal 
speakers encountering schizophrenics, and the experience of schizophrenics themselves. 
Schizophrenia casts into sharp relief much of the daily experience 'normals' take for granted. 
TIlls strangeness has been the subject of much myth and misunderstanding over the last 
century, thus this thesis began with an attempt to clarify what exacdy schizophrenia is and is 
not. What was clear from Chapter 1 is that schizophrenia is by no means a homogenous 
entity. 
Schizophrenia being the mainstay of psychiatry, conceptions of the disease have been shaped 
by the political and theoretical debates that have driven the field. While theories have come 
and gone, one feature or symptom of the disease that has consistendy been noted since its 
inception is that schizophrenics speak strangely, at least, some schizophrenics, some of the 
time. Naturally it is this feature that is of interest to the linguist. 
But 'the linguist' has turned out to be someone who is thoroughly blinded by what 
integrationallinguistics call 'the language myth' - age-old assumptions about what languages 
are and how they work which are clung to in the face of compelling evidence to the contrary. 
. Chapter 2 oudined some of this evidence by detailing the main principles and standpoints 
espoused by a critically minded linguistics - integrationism, complemented by the closely 
related dialogic approach - which opposes the orthodox tradition. 
In Chapter 3, I provided evidence that the myths of orthodox linguistics dominate current 
mainstream research in the field, and serve to reinforce the joint assumptions about 
languages and minds on which linguistics and psychiatry are based. Chapter 4 revealed that 
current overviews of the topic tend to airbrush out significant chapters in the history of 
research into SLB, particularly those theories which tend towards interpersonal accounts of 
schizophrenia. 
Finally, in Chapter 5, I demonstrated just why the orthodox linguistic approach fails to truly 











sketched briefly the potential integrational linguistic response. This sketch as a whole is a 
suggestion for future research. More specifically, future research needs to recognise that 
communication is an ongoing, endless activity between and within humans using the 
resources at their disposal. Metacommunicationally, the non-schizophrenic ~ay or 
professional) potentially stymies schizophrenics' attempts at making sense before they even 
start. The received, commonsense non-sense about language that has prevailed in studies of 
schizophrenic language behaviour needs to be replaced by an account that truly makes sense 
of the first-order experience of both schizophrenics and their normal interlocutors in 
communication interactions, by taking into account the ever-present second-order 
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